

Hungarian Diplomacy and the Non-Aligned Movement in the Cold War

Decades have passed since the end of the Cold War but its origins, essence, outcomes and consequences are still a matter of brisk historical debate. To examine the complexities of the Cold War in Europe we not only need to use a wide range of archives on the continent itself but we definitely need to go over the borders of Europe to develop a more detailed understanding. The germination of the Cold war has happened in the final years of the Second World War and it started just after the end of it. It has got its name because both superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union were afraid of fighting each other directly in a hot war, which could have led to a nuclear strike against each other. Such a nuclear endgame might destroy the whole human civilisation. As they have recognized this very risk they fought instead each other indirectly. They confronted each other and played havoc with conflicts in different parts of the world. Historians might disagree about the importance of the various Cold War theatres but they will not dispute the role of the countries outside Europe have played in it. The Cold War world was separated into three groups. The United States led the West with democratic political systems. The Soviet Union led the East with communist political systems. The third group included countries that did not want to be tied to either the first or the second world. The term „*third world*” was coined in August 1952 by the French demographer Alfred Sauvy in the magazine *L'Observateur*. With the Chinese Revolution just three years old and conflict raging in Korea, political thinking was dominated by the Cold War, in which the two ideologically opposed alliances seemed to be leading the world towards an all-out war between capitalism and communism. Sauvy argued, such a perspective ignored the real revolution in international relations: the arrival of the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America on the world stage. Drawing an explicit comparison with the role of the Third Estate during the French Revolution, Sauvy wanted to convey the colossal transformation represented by decolonization. As in 1789, Sauvy warned, „*this third world, ignored, exploited, scorned, wishes to stand up for itself*”.¹ To develop a more detailed understanding of the impact of the Cold War upon the processes of political change one needs to understand how all sides actively tried to influence political and economic developments around the world.

The United States and the Soviet Union provided military, economic, and technical aid to governments in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The United

¹ Martin Evans, Whatever Happened to the Non-Aligned Movement? In: *History Today* 57 (2007) 12, 49-50.

States helped Third World governments to fight communism while the Soviet Union tried to establish communist or at least pro-communist regimes. The superpowers and their closed allies offered aid, sold weapons, sent civilian and military advisers and in some cases invaded or helped to overthrow governments. If one side seized control over a certain country the other side tried to compensate itself elsewhere. That was the logic of the Cold War which affected the different regions of the world in diverse ways and its impact has changed significantly in time. China, Korea, Vietnam, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Cuba are only a few examples. This study examines how Hungary, a non-sovereign member of the communist block established links to the non-aligned group of countries, what were the intentions and the benefits of those affiliations. How the political struggle between communism and capitalism affected Hungary's wider international positions, in particular given the importance of Hungary to the dynamics of the Cold War in 1956 and in the years after when the „*Hungarian question*” was on the agenda. As foreign policy can generally be discussed under several aspects, like regime stability, security, trade and economic policy, national identity and state autonomy,² each of which relates to a particular problem complex we have to limit ourselves to the last issue. This approach helps us to understand what potential was bearing the connection to the Non-Aligned Movement, in a wider sense to the Third World, and why was it relatively important in one particular period (in the years after 1956) and why it had lost again its real significance after the mid-sixties.

The origin of the Non-Aligned Movement

Nobody would question the relevance of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War but many are of the opinion that this relevance was lost with the end of the bipolar era. And they seem to be right, the organization holds summits only every three years and even that is not very high on the international agenda. The last, 14th summit conference of heads of states and governments of the non-aligned countries was held in Havana, Cuba 11th to 16th of September, 2006.³ That means that on various diplomatic levels statements on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement are made since by the delegate of Cuba, as the representative of the organization, but on the official Cuban homepage of the 2006 summit the list of participants is in March 2009 still „*En construcción*” just like the page of the „*Adopted documents*”.⁴ It was not always clear how many actual members the group had. For example in 1992 Slovenia in principle inherited the membership as a former Yugoslav

² Tomas Niklasson, *Regime Stability and Foreign Policy Change. Interaction between Domestic and Foreign Policy in Hungary 1956-1994*. Lund Political Studies 143. (2006) 69.

