

## DOCUMENT NO. 1

### **Study Prepared for U.S. Army Intelligence, “Hungary: Resistance Activities and Potentials,” January 1956**

*This detailed study, prepared for the U.S. Army several months before the Hungarian uprising, examines Hungary “as a potential theater for Special Forces operations.” It not only analyzes the level and nature of dissidence in the country, but considers geographical and other factors in determining whether Hungary represents a suitable target for direct U.S. action. One remarkable feature of the report is a painstaking survey of forced labor camps and prisons (197 are listed) complete with a map indicating locations.*

*The report was one of a series of studies of conditions in Warsaw Pact countries conducted during the 1950s (and beyond), and provides evidence of the U.S. military’s active search for ways to exploit the vulnerabilities of regimes in Eastern Europe. In this case, however, the authors found that “Hungary is singularly unpromising” as a potential special operations area. Geographic obstacles--the country is described as mostly “a flat plain” offering “few evasion possibilities”--and the “notably” low level of active resistance compared with other East European countries are the main reasons given. Superpower politics aside, there were clearly very practical considerations preventing an American military or paramilitary operation in Hungary in 1956.*

*On the other hand, the report also notes the relatively “widespread, intense, and current” nature of passive resistance in the country, and points to the prospect that “what is now dissidence may be converted into active resistance with the proper leadership.” As it happened, this view mirrored the thinking of President Eisenhower and his close advisers, although they drew very different conclusions about the desirability of tapping reservoirs of popular discontent. Far from contemplating intervention in Hungary during the uprising, Eisenhower worried instead about inflaming the situation, possibly to the point of general war with the Soviet Union.*

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### **Hungary: Resistance Activities and Potentials (C)<sup>1</sup>**

Project No. 9570

Information Cut-Off  
5 January 1956

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<sup>11</sup> This study was prepared by an external research agency: (The) Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., research project, under contract to G2, Department of the Army, and does not necessarily represent the official views of ACSI, D/A. [Footnote in original.]

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<sup>2</sup> Since the document is too lengthy to include in its entirety in this volume, the Table of Contents has been provided for the information of the reader. Page numbers listed correspond to pages in the original document.

<sup>3</sup> Not reprinted here.

<sup>4</sup> Not reprinted here.

## Conclusions

### I. Purpose of Report

To examine Hungary as a potential theater for Special Forces operations and to analyze those resistance, sociological and geographical factors which pertain to Special Forces planning.

1. Sources of dissidence and resistance potential in Hungary.
2. Major dissident elements.
3. Extent and currency of passive resistance.
4. Extent and currency of partisan resistance activity.
5. Extent and currency of underground resistance activity.
6. Suitability of Hungary for guerilla-type activities.
7. Localities of greatest dissidence and resistance.

### II. Scope

This report goes beyond, and in some respects is less than, a supplementary to the general survey of the primary sociological characteristics and institutions of the people of Hungary which was presented in the Georgetown study, Resistance Potentials: Hungary, November 23, 1953. It is broader in scope because it will be principally guided by the requirements of Special Forces; it is less than a supplementary because it omits several sections which were integral parts of the old Resistance Potentials outline. The objective of this report is to analyze, chiefly in light of recent available information, those factors relating to Special Forces interests which have not been fully treated elsewhere. The geographical suitability of Hungary for Special Forces operations is analyzed to the extent that these operations require a theater which provides places of refuge and/or bases of operations, places of concealment from observation and where pursuit is difficult. Because of their accessibility and economic and strategic importance, the railroads in Hungary stand out as the most notable Special Forces targets. However, because of various limitations, no attempt has been made to formulate a list of such targets.

The report undertakes to synthesize existing finished intelligence. The chapters in the original Georgetown report dealing with sociological and resistance factors relevant to Special Forces operations have been brought up to date. G-2 Project 6550 and appropriate NIS sections are the major source of information for the brief analysis of areas geographically suitable for Special Forces operations. G-2 files of resistance incidents in Hungary (maintained in Eurasian Branch), a summary translation of items appearing in Magyarorszagi Hírek (1954-55) which indicate dissidence and resistance (provided by Air Information Division), and recent G-2, CIA, and Department of State intelligence reports, have been employed for measuring the degree of dissidence and resistance potential which exists in Hungary. Throughout consideration was given to the requirement that no unnecessary duplication occur of other intelligence studies on Hungary, such as G-2 Project 6550 and NIS sections.

### III. Factors Bearing Directly Upon the Conclusions

Viewed as a potential theater of Special Forces operations, Hungary is singularly unpromising. The geography of the country is forbidding: in view of the fact that most of

Hungary is a flat plain, there are few evasion possibilities and the selection of Special Forces operational areas is consequently quite limited. Active resistance, of both the partisan and underground variety, has been notably less than in the other European satellites. Special Forces planners who would require the operational conditions of suitable terrain in proximity to appropriate targets, favorable resistance and sociological factors, and the absence of security forces, will find a very small area of selection in Hungary.

Nevertheless, Hungary must not be discounted in Special Forces planning. It may be argued that in no other European satellite is passive resistance so widespread, intense, and current. The conclusions which follow suggest that what is now dissidence may be converted into active resistance with the proper leadership. If the objective of Special Forces is to rally dissident elements in active opposition to the regime, the possibilities of success are favorable, at least in some localities and particularly among some elements of the population. Furthermore, hot war conditions may radically change the resistance picture and other actors related to the feasibility of Special Forces operations.

#### IV. Conclusions

1. Theoretically and practically Communism is the very antithesis of Hungarian nationalism which, on its positive side, is Christian and pro-Western. In international and national politics, in its agricultural policy of collectivization, in its program of industrialization, in its policy of Sovietization, in its persecution of religion, its regimentation of workers and widespread use of forced labor, the Communist regime has completely thwarted Hungarian nationalism and provided all elements of the population with numerous reasons for being dissident.

2. Dissidence and resistance potential appear to be strongest among peasants, whose continuing opposition has substantially contributed to the failure of the regime's agricultural program; youth, whose cynicism and apathy has caused growing concern in Communist circles; industrial workers, whose disillusionment is widespread; and the Roman Catholic clergy, the majority of whom have not joined the regime-inspired "peace priest" movement and are respected by a large segment of the population.

3. Passive resistance is perhaps more common in Hungary than in any other European satellite. There are indications that this kind of resistance has grown in intensity since the Communist coup in 1948. The abandonment of the "new course" in early 1955 was partially responsible for this growth, and the predictable failure of the regime to achieve economic stability under a stricter program will probably continue to stimulate it.

4. Partisan activity during World War II was minor and probably consisted of little more than a few feats of individual heroism. Incomplete and poorly authenticated reports of partisan bands have placed them in those few areas of Hungary where the topography provided some possibilities of cover and concealment. There is no evidence that any armed partisans in Hungary endured for any length of time, and some of those reported may have consisted entirely of criminals and army deserters. There is no evidence of any current partisan activity in Hungary.

5. An analysis of the available information leads to the conclusion that underground activity of the early postwar period was poorly organized and haphazard. Further, there is evidence that the Communist regime itself either sponsored some of the organizations reported in order to entrap disloyal persons or invented them for the purpose of building up a case against

individuals whose removal from positions of public influence was desirable. It is possible that remnants of underground groups currently exist, and are responsible for occasional acts of resistance. More probable, however, is the conclusion that current reports of underground activity are an expression of hope rather than of fact.

6. There are few areas in Hungary in which the terrain affords possibilities of cover and concealment. The forests in these areas are deciduous and provide only limited concealment during the winter months. Of the seven geographically feasible areas listed in this report at least three--the Bakony Forest, and the Pilis and Borzsony ranges--must be ruled out because they either coincide with, or are very proximate to, closely guarded summer training and maneuver areas of the Hungarian Army. The Bukh [Bükk], Matra and Hegyalja ranges and the Meksec [Sic: Mecsek] Hills appear to provide limited possibilities for successful guerilla-type operations.

7. The resistance picture in Hungary is such as to permit only questionable generalizations about the comparative intensity of peasant and worker resistance. Apart from reports of resistance incidents which may serve as a reliable index of current local dissidence, there is no feasible method of estimating resistance potential in various parts of the country.

