

**Report on the talks of the Hungarian party and government delegation in Moscow
between 6-12 November 1964,
(November 16, 1964)**

TOP SECRET!

I.

1. On 29 October 1964, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China informed the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that on the occasion of the 47th anniversary of the Great October Revolution they would be happy to send a party and government delegation to Moscow headed by Comrade Chou En-lai. The CCP suggested that on this occasion the CPSU should invite party and government delegations from all socialist countries. On the Chinese side it was indicated that they did not consider Yugoslavia a socialist country.

After consulting the sister-parties of European socialist countries, including the HSWP CC, the CPSU CC declared that in theory they supported the suggestion. On the Soviet side, they would like to invite Yugoslavia, but they would not send an invitation to Albania.

In their reply, the HSWP CC informed the CPSU CC that they agreed with the idea of invitation and meeting. They suggested that the CPSU CC should send letters of invitation both to Yugoslavia and Albania. Our Central Committee recommended that the delegations should be headed by PC-members and vice-premiers, and that the delegations should not make speeches at the Moscow celebrations.

[...]

12. Concerning the conference with the representatives of the CCP, Comrade Kádár stated that not much was to be expected of the present talks. No one has been prepared for the talks - except, maybe, for the Chinese. It will not be easy to coexist with the Chinese even after the 14 October. Now it seems to them that the situation is favorable. It would be right to use the situation to put an end to the open polemics. In our opinion we can expect a long discussion, but it is our general and common interest that these discussions should be different from earlier ones. This is in the interest of both the Chinese and us. The Chinese position does not seem to be so simple either. If they want to make their positions more realistic, we should not throw difficulties in the way. For some time the achieved de facto cease-fire should be maintained.

The date of 15 December should not be regarded superstitiously [sic!], it is not worth making a question of principle out of the day. The Soviet leadership may feel free to allege as a reason that among the new circumstances they have a lot of tasks, so the preliminary conference could be postponed to another time.

The present trip of Chou En-lai and his comrades also provides an opportunity for the delegation of the CPSU to visit Beijing.

Comrade Brezhnev said they had reviewed their line of direction concerning the questions of the international communist movement after the CC session and had come to the conclusion that they had had the right position concerning all basic questions earlier as well, still they wanted to find some way to solve the questions. Without any theoretical concessions, they should carry on talks with the leaders of the CCP.

Comrade Gomulka also explained to the Soviet leaders that they should carry on talks with the Chinese, as a nation of 650 million people was concerned and ten years later the Chinese leaders would probably have a different position concerning a set of questions.

Concerning the talks carried on with the CCP delegation, Comrade Brezhnev and later Comrade Andropov gave the following information:

At the first meeting of 9 November, Chou En-lai and his comrades gave voice to their complaints. They criticized that, at the reception of 7 November, when clinking glasses with Comrade Chou En-lai, Marshal Malinovsky said unity was necessary and this unity should not be prevented by either Khrushchev or Mao Tse-tung. From this, Comrade Chou En-lai concluded that the Presidium of the CPSU did not want unity as they were insulting Comrade Mao Tse-tung. According to Soviet evaluation, the essence of this position of grievance was preliminary action of the blackmail type.

At the second meeting of 10 November, which was requested by the Chinese delegation, the Soviet comrades asked Comrade Chou En-lai what the Chinese party thought of further developments in the relations between the two sister-parties. Comrade Chou En-lai declared that their delegation arrived with empty pockets, they had no specific suggestions. As a reply, the Soviet comrades submitted two proposals: a) They should put an end to public controversy; b) The CCP should also participate in the preparation for the general conference. To make it easier, they could discuss with the other parties the postponement of the preliminary conference summoned for 15 December for 4-6 weeks. The conference could also be called a consultative conference.

As for putting an end to the open controversy, the representatives of the CCP avoided giving a straightforward reply. Concerning the preliminary conference, they declared they were not going to attend it as it had been dictated by Khrushchev and they would not bow to Khrushchev's dictate. The Soviet comrades emphasized that the summoning of the Editorial Board and of the great conference was not Khrushchev's dictate but the joint resolution of all sister-parties.

Chou En-lai and his comrades thought that only 13 out of the 26 parties approved of the idea of participation in the preliminary conference and they were surprised that already 19 parties had taken their stand in favor of the preliminary conference.

Chou En-lai and his comrades requested more precise information concerning the causes of Comrade Khrushchev's dismissal. They stated they did not believe that the dismissal had exclusively internal causes. They thought that Comrade Khrushchev's dismissal was bound to change the political line of direction as well.

At the third meeting of 11 November, Comrade Chou En-lai declared that they had come to Moscow having the intention of the consolidation of unity, because they had presumed that a new situation had occurred. The aim of their Moscow trip was to clarify the new situation, They were unhappy to find that there was no new situation, because the CPSU had not changed their earlier policy. This is proved by Comrade Brezhnev's speech of 6 November, Comrade Malinovsky's statement, the CPSU's insistence on summoning the Editorial Board and holding the conference and also by Comrade Mikoyan's declaration during the meeting according to which, concerning disputed ideological questions and the basic issues of international politics, the Central Committee and the Presidium of the CPSU and Comrade Khrushchev had the same position.

During the discussions, the representatives of the CCP stated: if the new leaders of the CPSU want to pursue the old policy, "they will also be dismissed". According to Chou En-lai and his comrades, unity may become consolidated only if the CPSU changes its political line of direction. On the Soviet side they said that the Soviet party had the same right to demand changes in the policy of the Chinese party, but under such conditions it was impossible to achieve any rapprochement. The Soviet comrades declared they were ready to carry on genuine discussions concerning the question of policy. Comrade Chou En-lai said they did not have the authorization to carry on genuine talks. He stressed that they were not going to participate at the international conference and they were not going to put an end to the open controversy until the CPSU changed its own policy.

At the end of this meeting, the Soviet representatives said: they were sad a) that the representatives of the CCP did not discuss the genuine questions of policy; b) that the CCP

was not willing to give up open controversy; c) that the CCP refused participation at the international conference. For all this the CCP had to take the responsibility. On the Soviet side, they suggested that the Chinese comrades should repeatedly review their position.

According to the Soviet comrades, the Moscow trip of Chou En-lai and his comrades was exploratory. The Chinese comrades presumed that the CPSU would change its policy and on the Chinese side, they wanted to ascertain in what direction and to what extent it was taking place.

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