³ The next summit will take place in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, 11-16 July 2009.

⁴ Movimiento de Países No Alineados: <http://www.cubanoal.cu/ingles/index.html>

republic but never exercised that. At the beginning of 2009 there are 53 African, 38 Asian, 26 Latin American and Caribbean and only one European (Belarus) all in all 118 members.⁵ In 2004 when 10 new states joined the European Union, two of them, Cyprus and Malta ceased to be a member of the group of non-aligned countries. Since that year they have the status of an observer in that movement. The last, 15th Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement held in Tehran, 27-30 July 2008 endorsed the application of Montenegro as an observer country of the Movement.⁶

In its organization and structure is the Non-Aligned Movement quite unique. First, it considers itself to be non-hierarchical in nature in that there are no countries that contain veto power or have special privileges in certain areas. The movement has neither a secretary general nor a permanent secretariat as it managed by the presidential troika committee, which includes the former, current and coming presidents of movement, and an office of coordination in New York which includes representatives of the member states already existing in the UN. The Non-Aligned Movement enjoys a great voting influence on issues such as human rights and UN management and financial affairs. The chair is rotated officially at each summit. The administration of the organization falls to the responsibility of a rotating chair (currently until July 2009 Cuba, than Egypt for 3 years) and the rotation is consistent. Secondly, the organization does not have any sort of constitution as many similar organizations do. This was done out of recognition that with so many countries having so many varying viewpoints and priorities, any formal sort of administrative structure would increase divisiveness and eventually lead to the collapse of the organization. Membership in the organization has changed from the original just as requirements. As the organization has matured and international political circumstances have changed, so too have the requirements. There is an obvious attempt to integrate the requirements of the Non-Aligned Movement with the key beliefs of the United Nations.

The non-aligned movement has the origin in the anti-colonial discourse of pre-1947 India. Even the term „*Non-Alignment*” was coined by the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru during his speech in 1954 in Colombo, Ceylon. In that speech Nehru described the five pillars to be used as a guide for Sino-Indian relations, called Panchsheel, the „*five restraints*”, or five principles. Krishna Menon who also played an important role in the establishment of the Non-aligned Movement and who represented India at the United Nations in 1946 and again from 1952 to 1961 and one of the initiators of the proposal for the Asian-African Conference in Bandung described first

⁵ The Movement recognizes three categories for participation: Full Member, Observer and Guest. See: XV. Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, 11-16 July 2009. <http://www.namegypt.org/en/Pages/default.aspx>

⁶ The Conference also endorsed the application of the Secretariat of the Commonwealth of Nations as an Observer Organization. (NAM 2008/INF.5)

the Panchsheel, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as a facile start to a complex diplomacy but later has changed his mind.⁷

The five principles, i. e. mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in domestic affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence have been adopted in many other international documents. That meant peace and disarmament, self-determination, particularly for colonial peoples, economic equality, cultural equality, and multilateralism exercised through a strong support for the United Nations. These principles served later also as the basis of the Non-Aligned Movement, emerged even as a slogan or mantra. This sense of shared identity is common to the non-aligned movement ever since. The movement tried to serve as a kind of counterweight to the two rival Cold War blocs and as an international pressure group for the Third World. This „Thirdism”⁸ inspired a wide range of political initiatives. Shortly before the Indian independence Nehru wrote that his country would pursue „a policy of its own as a free state, not as a satellite of another nation”.⁹ Nehru clearly stated that non-alignment should be considered not within the classical 19th century European framework of non-involvement, but as a dynamic policy directed against imperialism and in support of national advancement. He also viewed the opposition to Western domination as inseparable from his desire for both national legitimacy and identity and social progress. In the course of a speech in the Indian Parliament in 1951, he stated: „By aligning ourselves with any one power, you surrender your opinion, give up the policy you would normally pursue because somebody else wants you to pursue another policy.”¹⁰