### Hungary: Resistance Potentials and Activities

#### A. Dissidence in Hungary

Dissidence,<sup>5</sup> a state of mind involving discontent or disaffection with the regime, is widespread in Hungary. By its very nature unorganized, it is not unified by any institutions such as church or political party. Though it is widespread--in 1954, an estimate placed the regime's ideologically convinced popular support at about 10 percent<sup>6</sup>--and hampers the efficiency of the Communist regime, it does not constitute an immediate threat to its security. The factors productive of dissidence and resistance potential spring mainly from the sociological characteristics of the people, and the measure taken by the Communist regime in opposition to them. Every vulnerability in the Communist system tends to generate dissidence; every passing day, without the hope of outside help, tends to diminish it.

#### 1. Sources of Dissidence

Hungarian nationalism is anti-Slav, anti-Rumanian, anti-Czechoslovakian, anti-Semitic, and anti-Communist. On the positive side it is Christian, pro-German (as the lesser of two evils), and pro-Western, consisting of a deeply ingrained sense of the historic role of Hungary as a Christian nation and an outpost of Western civilization and culture. Although many fundamental and largely irreconcilable differences remain between Hungarian mentality and German character, the cultural affinity of the two peoples are based on a common Western heritage. Magyars bear a deep-rooted resentment toward the concept of Slavic supremacy. Their animosity toward Rumania and Czechoslovakia is an expression of revisionist ambition--to

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<sup>5</sup> Definitions of dissidence and resistance are taken from Resistance Intelligence Report, RIR-1, July 20, 1954, Anti-Communist Resistance Activities and Potentials in Poland, prepared by the Resistance Intelligence Committee--approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee (SECRET). [Footnote in original.]

<sup>6</sup> Dept. of State, Psychological Intelligence Digest, II/14, July 15, 1954 (S). [Footnote in original.]

regain some of the territories lost to these countries by the World War II settlement, ratified by the Treaty of Trianon.<sup>7</sup> In contrast with some of the other satellites, Hungary has no territorial issues to settle with Germany. Because Communism is diametrically opposed to each element of Hungarian nationalism its acceptance involves a complete rejection of the latter. That Hungarians realize this can be presumed in view of their memory of the short-lived Bela Kun government of 1919<sup>8</sup> and their current experience under a Communist regime. The Sovietization of Hungarian society and culture, the rejection of Hungarian revisionist ambitions, the disproportionate number of Jews in high official positions, the savage attempts to collectivize the peasants, and the persecution of religion are forceful illustrations that Communism is the very antithesis of Hungarian nationalism.

On the reasonable assumption that the majority of Hungarians retain their nationalistic outlook and sociological characteristics, the following measures and policies implemented by the Communist regime are productive of dissidence and resistance potential:

- a. After World War II Hungarian revisionist ambitions were completely thwarted. Whereas Hungary suffered losses of both territory and people, receiving no compensation whatsoever, Poland was granted administration of the so-called "Recovered Territories"; Northern Transylvania, which had been ceded to Hungary August 30, 1940, was returned to Rumania; Czechoslovakia received the Teschen area.
- b. Although the experience of Hungarians with multi-party democracy in the inter-war years was very limited, the elections of 1945 and 1947 gave strong endorsement to parties representing democratic politics. The suppression of the multi-party system and the tyrannical Communist domination of every aspect of political life have intensified the antipathy of politically-conscious Hungarians.
- c. The following measures taken by the Communist regime in the implementation of its agricultural policies have caused widespread discontent among Hungarian peasants, who in 1949 comprised nearly 50 percent of the total population:<sup>9</sup>
  - (1) collectivization, with its pressures against the peasants;
  - (2) the gradual but constant abrogation of the Land Reform Act of 1945;
  - (3) the transfer of agricultural laborers into industry, contrary to the peasants' traditional dislike of industrial work, and which has deprived many independent peasants of the normal supply of farm labor;
  - (4) the quota delivery system, under which large portions of crops are sold to the state at low fixed prices;

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<sup>7</sup> The Treaty of Trianon, in which Hungary lost two-thirds of its former territory, was part of the settlement of World War I.

<sup>8</sup> The Hungarian Soviet Republic (Tanácsköztársaság) was established by a coup on March 21, 1919, after the merger of the Hungarian Party of Communists and the Hungarian Social Democratic Party. Although, formally, the head of the government was the Social Democrat Sándor Garbai, real power was in the hands of the communist, Béla Kun, who was commissar for foreign affairs. The "Red terror" and collectivization of land soon made the Soviet Republic unpopular, and by August 2 it was overthrown through a combination of internal counterrevolution and foreign intervention.

<sup>9</sup> According to Hungarian official statistics, 40 percent of the total population of 9,750,000 in June were urban residents and 60 percent, rural residents. (Free Europe Committee, News From Behind the Iron Curtain (hereafter referred to as NBIC), May 1955). [Footnote in original.]

- (5) heavy taxation and the withholding from independent peasants of necessary supplies of seed, fertilizer, machinery, and other essentials;
- (6) restrictions on freedom of action of peasants and their frequent intimidation by Communist officials.

Since the abandonment of the “new course” the regime has renewed its program of collectivization. In an article published in the Cominform journal (the official organ of the East European Communist parties) in September 1955, Janos Matolcsi,<sup>10</sup> now Minister of Agriculture, stated the Hungarian government aims at the socialization of 50 percent of the crop area by 1960.<sup>11</sup> According to Matolcsi, 43,000 new members were brought into the collectives since June 1955, and the total number of such farms now stands at 4,600. Although the collectivization goal is still fairly modest, the outlook for the private farmer is bleak. He is still being courted by the regime with promises of material aid, but it is made abundantly clear that the reason for this is simply that he and his fellows still farm 70 percent of the arable land and Hungary must have food. If the drive for more collectives is successful, the private farmer knows that he will become an ever less important member of the community, and that his treatment by the regime will deteriorate to the same degree.<sup>12</sup> Meanwhile, in view of his rather open resistance to the regime, the private farmer must be kept under constant surveillance.<sup>13</sup>

- d. The Communist program of industrialization has been carried out with little regard for the welfare or desires of the Hungarian people. The industrial labor force has been expanded from a pre-war figure of about 300,000 to a total of approximately 1,000,000. Additional workers have been drawn from the peasantry, the former middle class, and the female and child population. With the exception of a few favored groups, industrial workers have suffered a marked reduction in their standard of living. The spectre of unemployment raised by large-scale layoffs in August and September 1954 so intensified the negative attitude of the population that the regime was forced to announce, in the wake of dismissals, apparently unplanned pension increases and emergency measures to aid the employed.<sup>14</sup>
- e. Most independent craftsmen and merchants have been forced out of business. Nationalized domestic commerce has not fulfilled the needs of the people, and the introduction of inferior equipment and machinery of Soviet manufacture into Hungarian industries has caused many breakdowns.
- f. The Communists have assumed control of all education in Hungary. Academic freedom has been abolished, textbooks have been rewritten from the Soviet point of view, and a rigid system of state control has been introduced at every level. Teachers

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<sup>10</sup> János Matolcsi was a member of the HWP CC from 1951-1956, CC Secretary beginning 1953 and Minister of Agriculture from November 1955 to October 25, 1956.

<sup>11</sup> New York Times, September 20, 1955; Dept. of State, OIR, Soviet Affairs, April 1955 and July 1955 (S). [Footnote in original.]

<sup>12</sup> Dept. of State, OIR, IB No. 1794, June 16, 1955 (OUO); The Economist, June 18, 1955. [Footnote in original.]

<sup>13</sup> CIA, Current Intelligence Digest, OCI 0011/55, January 14, 1955, ID 0117305 (C). [Footnote in original.]

<sup>14</sup> Dept. of State, IR No. 6771, December 14, 1954 (S); IR No. 6853, February 1, 1955 (S). [Footnote in original.]

- of elementary and advanced schools are under close supervision of the government, and Party teachers who failed to follow Communist ideology have been dismissed. Students applying for a university education must satisfy Communist standards of loyalty.
- g. The Sovietization of Hungarian culture has been relentlessly promoted on all fronts. Hungary is represented as a junior partner in the Pan-Slavic movement. The Russian language is compulsorily taught in the schools and the history textbooks are being re-written to show that Hungary is a natural and traditional ally of the Soviet Union.
  - h. Apart from the Land Reform Laws of 1945 which provided for the nationalization of all landed properties of the churches exceeding 100 hold (approximately 141 acres) and may have enjoyed popular support, the Communist regime has carried on a steady campaign against religious institutions in Hungary. Among the measures enacted against the various churches are the following:
    - (1) The privilege of clergymen to serve in the ranks in the military service was abolished.
    - (2) The Jewish denominational organizations were deprived of their autonomy when their officers, previously elective, were made subject to appointment by the government. At the same time two of the Jewish denominational organizations were merged by decree.
    - (3) Several laws and decrees were issued which deprived the churches of their schools and progressively restricted religious instruction in schools until it was all but abolished.
    - (4) A large number of national and local charitable, cultural, and economic associations under religious auspices were dissolved by the Ministry of Interior.
    - (5) Many ecclesiastical holidays were declared regular workdays.
    - (6) In violation of a previous agreement between the churches and the regime, the clergy were forced to take an oath of loyalty to the government.
    - (7) Most Roman Catholic religious orders were disbanded and their monasteries confiscated. Only the Franciscan, Benedictine, and Piarist orders were spared and are currently permitted to conduct two high schools each.<sup>15</sup>
    - (8) The appointment of bishops and prelates was made subject to government approval with retroactive effect.
    - (9) A “Movement of Peace Priests” has been developed by the Communists in order to split the unity of the Roman Catholic Church.

In addition to these measures, which in reality provide only the legal framework for the destruction of the churches, atheist propaganda, intense police terrorism, and brutal treatment of the clergy provide the most impressive evidence of the intentions of the regime. People who have continued to practice their religion have been discriminated against, and it was apparently common knowledge in some areas that regular church attendance could cause loss of employment.<sup>16</sup>

The Roman Catholic Church, of which approximately 70 percent of the population are members, has been a primary target of the regime. The arrest and trial of Cardinal Mindszenty, Primate of Hungary, was perhaps productive of more dissidence and resistance potential than any other single action of the regime. The “peace priest”

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<sup>15</sup> New York Times, November 2, 1955. [Footnote in original.]

<sup>16</sup> JIC, USFA, March 12, 1955 (DOI: 1953), Eval: F-None (C). [Footnote in original.]

movement has apparently failed to achieve its objective and is regarded with suspicion by the majority of the people. During the “new course” the campaign against the Catholic Church was suspended. Radio Vatican stated that in the 18 months of Imre Nagy’s government religion in Hungary enjoyed an almost privileged position, and that celebrations of the Marian Year, the normal exercise of pastoral functions, and other imposing privileges granted to the Church had quieted the minds of the people.<sup>17</sup> The dismissal of Nagy and the abandonment of the “new course” have been followed by an intensification of the campaign against the Catholic Church. According to Radio Vatican, as soon as the new Premier, Hegedus, took office, the secret police resumed close watch on the churches, bishops’ palaces, priests and Catholic lay leaders.<sup>18</sup> The announced release of Cardinal Mindszenty, and the reportedly imminent release of Archbishop Groesz [Grösz] and other clergymen, may signify another pause in the campaign against the Church. Recent reports of a new program of so-called cooperation between Church and State--the people being urged to believe in God and go to church--indicate a more lenient attitude.<sup>19</sup> At best, however, these are only tactical maneuvers and most probably are recognized as such by the Hungarian people.

- i. General labor restrictions apply to every worker in Hungary. Prohibitions against leaving one’s job, rules concerning work performance, and a carefully detailed system of disciplinary regulations, hem in the worker and subordinate him to Communist economic plans. Some of the specific forms of the coercion of free labor are:<sup>20</sup>
  - (1) Youth Brigades, organized and administered by the Communist Working Youth Association (DISZ), for work during summer vacations. The fact that scholarships and even the individual’s school record depend upon his cooperation in this regard belie the so-called “voluntary” nature of this work. Youth brigades have been reported at Kolocsa-Baja, Kazincbarcika, and other places.
  - (2) The assignment of graduating students and technical personnel to work designated by the state.
  - (3) Forced labor “on the job.” This is a marginal case between free and forced labor and it applies to individuals sentenced to “corrective-educative” labor. The worker is generally left on his job but is fined from 10 to 25 percent of his wages. “On-the-job” forced labor has been reported from Hodmezovasarhely and other places.
- j. Special restrictions have been imposed on many persons whose loyalty to the regime has been questioned. These restrictions amount to forced labor, of which there are the following types:<sup>21</sup>
  - (1) Area arrest, or assignment to a new place of residence with the obligation to work. Individuals included in this category are not physically detained in a

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<sup>17</sup> FBIS, Paris AFP, March 12, 1955. [Footnote in original.]

<sup>18</sup> FBIS, May 11, 1955. [Footnote in original.]

<sup>19</sup> Time Magazine, October 17, 1955; New York Times, November 2, 1955. [Footnote in original.]

<sup>20</sup> Forced Labor in the “People’s Democracies.” Mid-European Studies Center, Free Europe Committee, Inc. (New York: 1955), ID 948099 (U). [Footnote in original.]

<sup>21</sup> Forced Labor in the “People’s Democracies,” op.cit. [Footnote in original.]

camp or prison, but on the basis of a court sentence or administrative police order are made to perform work under police surveillance at an arbitrarily assigned location.

- (2) Army labor service battalions. These labor units are recruited under military draft for seasonal or more permanent work. The draft for these units is similar to the pre-war anti-Jewish measures and is based on political discrimination. Young kulaks and unreliable elements serve three-year terms under armed guards, working conditions being very similar to those of forced laborers in camps and prisons.<sup>22</sup>
  - (3) Forced Labor under total restraint. This category includes workers in all types of camps or prisons engaged in economic activity. More than 200 forced labor camps and prisons have been reported as existing in Hungary. (See Tab A)<sup>23</sup>
- k. Deportations (see Tab B),<sup>24</sup> as a means of carrying out various objectives of the regime, have been conducted by the Hungarian Communist regime since the coup in 1948. (Prior to 1947, they were initiated by the Soviets to supply labor for the Soviet Union.) Deportees, whose number it is impossible to estimate with any degree of accuracy, eventually became forced laborers. Large-scale deportations have resulted in the virtual elimination of the upper and middle classes. As a result of the amnesty provisions of the “new course,” none who were released from detention camps were allowed to return to their original places of residence. During 1955 a renewed campaign of deporting undesirables has been reported. According to one report, 1700 persons were deported from Budapest, Győr and Miskolc during May and June 1955, and for the first time the relatives of persons who have fled the country are being deported for that reason.<sup>25</sup> The deportees were reportedly being taken to emergency accommodations in Bekes (4646-2108) near the Rumanian border and their homes were being confiscated.

## 2. Major Dissent Elements

Whether the discriminatory measures of the Communist regime have destroyed more resistance potential than they have created is difficult to determine. The measures have been largely directed against those elements of Hungarian society which, if uncontrolled, might eventually generate resistance leaders. The campaign to eliminate potential resistance leaders has been thorough and probably effective. At the same time it has served to crystallize the opposition of various groups who have been clearly marked out for destruction by the regime. Whereas there are apparently few potential resistance leaders remaining in Hungary, there are

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<sup>22</sup> Army Labor Brigades (Muszaki Dandár--MJSZ) were reportedly abolished in 1953. See American Embassy, Vienna, Desp. No. 1045, March 14, 1955 (C). [Footnote in original.]

<sup>23</sup> Not reprinted here.

<sup>24</sup> Not reprinted here.

<sup>25</sup> Washington Post and Times Herald, August 8, 1955 (letter from Bela Fabian, member of the Executive Committee of the Hungarian National Council); New York Times, August 5, 1955 (from Austrian Socialist Press Service). [Footnote in original.]