Nehru defended the right of self-determination of nations, the independence and sovereignty of states and the right of every nation to develop freely and to choose, without foreign interference, its own socio-political system. Since the largest obstacle to independence for India, and Third World nations, more generally, was the continued presence of the British and of the other European colonial powers, a proactive and productive foreign policy, specifically anti-colonial in tone, was easily located within the discourse of nationalism used

⁷ Menon recalled later: „When I saw the drafting of the Five Principles I thought it had been rather badly written, ... I said so to the prime minister (Nehru), and he said, „what does it matter; it isn't a treaty or anything, it's a preface to this Tibetan business.” See: Abraham Itty, From Bandung to NAM: Non-alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947-65, in: *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 46, (2008) 2, 195-219.

⁸ From a communist revolutionary perspective Mao Zedong formulated a theory of three worlds in which the First World consisted of the then-superpowers (Soviet Union and United States), whose imperialistic policies, as he felt, posed the greatest threat to world peace. Mao placed the middle powers (Japan, Canada, and Europe) in the Second World. Africa, Latin America, and Asia (including China) formed the Third World. <http://science.jrank.org/pages/11447/Third-World-Origins.html>>Third World - Origins

⁹ Jawaharlal Nehru, *Vneshnaya politika Indii*, Moscow 1965, 30-31.

¹⁰ Kristin S. Tassin, „Lift up Your Head, My Brother”: Nationalism and the Genesis of the Non-Aligned Movement, in: *Journal of Third World Studies*, Vol. XXIII, (2006) 1. 147-168.

throughout the pre-independence period in India. Nehru was the progenitor of the first Asian Relations Conference held in Delhi in 1947. Many of its participants were yet to be decolonised. The concept was to create a ring of strong, prosperous, unified nations with a common purpose and goal to throw off the yoke of colonial powers and to create vibrant and self-sufficient nations within a strategically and economically relevant Third World. In December 1954 the so called Colombo powers, India, Burma, Pakistan, Indonesia and Ceylon, decided to meet in Bogor to settle issues regarding a large scale conference. After long debates they decided to invite China to that conference which became the most significant milestone in the development of the non-aligned movement and most important conference of the Afro-Asian Block. It was held in Bandung, in 1955 and hosted by Indonesia. Indonesian president Sukarno. This conference is generally seen as the founding meeting of the non-aligned movement. 29 states were participating, mostly from Asia and six from Africa. Many of them had recently been decolonised and the anti-colonial sentiments were very strong among them. The Final Communiqué of the Bandung Conference condemned colonialism on various grounds. It called colonialism a „*means of cultural repression*” and defined colonialism as „*the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation*”. In their condemnation of colonialism however there existed considerable divergence between the participants as they expressed their opinion on its definition.¹¹

Some countries which strictly belong to Afro-Asia were not invited to the conference in the first place on political grounds, e.g. South Africa, Israel, North and South Korea and Taiwan.¹² The five principles were considered as the initiative of the left-wing countries, the Western aligned nations, such as Pakistan and Iraq made as counter-proposal the so called „*Seven Pillars of Peace*”. Carlos Romulo the head of the Philippines’ delegation was even called during the days of the conference as the „*Voice of America*”.¹³ But the main surprise came from the prime minister of Ceylon, Sir John Kotewala. He delivered his speech maintaining that: „*There is another form of colonialism, however, about which many of us represented here are perhaps less clear in our minds and to which some of us would perhaps not agree to apply the term colonialism at all. Think, for example, of those satellite States under Communist domination in Central and Eastern Europe, of Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland. Are not these colonies as much as any of the colonial territories in Africa or Asia? And if we are united in our opposition to*

¹¹ On the fourth day of the Conference (21 April 1955), Syrian Foreign Minister Kahled Bey Al Azam named the most important issues: Palestine, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and West Irian.

¹² Volker Matthies, The „*Spirit of Bandung*” 1955-1985: Thirty Years since the Bandung Conference. In: *Intereconomics* 20, (1985) 5, 207-210.

¹³ In 1953 Romulo was a candidate for the position of United Nations Secretary-General but he lost to the Swedish diplomat Dag Hammarskjöld.

colonialism, should it not be our duty openly to declare our opposition to Soviet colonialism as much as to Western imperialism?"¹⁴

Some delegates protested they were not in Bandung to „listen to the propaganda of John Foster Dulles”¹⁵, but Kotewala's strongest critic was the Chinese prime minister Zhou En Lai. He adhered to the Leninist doctrine on colonialism, according to which colonialism equalled „capitalist exploitation”. According to that doctrine socialist systems of government could therefore never be colonial. Zhou also might have felt threatened by the analogies between Russian colonialism and Chinese policies, in Inner Mongolia, Uyghurstan or East Turkistan and Tibet. For these reasons Zhou objected to the inclusion of the phrase „colonialism in all its forms”, as proposed by the majority. He finally accepted the face-saving word „manifestations” instead of „forms”, so the conference as a whole could declare that „colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which must be speedily brought to an end.” As far as Zhou's rejection of Kotewala's observation was mostly based on reasons of a political rather than a conceptual nature, it had little bearing on the conference's observations on the nature of colonialism as a system of „alien domination, subjugation and exploitation.”¹⁶ Making an explicit link between Nazism and colonialism, the Bandung conference also declared its support for the rights of the peoples of all countries to self-determination. Finally the conference agreed upon the Ten Principles of Bandung (Dasa Sila Bandung).¹⁷

Six years after Bandung, an initiative of the Yugoslav president Tito led to the first official Non-Aligned Movement Summit, which was held in Belgrade on 1-6 September 1961 with 28 countries participating (25 full members and 3 observers). During the period of Tito's struggle against Moscow it was natural for the Yugoslav leader to seek and find allies among the newly liberated

¹⁴ UNP Ceylon Prime Minister, Sir John Kotelawala at Bandung, 1955. http://www.tamilnation.org/intframe/tamileelam/56sir_john.htm

¹⁵ Abraham Itty, op. cit.

¹⁶ Making an explicit link between Nazism and colonialism, the Bandung conference also declared its support for the rights of the peoples of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self-determination, thereby encapsulating a gathering spirit of revolt against European domination.

¹⁷ The Dasa Sila principles were adopted later as the main goals and objectives of the policy of non-alignment: 1. Respect of fundamental human rights and of the objectives and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 2. Respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations. 3. Recognition of the equality among all races and of the equality among all nations, both large and small. 4. Non-intervention or non-interference into the internal affairs of another country. 5. Respect of the right of every nation to defend itself, either individually or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. 6. A. Non-use of collective defense pacts to benefit the specific interests of any of the great powers. 7. B. Non-use of pressures by any country against other countries. 8. Refraining from carrying out or threatening to carry out aggression, or from using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country. 9. Peaceful solution of all international conflicts in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. 10. Promotion of mutual interests and of cooperation. 11. Respect of justice and of international obligations.