This information seems to be incorrect since there is no indication of such deportations as late as 1955. In fact, this period was characterized by the elimination of the entire deportation system and by the release of those who had been previously deported.

dissident elements in almost every walk of life. Dissidence and resistance potential appear to be strongest among the following groups:

- a. Peasants. The term “kulak,” loosely used to refer to all farmers who have remained outside the collectives, has become almost synonymous with “enemy of the people.” Even those persons with a kulak background are regarded as suspect. The fact that approximately 278,000 farmers (one out of every four) withdrew from the collectives during the 1953-54 period is a clear indication of the unpopularity of the collectivization program. Despite every pressure to join the collectivization program, only approximately 30 percent of the arable land in Hungary has been collectivized.<sup>26</sup> Disaffection toward Communist rule and popular apathy toward Communist measures became so pronounced in the rural areas as to compel the regime to admit its weakness in an unprecedented manner during the local elections held in November 1954.<sup>27</sup> These elections were distinguished from previous ones held in the satellites in that never before had any Communist regime allowed the admitted small minority of negative votes to affect the actual outcome of the election. In announcing the results, the Hungarian regime claimed 97.9 percent of the vote cast, but admitted the rejection by the voters of 586 candidates out of 106,000. Virtually all of the rejections occurred in the villages where the candidates were close to the electorate. Furthermore, there is evidence that farmers’ clubs, whose organization was recently authorized by the regime in order to bring “Communist culture” to the rural population, have come under the influence of “kulaks.” The rural population readily responded to the invitation to form these clubs, many respected anti-Communist peasants joining. In an editorial, January 13, 1955, Szabad Nep wrote: “In the farmers’ clubs, certain elements under the influence of the enemy try to incite the working peasants against the Party . . . Everywhere kulaks penetrate these clubs.”<sup>28</sup>
- b. Youth. Contrary to early predictions of Communist success in the indoctrination of youth, the whole youth program has been far from successful, and the resistance of youth is one of the most serious problems facing the Communists. There have been several “official criticisms” of the DISZ (the Communist youth organization), and Hungarian youth, particularly students, have reacted to Communist propaganda with apathy and cynicism. Over the past few years, the Party has issued many complaints about the young people’s bourgeois attitudes and emulation of Western customs.<sup>29</sup> Resentment of Communism has been manifested by “hooliganism,” which often amounts to nothing more than wearing American-style ties, chewing gum, listening to American jazz, reading and distributing “westerns,” as well as by indifference to Marxist-Leninist courses and Communist youth activities. For example, Szabad Ifjusag (Budapest, April 25, 1954) stated:

This year there were 1,200 disciplinary cases at the Polytechnical University. In some cases, such as in the fourth year thermodynamics class, whole circles of students refused to perform

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<sup>26</sup> Soviet Affairs, July 1955 (S). [Footnote in original.]

<sup>27</sup> Dept. of State, IR 6853, February 1, 1955 (S). [Footnote in original.]

<sup>28</sup> Magyarorszagi Hirek, No. 4, January 22, 1955, item 5. [Footnote in original.]

<sup>29</sup> See American Legation, Budapest, Desp. No. 386, June 3, 1955 (LOU). [Footnote in original.]

the obligatory tasks. Often, on days when only one or two classes are given, 25 percent of the students are absent.<sup>30</sup>

- c. Industrial Workers. Only a small percentage of industrial workers originally supported the Communists. As a result of the regimentation of labor, stakhanovite methods of speeding up production, and deteriorating living standards, many have been alienated. One report states that the regime believes that resistance is most likely to arise from the disappointed working class and in particular from old Social Democrats, and that, as a result, industrial workers are more closely watched than kulaks or members of the middle class who are materially and morally depressed and incapable of organizing any resistance.<sup>31</sup>
- d. Clergy. Despite intensive pressure, the “peace priest” movement has apparently failed. In July 1955 the official organ of the movement, Kereszt, was placed on the Index of Forbidden Books by the Vatican. Church attendance is reportedly greater than ever before and the majority of the clergy are at least recognized as non-conformists and have great influence on the people. It has been reported that Communist influence is stronger in the Protestant areas of Hungary.<sup>32</sup> Since the abandonment of the “new course” there have been new arrests of priests and the Communists have reportedly issued a warning that priests will be held responsible for peasants who fail to meet their quotas and for any general effort to resist the authorities.<sup>33</sup> In the vicinity of Szeged priests have been warned that in case of sabotage they will be required to pay for all the damage.<sup>34</sup>

## B. Passive Resistance

Conducted within the framework of the resisters’ normal life and duties, passive resistance<sup>35</sup> involves the deliberate non-performance or the malperformance of acts which would directly or indirectly benefit the regime, or deliberate nonconformity with standards of conduct established by the regime. Under a Communist regime the simplest and safest method by which the ordinary citizen may offer resistance is by carrying out his work in a slipshod manner and only externally complying with the regulations of the government. This is especially true in Hungary where an effective Soviet control system and other factors such as physically and psychologically exhaustive work norms, material want, and compulsory political activities have restricted Hungarian resistance to passive, unorganized manifestations.

If the public complaints of the regime are accepted at their face value, resistance of this type has been widespread in Hungary.<sup>36</sup> Prior to the “new course,” passive resistance took the

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<sup>30</sup> NSIC, August 1954; Magyarorszagi Hitek, No. 18, May 29, 1954, item 7. [Footnote in original.]

<sup>31</sup> CIA, CS-X-48559, November 30, 1954, B-3 (S). [Footnote in original.]

<sup>32</sup> G-2, USFA, R-1317-54, 22 July 1954 (DOI: Dec. 1953), F-3 (O). [Footnote in original.]

<sup>33</sup> FBIS, May 11, 1955, Source: Radio Vatican. [Footnote in original.]

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. [Footnote in original.]

<sup>35</sup> Definitions of dissidence and resistance with its various types are taken from Resistance Intelligence Report, RIR-1, July 20, 1954, Anti-Communist Resistance Activities and Potentials in Poland, prepared by the Resistance Intelligence Committee--approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee (S). [Footnote in original.]

<sup>36</sup> NIE 10-55, April 12, 1955, p. 19 states: “Passive resistance in Hungary appears to have been more widespread and effective than elsewhere in the satellites.” [Footnote in original.]

forms of absenteeism, job-hopping, shoddy work, waste, frauds in computing norms, and often culminated in deliberate sabotage. Peasants formed the largest section of the population which offered resistance to the regime.<sup>37</sup> In the factories, excessively high labor norms, long hours with little pay, poor working conditions, inefficient bureaucratic management, defective materials, ever-increasing demands for speedier output, and expanded “socialist competitions,” had alienated the Hungarian workers. Shortages of food and consumer goods, poor housing conditions, currency reforms which reduced purchasing power and wiped out savings, added to the grievances of the Hungarian people. The evidence is that the Hungarian people at first regarded the “new course” as a manifestation of the weakness of the regime. In response to Premier Nagy’s announcement of July 4, 1953 that the dissolution of the kolkhozes [collective farms] would be permitted, many peasants started a movement for leaving and breaking up the collectives. The announcement, coming during the harvest period, was ill-timed: desertions from the kolkhozes disrupted the harvesting of crops, and individual peasants rushed onto the kolkhoz land to pillage crops, reclaim their individual holdings, and incite collective farm members to revolt. During the “new course” period approximately one-fourth of the collective farms were disbanded. Further, many peasants, believing that the regime would abandon its agrarian policy entirely, grew bolder in their refusal to meet delivery quotas, which they believed would be reduced even more. On October 30, 1953, Radio Budapest pointed out that the “new course” was in no way a sign of regime weakness:

The enemy described cancellation of delivery arrears and concessions granted under the new produce collection as a sign of weakness; the enemy spreads lies that the present concessions will be followed by others and that peasants therefore much not surrender their produce. A number of our local councils do not stand up to such hostile views with sufficient determination.