countries. Most of these manifested socialist tendencies in varying degrees, but were opposed, both to their former Western „imperialist” rulers, and to Soviet or Chinese style communism. Yugoslavia's support for these newly independent states of Asia and Africa was also calculated to bolster its own position in Europe. This was for Tito of great importance, particularly in view of the fact that the conflict with Moscow had compelled him to look for closer relations with the West and had resulted in more liberal domestic policies. An alliance with the neutral countries of Asia and Africa was important to him in his struggle against both „Western imperialism” and Soviet hegemony. In December 1954 and January 1955, Tito visited India and Burma, just at the time when it was decided that the first conference of Asian and African nations should take place in Bandung. While in New Delhi he signed a joint statement with Nehru (23 December 1954) in which for the first time the meaning of the policy of nonalignment was explained, neutrality was separated into its „positive” and „negative” aspects and the idea of a third bloc was firmly ruled out as „a contradiction in terms, because such a bloc would mean involvement in the very system of alignments that has been rejected as undesirable.” Tito's reputation was enhanced after Khrushchev came to Belgrade in May 1955, one month after the Bandung Conference to apologize for Stalin's mistakes. This was mainly the reason why the initiative in organizing and co-ordinating the activities of the non-aligned countries passed into the Yugoslav leader's hands. He travelled through Asia and Africa and won much sympathy for Yugoslavia and a style of communism that had been accepted even by Moscow as one of „various roads to socialism.” The Afro-Asian countries saw in the Yugoslav system a type of communism which was tolerated both by the West and by Moscow. The Afro-Asian neutrals were impressed by Tito's success in playing the extremes against the middle. This game was possible simply because it appeared that the non-aligned countries could fill an important role in a situation marked by tense relations between two great blocs.¹⁸

In Belgrade the founding fathers of the movement besides Tito were Nehru from India, Sukarno from Indonesia, Nasser from Egypt and Nkrumah from Ghana. In July 1961, during the preparatory meeting in Cairo for the summit in Belgrade they formulated what they called a political yardstick for determining whether a country is non-aligned or not. (1. Is a country following an independent policy based on peaceful coexistence and nonalignment, or does it manifest sympathy for such a policy? 2. Does it support the struggle for national liberation? 3. Does it belong to any collective military pact that might draw it into a conflict between the great powers? 4. Is it party to any bilateral alliance with a great power? 5. Does it have, any foreign military bases on its territory?) Their action was called „the Initiative of Five”. The Belgrade summit was

¹⁸ Slobodan Stankovic Summary , RAD Background Report/166, Tito and the Nonaligned Summit in Colombo, BOX-FOLDER-REPORT: 82-3-186, <http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/82-3-186.shtml>

disturbed by Moscow's resumption of nuclear testing on September 1, the very day the conference, began. This immediately led to a clash between Tito, who supported the Soviet action, and Nehru, who regretted it.

The second summit was held in Cairo on 5-8 October 1964 with 57 countries present (47 full members and 10 observers), the third was organized in Lusaka (Zambia) on 8-10 September 1970 with 64 countries attending (54 full members and 10 observers), the fourth met in Algiers on 2-8 September 1973 with 87 countries taking part (75 full members, 9 observers, and 3 guests, plus representatives of 15 liberation movements were also present, these were given the status of observers, plus 4 international organizations). The fifth conference of non-aligned nations was taking place in Colombo on 16-19 August 1976 with 85 full members, 10 observers, 11 revolutionary movements and organizations, 3 guests. (Sweden, Austria, and Finland) At that summit Tito was the only survivor of the original „*Big Five*” of the movement.¹⁹ The sixth conference meeting was held in Havana, September 3-9, 1979. Castro's long shadow was hanging over that summit as for his revolution export-import venture the ties to the Soviet Union was a kind of „*natural alliance*” and under the chairmanship of Fidel Castro the summit discussed the concept of an anti-imperialist alliance with the invader of Afghanistan. The Havana Declaration of 1979 was accenting the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of non-aligned countries in their „*struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, interference or hegemony as well as against great power and bloc politics.*”²⁰ At the seventh summit held in New Delhi (instead of Baghdad) in March 1983, the movement described itself as the „*history's biggest peace movement*”.²¹ Here and later in Harare (1986) and again in Belgrade (1989) in spite of ever-increasing participation there were clear signs of decline of the movement as the end of the cold war was nearing.