Other farmers decided that the “new course” concessions were only wasted maneuvers and that the regime was “fattening peasants for a future kill.” This attitude was so widespread that on September 29, 1953, Nagy saw fit to denounce “enemy propaganda” which claimed that government aid to farmers was a “transitory phenomenon.”<sup>38</sup>

The “new course,” in some ways an admission that the regime no longer found it expedient either politically or economically to disregard the welfare of the people, failed to achieve its objective of pleasing the people and was abandoned in early 1955. According to the admissions of the regime, Hungary faces falling agricultural production, the need to import “considerable quantities” of grain, the non-fulfillment of even the reduced compulsory deliveries, and “rampant indiscipline” in the local councils and on some of the farms.<sup>39</sup> The dismissal of Imre Nagy as Premier (announced officially April 18, 1955) signaled the formal abandonment of the “new course” and a return to the rule of force and fear. Circumstances surrounding Nagy’s dismissal from all Party and government posts emphasized the central position of agriculture in regime planning.<sup>40</sup> (Among the crimes imputed to Nagy was failing to carry on class warfare in the villages--eradication of kulaks--and to encourage the development of collective farming.) For the peasant the abandonment of the “new course” means a more

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<sup>37</sup> G-2, GSI/TRUST/BETFOR, R-189-53, 2 July 1953 (DOI: up to Oct. 1951), ID 1181961, F-6 (S). [Footnote in original.]

<sup>38</sup> NBIC, August 1954. [Footnote in original.]

<sup>39</sup> The Economist, June 18, 1955. [Footnote in original.]

<sup>40</sup> See American Legation, Bucharest, Desp. No. 338, May 11, 1955 (S); Dept. of State, OIR, IB No. 1769, April 20, 1955. [Footnote in original.]

rigorous enforcement of the collectivization program. For the churches it means new persecution and a tightening of controls. For the worker it means more stringent restrictions.

The anticipated withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, as a consequence of the peace treaty with Austria, may have been one of the motives for the recent tightening of controls. In an effort to brace itself for a possible reaction to a withdrawal of Soviet troops, promised by Soviet leaders in July 1955,<sup>41</sup> the Hungarian regime has renewed its campaign to eliminate potential resistance leaders. However, Hungarian officials have pointed out that Soviet troops would remain in their country while NATO existed, and that, on the basis of the Soviet-bloc military pact signed in Warsaw in May 1955, troops of the signatory powers could be assigned to any one of the member nations.<sup>42</sup> During 1955, deportations have been reported and there have been an increasing number of regime attacks on kulaks, speculators, and peasants who have not fulfilled delivery quotas.

As a result of passive resistance by the people and poor planning by the regime Hungary's economic situation borders on the critical.<sup>43</sup> In addition to larger admissions of failure in the fields of agriculture and industry, the Communist press has publicly acknowledged many instances of production failures. These, together with reports of unrest among the peasants and other sectors of the population, provide an index of the extent of passive resistance in Hungary (see Tab C).<sup>44</sup>

It is reasonable to assume that the majority of Hungarians regard themselves as a captive people and resent this status. Motivated by expediency and the necessity of achieving a modus vivendi, many have come to accept the status quo and, with the motive of "making the best of a bad situation," to cooperate with the regime. Certainly, after several years of Communist domination, some people are becoming desperate and giving up hope of outside help. Others are perhaps bitter at the West for what they consider as broken promises. Nevertheless, the Communist tyranny has not become more palatable with the years and national pride and ambitions have not been destroyed in a decade. The causes of dissidence remain in Hungary and will probably continue to produce passive resistance for several years to come.

### C. Resistance Activities

Resistance, which is dissidence translated into action, may be organized or unorganized, and, in either case, may be active or passive. Organized active resistance is either overt (partisan activity in open revolt against the regime) or covert (underground resistance which is carried out in secrecy and is designed to collect and disseminate intelligence, and to prepare for the overthrow of the government).

There is no tradition or history of active resistance in Hungary, and all the evidence indicates that this tradition has not been broken.<sup>45</sup> During World War II there were several military and civilian underground groups active in German-occupied Hungary, but their exploits are probably best described as feats of individual heroism. Hungary is a relatively small country with few inaccessible areas and a large and efficient police force which is probably loyal to the

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<sup>41</sup> Washington Post and Times Herald, July 31, 1955. [Footnote in original.]

<sup>42</sup> New York Times, September 14, 1955. [Footnote in original.]

<sup>43</sup> See M/A Hungary, R-455-53, December 15, 1953 (DOI: August 1, 1953), ID 1192960 (C); Dept. of State, IR No. 6771, December 14, 1954 (S). [Footnote in original.]

<sup>44</sup> Not reprinted here.

<sup>45</sup> See M/A Hungary, R-455-53, op. cit. [Footnote in original.]

regime. It has been suggested that there is resistance in Hungary and that it is purposely scattered and indefinable so that it will be more difficult to detect.<sup>46</sup> However, this purposiveness would seem to require a direction and organization which does not appear in any of the reports which describe resistance activity. Closer to the true situation is the conclusion that most of the resistance in Hungary is of a passive character, and that there are few potential underground leaders.

Since the Communist coup in 1947 active resistance has been largely unorganized. There are only a few instances of alleged partisan activity, and much of the underground activity reported appears to have been invented or “inspired” by the regime. Since the coup, the Communists have publicized a number of alleged conspiracies, such as in the Cardinal Mindszenty trial (1949), the Rajk case (1949), the imprisonment of Archbishop Groesz (1951), and General Gabor Peter (1953-54). The Communist press, especially during the 1951 to 1953 period, carried frequent accounts of the arrests and trials of saboteurs. Although there is a report which states that there are 1,000 Hungarians in the penal prisoner area around Tayshet (Eastern Siberia) who were sentenced because of activities on June 17, 1953,<sup>47</sup> there is no other evidence that there were large-scale disturbances on the occasion of the East German uprising.<sup>48</sup> Neither did the purge of [Beria] in the USSR cause any covert or popular reaction in Hungary. There is evidence that some of the underground movements alleged to exist in Hungary were “inspired” by the regime for the purpose of apprehending dissident elements of the population. On the whole, admissions by the regime of specific acts of popular resistance diminished considerably after the inauguration of the “new course” in July 1953. However, since late 1954 reports of arrests have been more numerous, and there have been recent avowals of a renewed vigilance campaign against the “traditional enemies of socialism.”

## 1. Partisan Activity

It is highly unlikely that there is any organized partisan activity in Hungary today. Considering the strength of the regime, the pervasiveness of its control, and the fact that most of Hungary is geographically unsuitable for partisan warfare, it would indeed be quite surprising if partisan groups still existed. Reports of partisan bands in the past have placed them in those areas where the topography provided some possibility of cover and concealment. There is no evidence that any armed bands in Hungary endured for any length of time, and some of those reported may have consisted entirely of criminals and army deserters. An unsuccessful attempt by five men to penetrate a large ammunition dump located in a wooded area near Erdotelek (4741-2019) in December 1953 is apparently the most recent resistance incident which might be construed as partisan activity.<sup>49</sup>

Following is a summary account of several incomplete and inadequately authenticated reports of partisan activity in Hungary. Since these activities took place prior to 1954--mostly in

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<sup>46</sup> CIA, OO-W-26725, June 29, 1953 (DOI: April 10, 1953) (R). [Footnote in original.]

<sup>47</sup> USAREURIC, 513th MISG, RVPET-950-54 (EI-2558), October 19, 1954 (DOI: Feb.-Mar. 1954), ID 1264080, F-6 (C), p. 42. [Footnote in original.]

<sup>48</sup> In fact, there were no disturbances at all in Hungary at the time of the East German uprising.

<sup>49</sup> M/A Hungary, R-471-53, December 22, 1953, B-3, ID 1194807 (C) (Source: member of a friendly legation). The official comment on this information was that the attempted penetration was the work of some resistance groups in need of ammunition or merely an act of sabotage. [Footnote in original.]

1950--they are of interest only because they highlight the areas within Hungary which are suitable for this type of active resistance.

- a. In July 1950 a partisan camp was reportedly located near Bukkszentlaszlo (4804-2040) and Bukkszentkereszt (4804-2038). There were also 10 small encampments between Lillafured (4805-2037) and Ujmassa (cannot locate), each quartering from 30 to 50 partisans. Partisans allegedly had a transmitting and receiving radio station at Ujmasa and large supply depots in the woods between Ujmasa (cannot locate) and Omassa (4807-2032).<sup>50</sup>
- b. In late November 1950 there were reportedly partisan groups in the mountainous regions of Nagyszal (4752-1707), Karancs (4809-1947), Czerbat [Cserhát] (4755-1919), Bukh (4804-2035) and Matra (4750-2000). These probably crossed the Danube from Eastern Slovakia and were allegedly composed of Hungarians, Slovaks, Balkan Volksdeutsche, Ukranians and Ruthenians. The partisans were reportedly poorly armed, only an estimated 30 percent having weapons.<sup>51</sup>
- c. In September and October of 1950 the authorities at Vac (4746-1908) reportedly organized extensive expeditions in the regions of Kosd (4748-1910), Osagard (4751-1912), Alsopeteny (4752-1915), and farther north to seek out these groups. These expeditions failed, and despite the use of agents provocateur to single out those who may have been helping the partisans, did not discover any disloyal elements in the local populace. According to the source of this information, it was mostly Slovak peasants (presumably in Slovakia) who were aiding these partisans.<sup>52</sup>
- d. In late 1950 independent partisan bands were reportedly operating in the marshy regions of the Hortobagy river on the plain north of Szeged.<sup>53</sup> Consisting of five to ten men, these groups were composed of Russian and Hungarian deserters, fugitive peasants from the collective farms near the Yugoslavian frontier, and ordinary criminals. Equipped with Russian arms and supplies, these groups limited themselves to banditry.
- e. In late 1950 some partisan groups allegedly maintained contact with the Yugoslav authorities and there was an organized contact group of a permanent character along the Yugoslavian frontier supported by Yugoslavian officials.<sup>54</sup> Yugoslav patrols allegedly made contact with partisan groups, usually along the lower course of the Danube where it is difficult for Hungarian police to guard the border effectively.<sup>55</sup>
- f. Because of numerous troops in the area, the mountainous region of Mecsek (4606-1813) was abandoned by partisans, but small groups were reportedly coming back in late 1950.<sup>56</sup> It was reported that, on August 2, 1950, a Hungarian resistance group of 15 attacked a Soviet military store in the vicinity of Villany (4552-1827), killed five

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<sup>50</sup> CIA, SO-59549, April 4, 1951 (DOI: July 1950), ID 777145 (S). (Washington comment: The identity of these "partisans" is unknown.) [Footnote in original.]

<sup>51</sup> CIA, SO-73847, October 23, 1951 (DOI: late Nov. 1950), C-6, ID 845578 (S). [Footnote in original.]

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.* [Footnote in original.]

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.* [Footnote in original.]

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.* [Footnote in original.]

<sup>55</sup> It may be significant that in August 1955 Yugoslavia received a friendship pledge from Hungary, a fact which may mark the end of the open enmity of several years standing between the two countries.

[Footnote in original.]

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.* [Footnote in original.]

- Soviet guards and took 150 automatic pistols and rifles and large quantities of ammunition and food rations.<sup>57</sup> In 1952 a meeting of an anti-Communist youth group in the woods of Mecsek was reportedly raided by the AVH and 80 of the participants were arrested.<sup>58</sup> In May 1954 there was hearsay information that this group still existed and held meetings in the same wooded area.<sup>59</sup>
- g. In 1951 the White Guard (see following section), according to the source,<sup>60</sup> had its headquarters at Kismaros (4750-1901) in the Bukh mountains and partisan centers in the Bakony mountains (4715-1750) (the leader living in Papa), in the area of Lake Balaton (with headquarters in Siofok), and a fourth group between the Danube and the Tisza. The Guard reportedly had a 200-man unit at Kismaros, 50 men at Siofok near Lake Balaton, and 280 men at a spot somewhere east of the Danube--each unit having a secret arms cache and instructions not to take action until a propitious time.<sup>61</sup>
  - h. Sometime after 1947 one source reported hearsay information of partisan activities in the Pilis mountains (4741-1852).<sup>62</sup>

## 2. Underground Activity

If one were to believe the claims of émigré organizations and the reports of the Communist press, there has been considerable organized active resistance of the covert variety in Hungary. However, an analysis of the available information leads to the conclusion that there is really no organized underground movement at the present time and that underground activity of the early postwar period was poorly organized and haphazard. Further, there is evidence that the Communist regime itself was either the sponsor of some of the organizations reported or invented them for the purpose of building up a case against individuals whose removal from positions of public influence was desirable. Tab D<sup>63</sup> lists 15 underground organizations which have been reported in the postwar period.

There is no feasible method of determining to what extent the Communist regime promotes “resistance” groups under the names of White Guard, Black Eagle, etc., for the purpose of apprehending disloyal citizens. Certainly some of the anti-regime elements in Hungary have learned to be very careful in joining resistance groups. An incident reported in the Domsod (4705-1900) area depicts the astuteness of the regime in weeding out dissident elements and forestalling the growth of resistance movements:

According to an F-2 source (an American businessman), the potato crops in the Domsod area in 1952 were so poor that none of the uncollectivized farmers were able to meet their quotas and their temper was “pre-revolutionary.” The AVH

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<sup>57</sup> CIA, OO-W-15025, November 8, 1950 (DOI: 1950), ID 731177 (C) (from Hungaria, an émigré newspaper published in Munich). [Footnote in original.]

<sup>58</sup> JIC, USFA, R-6676-54, December 21, 1954, ID 1268756 (C). [Footnote in original.]

<sup>59</sup> Ibid. [Footnote in original.]

<sup>60</sup> American Embassy, Vienna, Desp. No. 1124, April 23, 1951, ID 805567 (S). [Footnote in original.]

<sup>61</sup> G-2, D/A, Weekly Intelligence Report, August 10, 1951 (S); USFA, Bi-Weekly Report No. 145, June 8, 1951 (DOI: Jan. 11, 1951), F-3 (S). [Footnote in original.]

<sup>62</sup> JIC, USFA, R-0060-55, October 30, 1954 (DOI: 1947-June 1954), C-None, ID 1274369 (C). [Footnote in original.]

<sup>63</sup> Not reprinted here.

secretly distributed pamphlets in English and Hungarian calling for recruits in a resistance group. Applications were accepted only with payments of 300 forints. Nine men were hanged after applying. The news of this was apparently suppressed because recruiting continued in this area as well as in another village 20 km south of Budapest.<sup>64</sup>

In the last two years no new underground movements have been reported. There have, however, been several defector reports which rather vaguely affirm that there is still a distinct underground movement in Hungary.<sup>65</sup> A non-commissioned officer of the Hungarian Army, who defected in January 1954, state that there still is a NEM (see Tab D-15)<sup>66</sup> underground movement in the Hungarian Army, operating on a cell system.<sup>67</sup> According to this defector, only a few officers belonged to this movement but there was a conscript cell in almost every army unit. Considering the available evidence, the most probable conclusion which can be drawn is that it is highly doubtful that there ever was a large organized underground in Hungary, and the organized resistance which continues to be reported is more an expression of hope than fact.

### 3. Resistance Incidents

In contrast to Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia, there has been very little, if any, organized resistance in Hungary, and the volume of incidents of active resistance appears to be proportionately smaller. Arrests and trials of persons for anti-regime activity are listed in Tab F<sup>68</sup> and provide information valuable for determining the extent of both passive and active resistance. Many of the incidents of active resistance which have occurred appear to be spontaneous outbursts of pent-up opposition to the regime; others, such as the distribution of anti-regime literature, indicate some planning. Considering the oppressive measures of the regime and the absence of a reasonable expectation on the part of the Hungarian people that these will be of short duration, it is to be expected that such incidents will continue. Such resistance obviously does not constitute any threat to the security of the regime, and indeed may even have been provoked by the regime in some cases for the purpose of uncovering subversive elements of the population. From an anti-Communist point of view, however, resistance incidents, of whatever type, serve to index the strength of passive resistance, and may cumulatively provide information concerning attitudes of a definitive sector of the population. Examples of resistance incidents which have occurred in different parts of Hungary are listed in Tab E.<sup>69</sup>

### 4. Arrests and Trials of Anti-Russian Elements

Charges made in courts and convictions obtained should not be construed as acceptable evidence of the extent of active resistance. Many arrests and trials are undoubtedly largely motivated by the necessity of finding scapegoats for failures to meet production quotas or to keep promises of better economic conditions; others, probably those of real resistance leaders,

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<sup>64</sup> CIA, SO-94806, October 16, 1952 (DOI: August 12, 1952) F-2 (S). [Footnote in original.]

<sup>65</sup> USFA, R-9236-54, May 13, 1954, ID 1254092 (C). [Footnote in original.]

<sup>66</sup> The National Resistance Movement or Nemzeti Ellenállási Mozgalom. Tab D is not reprinted here.

<sup>67</sup> American Embassy, Vienna, Desp. No. 1045, March 14, 1955 (C). [Footnote in original.]

<sup>68</sup> Not reprinted here.

<sup>69</sup> Not reprinted here.

are not publicized. According to Communist policy near relatives of the accused are also arrested on the grounds that they have violated security laws in not reporting subversive activity. For the purpose of swaying the public conscience, all of those accused of anti-regime activity are also charged with petty crimes such as fraud and theft.<sup>70</sup> It appears reasonable to assume that the persons arrested can be regarded at least as potential resistance leaders, and, in some cases, may indeed have been involved in some effort, however disorganized, to defeat the objectives of the government. Consequently, Tab F presents a partial list of arrests, trials, and sentences passed in the last three years which may reveal elements in the population and/or localities which the regime regards as potential trouble-spots, and may thus serve as a criterion for appraising resistance potential.

There are continuing reports of arrests in Hungary: In early July 1955, reports reaching Vienna stated that in mid-June hundreds of police arrived in Budapest and raided homes, cafes, and coffee houses. At about the same time the Hungarian Communist news agency (M.T.I.) confirmed that widespread tension existed by reporting numerous arrests of Hungarians charged with acting as "American spies and saboteurs."<sup>71</sup> According to Neue Zuercher Zeitung, August 1, 1955, "... police terror in Hungary is on the increase and security has been tightened: Budapest was literally occupied by police; cars were stopped and passengers searched; anti-West posters appeared on the walls of buildings; all groupings of people were immediately dispersed and food warehouses were placed under heavy guard; large military units were dispatched towards the Austrian and Yugoslavian borders."

#### D. Suitability of Hungary for Special Forces Operations

One of the principal reasons why Hungarian resistance is more or less restricted to passive unorganized manifestations is geographical. Poor terrain impedes the formation of nuclei for future guerilla operations and certainly would inhibit Special Forces operations. There are relatively few areas in Hungary which offer possibilities of refuge and concealment for guerilla-type activity. With the exception of a semi-circle of forested hills to the west and northwest and the Meksec [Mecsek] Upland (northwest of the city of Pecs), Hungary is a flat plain, the Alföld. Areas of the country which are suitable for Special Forces operations requiring terrain offering such possibilities are the Northern Hills region and the Meksec Hills.

Map A<sup>72</sup> shows geographically suitable refuge areas and/or bases of operations for Special Forces. These areas are identical with those selected by G-2 Project #6550 on the basis of cartographical inspection of terrain and cultural features. Refuge areas on Map A are referred to by the same numbers and letters under which they are described in the text. Training and maneuver areas of the Hungarian Army--most of them used only in the summer when the deciduous mountain forests provide the best concealment--are also plotted because of their proximity to the refuge areas.

##### 1. Geographical Suitability

a. The Northern Hills region, a narrow northeast-southwest-trending series of forested hills, lies between Satoraljaujhely on the Hungarian-Czechoslovakian border and Keszthely at

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<sup>70</sup> G-2, USFA, R-1317-54, July 22, 1954 (DOI: Dec. 1953), ID 1257339 (S). [Footnote in original.]

<sup>71</sup> New York Times, July 6, 1955. [Footnote in original.]

<sup>72</sup> Not reprinted here.

the Western end of Lake Balaton.<sup>73</sup> This region varies in width from 13 to 28 miles and can be subdivided as follows:

- (1) Bakony Forest: The Bakony range overlooks lengthy and shallow Lake Balaton from an escarpment. It is covered by discontinuous forests of oak and hornbeam and has many steep and stony slopes. The range is interrupted by valleys and, on the gentler slope, by small villages and towns. Relatively speaking, the mountains are sparsely populated, but lumbering and mining are common. None of the following cover areas listed by G-2 Project 6550 is truly isolated, all of them being fairly easy of access, having many roads and trails crossing them:
  - (a) An area (Area H-1, Refuge Area E) located just north of the western tip of Lake Balaton near Keszthely, approximately 10 km east-west and 8 km north-south.
  - (b) An elongated strip of forested land (Area H-1, Refuge Area C), approximately 30 km long with an average width of 4 km, lying along the crest of the mountains north of Veszprem.
  - (c) A forested area adjacent to (b) (Area H-1, Refuge Area D), about 20 km east of the city of Papa and about 10 km east-west and 7 km north-south. This area is bisected by a secondary north-south road (82); height 704 m. commands the low ground to the north.
  - (d) A circular, well-forested area (Area H-1, Refuge Area B) of approximately 100 sq. km between the cities of Mor and Csakvar. The mountains are quite low in this area which is easily accessible from either of the towns mentioned.
- (2) Pilis Mountains: The Pilis Mountains are located approximately 10 km northwest of the outskirts of Budapest. There is a refuge area (Area H-1, Refuge Area A) of approximately 300 sq. km of hilly to mountainous forest which, from its center, is only about 25 km to the heart of Budapest. The Danube bends guard the approaches from the north and east, and there is good observation of the surrounding lowlands from heights 757 m. and 950 m.
- (3) Borzsony Mountains: The Borzsony Mountains are located north of the Danube River bend above Budapest. A refuge area (Area H-3, Refuge Area D) is approximately 18 km long and 12 km wide and consist of mountainous forest terrain. The mountains are low but have steep slopes; streams are deeply incised. There are dense forests of beech and oak with scattered stands of pine at the higher elevations. Heights from 585 m. to 939 m. provide a good view of the Danube River valley to the south. The area is sparsely populated, but there is mining and lumbering in the mountains.
- (4) Matra Mountains: The Matra Mountains are located north of Gyongyos. A refuge area (Area H-3, Refuge Area B) is roughly 30 km east-west and 15 km north-south and consists of mountainous forested terrain. The mountains have steep slopes and are extensively dissected by deeply incised narrow-stream valleys. There is a pronounced escarpment along the southern border of the mountains and the height increases (from west to east) from 803 to 1010 m. At the lower elevations there are dense forests of beech mixed with oak; scattered stands of pine appear at the higher elevations. On the southern slopes there are

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<sup>73</sup> NIS 19-21, Fig. 21-1: Map of Military Geographic Regions and areas suitable for guerilla bases. [Footnote in original.]

numerous vineyards and orchards. Good roads (routes 24 and 217) cross the area from east to west and lead south to Gyongos; numerous trails traverse the mountains. Off-road movement, however, is impossible for vehicles. The area is sparsely populated but there is considerable lumbering and mining activity in the mountains.

- (5) Bukh Mountains: The Bukh (Beech) Mountains are located 8 km west of Miskolc and only three km west of the steel mills at Diosgyor. A refuge area (Area H-3, Refuge Area A) consists of forested mountains extending 30 km from east to west and 20 km from north to south. The mountains are extensively dissected below 670 m. and have steep slopes and deep narrow-stream valleys. The upland area above this is comparatively less rugged but is rimmed by an escarpment with slopes up to 50 percent. Several roads, notably route 22, and numerous trails penetrate the area. However, traversability on foot is limited.<sup>74</sup>
- (6) Hegyalja Mountains: The Hegyalja Mountains, northwest of the Bodrog River, are located near Tornynosnemeti and Satoraljaújhely. A refuge area (Area H-3, Refuge Area C) covers more than 200 sq. km, extending 15 km from north to south and 20 km from east to west. The terrain consists of low mountains which are extensively dissected by numerous streams and characterized by sudden changes in the slope. There is a dense beech forest with some oak at the lower elevations. Extensive clearings occur along the southern border of the mountains, and there are scattered clearings on some peaks and in the valleys. Numerous roads and trails cross the area but the drainage pattern makes cross-country movement difficult.
- b. The Meksec [Mecsek] Hills are a part of the Somogy-Meksec Upland, an area of hills and dissected plateaus southeast of Lake Balaton. This Upland rises 70 to 150 m. above the surface of the surrounding plain, and peaks within the fringing hill belt are 600 to 680 m. in elevation. The plateaus and hills are covered by discontinuous dense forests of broad-leaved trees which, except during the winter months, provide good concealment. In comparison to the sheltering plain, the Upland is sparsely populated. The best refuge or cover area in this region is located in the Meksec Hills northwest of Pecs (Area H-2, Refuge Area A). Here the elevation varies between 200 and 600 m. and the terrain is dissected by shallow, steep-sided valleys. Broad-leaved forests cover the entire area--oak and hornbeam on the lower and red beech on the higher slopes. The forests at the lower elevations are more open; orchards, vineyards, and cornfields planted along the lower slopes and in the valleys provide limited concealment.

## 2. Training and Maneuver Areas of the Hungarian Army

The scope of this study does not call for a detailed discussion of the Hungarian Army and internal security forces. In general, the reliability estimate of these organizations which appears in the Georgetown Study, Resistance Potentials: Hungary, November 23, 1953, is still valid, and there is additional evidence of the poor morale of the conscript element.<sup>75</sup> The curtailment of the

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<sup>74</sup> The telecom exchange of the Soviet High Command is housed in bombproof headquarters in Lillafured. (NIS 19, Sec. 38, September 1952). [Footnote in original.]

<sup>75</sup> American Embassy, Vienna, Desp. No. 1045, March 14, 1955 (C). [Footnote in original.]

formerly free-wheeling State Security Authority (AVH) and imprisonment of its chief, Gabor Peter, after the introduction of the “new course” has not had any observable bad effects on the efficiency of police controls.<sup>76</sup>

Because changes in order of battle occur relatively often in peacetime, and may be radical and sudden in time of war, and because current Order of Battle is available from G-2, no attempt is made to describe the present location of Hungarian Army and security components. Training and maneuver areas of the Hungarian army are plotted on Map A--showing geographically suitable refuge areas and/or bases of operation--because they are relatively stable and may directly affect the utilization of these areas.

Map A is not intended to present definitive information on training and maneuver areas. These areas are approximately located on the basis of information contained in files maintained by G-2, Eurasian Branch, Special Projects Section, and their size on Map A is only a rough approximation of their actual size. Most training and maneuver areas are located in the plains regions, but some also appear in the Northern Hills. Following is a list of the areas referenced on Map A:

Bekes (4646-2108) - Doboz (4644-2115) - Sarkad (4644-2123)  
Berkesd (4604-1824)  
Böhönye (4624-1723) - Nagybajom (4623-1730)  
Bugacmonostor (4641-1941)  
Csakbereny (4721-1819)  
Debrecen (4731-2139) - Hajduhadhaz (4740-2140)  
Deg (4652-1826) - Enying (4656-1814)  
Diosjeno (4756-1902) - Dregelypalank (4803-1903) - Vamosmikola (4758-1847)  
Dombovar area (4623-1808)  
Eger (4754-2022 - Verpelet (4751-2014) - Tarnamera (4739-2010) - Vamosgyork  
(4741-1956) - Gyongyos (4747-1956)  
Esztergom (4747-1845) - Dobogoko (4741-1854)  
Janoshalma (4618-1919) - Melykut (4613-1922)  
Jaszbereny (4730-1955)  
Kalocsa (4632-1859) - Kiskoros (4637-1917)  
Kecel (4631-1915) - Soltvadkert (4634-1923) - Bocsa (4636-1929)  
Kenyeri (4723-1705)  
Kisbodak (4754-1725)  
Kiskunhalas (4625-1929) - Sandorfalva (4622-2006)  
Marcali (4635-1725)  
Nyiregyhaza (4758-2143)  
Ozd (4813-2018)  
Paks (4638-1851)  
Papa (4720-1728) - Keszthely (4649-1715) - Sumeg (4658-1717)  
Paszto 94755-1942)  
Petervasara (4801-2006)  
Pomaz (4739-1901) - Szentendre (4740-1905)  
Pusztavam (4726-1813)  
Solt (4648-1900)

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<sup>76</sup> Dept. of State, IR No. 6771, December 14, 1954 (S). [Footnote in original.]

Szeged (4615-2009) - Mindszent (4632-2012) - Szentcsanak (4635-2037) - Bekescsaba (4639-2105)

Tab (4643-1802)

Tamasi (4638-1817) - Kocsola (4632-1812)

Tata (4739-1819)

Tiszadob (4801-2110)

Tiszafured (4737-2045) - Kiskore (4730-2030)

Zalaegerszeg (4650-1651) - Bak (4643-1651)

Zirc (4716-1752) - Lokut (4712-1752) - Penzeskut (4714-1747)

In choosing some training areas the Hungarian Army apparently places emphasis on the concealment factor. Some camps are located in mountainous and wooded areas which do not appear to offer good training facilities. Map A shows that of the geographically suitable refuge areas all but two or three should be eliminated either because they coincide with, or are in close proximity to, training and maneuver areas. The entire Bakony Forest appears to be a vast training area. Near the Pilis refuge area there is a training and maneuver area probably used by motorized rifle troops. In the Borzsony mountain area there are extensive firing ranges and summer training areas. It is reasonable to assume that, when in use, all these areas are closely guarded and it would be quite hazardous to use them as Special Forces refuge areas and/or bases of operations.

### 3. Locale of Dissidence and Resistance

The resistance picture in Hungary is such as to permit only questionable generalizations about the comparatively intensity of peasant and worker resistance, and there is no feasible method of estimating resistance potential in various parts of the country. There are no sizeable communities of ethnic minorities, and no institutions of local or national importance which have organizationally survived the approximately seven years of Communist domination. A study of dissidence and resistance in Hungary reveals no definite patterns: passive resistance has been widely spread and scattered; similarly, incidents of active resistance largely appear to represent sporadic outbursts of pent-up opposition which cannot be accurately related to any particular locale as indicating the mood and temper of the people.

Incidents of passive and active resistance which have occurred during the last three years are listed in Tabs C and E. These have occurred in both the cities and the outlying areas, but in no particular locality with such frequency as to suggest a greater degree of opposition to the regime. Current reports of resistance incidents which can be verified may, however, serve as an index of local dissidence which can be exploited. The dozen or more underground groups, reported as existing at one time or another since 1948, operated largely in the major cities (see Tab [illeg.]). Possible remnants of some of these organizations still exist in a dormant state, and it is probable that more underground groups will appear at least as symbols of opposition to the regime.

As noted in Section C of this study which deals with resistance movements, there has been very little, if any, genuine partisan activity in Hungary. Incomplete and inadequately authenticated reports of partisan bands generally place them in those areas where topography provides some possibility of cover and concealment. Partisan activity has been reported in the Bakony, Pilis, Borzsony, Bukh, Matra and Mekesc [Mecsek] mountainous regions. Most of this activity allegedly occurred in 1950, a fact which may be explained by spotty reporting and/or the unavailability of earlier or later information for this study. No resistance whatsoever has been

reported in the Hegyalja mountain area. Of the areas listed, the Meksec Hills<sup>77</sup> have been cited most often and most recently as the scene of partisan activity; the Bakony Forest and the Pilis and Borzsony mountain areas are referred to most vaguely and infrequently in connection with such activity. A seemingly plausible report names the Matra-Bukh range<sup>78</sup> as a refuge area for partisan groups from Eastern Slovakia.

All-in all, the few reports of partisan resistance do little but confirm the general principle that partisan groups do not develop save in those geographic regions where there is terrain offering possibilities of cover and concealment. The incomplete reports of partisan activity available barely suggest that, of the limited mountainous areas in Hungary offering such terrain, the most advantageous are the Meksec Hills and the Matra-Bukh mountain areas.

*[Source: U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, (non-integrated collection of military studies). On file at the National Security Archive, "Soviet Flashpoints" Collection.]*

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<sup>77</sup> In connection with the interest of the Special Forces, it is noteworthy that the Meksec Hills and the Matra-Bukh range coincide with areas of great economic and strategic importance to Hungary. In view of Hungary's major economic weaknesses--her lack of minerals and sources of hydro-electric power--the coal mines near Pecs (the only natural source of coking coal in Hungary) and the lignite reserves of Salgotarjan and the Matra foothills are outstanding economic targets. Furthermore, one of the main industrial regions in Hungary is located in the Matra-Bukh area (at Salgotarjan, Ozd, Diosgyor and Miskolc), a fact that highlights the strategic importance of the rail network in this area. [Footnote in original.]

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.* [Footnote in original.]