From the 1960s through the 1980s the movement which already represented nearly two-thirds of the United Nation's members and comprised more than half of the world population, used its majority voting power within the United Nations to redirect the global political agenda away from East-West wrangles over the needs of the Third World. However, in practice, with the exception of anticolonialism, about which there could be strong agreement, the aim of creating an independent force in world politics quickly succumbed to the pressure of Cold War alliances. By the 1970s the non-aligned movement had largely become an advocate of Third World demands for a New International

¹⁹ Sometimes with Ben Bella from Algeria they are mentioned as the „*Big Six*” but the later was not present at the beginning.

²⁰ Grant, Cedric, Equity in Third World Relations: a third world perspective, in: *International Affairs* 71, 3 (1995), 567-587.

²¹ András Balogh, Az el nem kötelezett országok csúcserkeztele Új-Delhiben (The New Delhi Summit of the Non-Aligned Countries) in: *Külpolitika*, 10 (1983) 2, 86-102.

Economic Order (NIEO), a role it shared with the Group of 77, the caucusing group of Third World states within the United Nations. Through NIEO, the Third World argued in favour of a complete restructuring of the prevailing world order, which they perceived to be unjust, as the only enduring solution to the economic problems facing them. At the level of UNESCO, Third World scholars waged a war against unequal cultural exchange through calls for a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). In general, the Third World wanted a new order based on equity, sovereignty, interdependence, common interest, and cooperation among all states. Given the economic weakness of the Soviet Union, these demands were essentially directed at the West.

Between East and West: Hungarian Foreign Policy in the 20th Century

During the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century Hungary was a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire with no independent foreign policy. Baron Ludwig von Flotow is regarded as the last common Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister. Once it regained its independence, Hungary had to establish its own Foreign Ministry. In November 1918 Prime Minister Count Mihály Károlyi was in the same time ad interim charged with foreign affairs.²²

The tasks of the Hungarian foreign policy did not change considerably in the last centuries, i. e. staving off foreign invasions, preventing a dangerous combination of hostile neighbours, and finding allies among the powers. With the rise of nationalism in the 1830s, a new task was added, to preserve the territorial integrity in face of the non-Hungarian nationalities and their conationals beyond the borders. There was also a pipe-dream of what might be called the Hungarian imperial idea, concerning the Balkan, Turkey and Central Asia.²³ In 1918-19 the Hungarian foreign policy's goal was to preserve the country's integrity and find a way to break out of the international isolation in which the newly independent state found itself. The 1920 Trianon Peace Treaty signed with Hungary among others by the Associated Powers as China, Cuba,

²² See: Pál Pritz, Geschichte des ungarischen auswärtigen Dienstes 1918-1945, in: Das Institutionserbe der Monarchie. Das Fortleben der gemeinsamen Vergangenheit in den Archiven. Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs. Sonderband 4. 1998. (Wien) 1-14.

²³ That was the pan-turanist idea of the Hungarian Turan Society founded in 1910 which included many leading scholars like the future prime minister count Pál Teleki. Turanism emerged as an ambitious version of Hungarian imperialism playing up the Asiatic roots of the Hungarians and the supposed close relationship of Hungarian to the languages of Central Asia. After the Trianon Treaty many rejected Europe and turned towards the East in search of new allies in a bid to revise the terms of the treaty and restore the Hungarian „supremacy”. not just on the Balkans, but also the in regions between the Caspian Sea and the Pamir mountains as potential targets for economic and cultural penetration by Hungary. The first issue of the Journal „*Turán*” started in 1913 by the Turan Society.

Nicaragua, Panama and Siam, in Part IV. regulated the „*Hungarian Interests outside Europe*”, from articles 79-101. dealing with questions concerning Morocco, Egypt, Siam and China.²⁴

After Trianon the intentions have taken the form of trying to maintain peaceful relations with the neighbouring states while giving support to the Hungarians who were detached from Hungary and became national minorities. Such were the aims of the regimes that followed each other in succession, and which are identified with the names of Mihály Károlyi, Béla Kun, and Miklós Horthy. During the interwar years the breakout from the international isolation could have been and was achieved only via the support of other revisionist powers, first fascist Italy and later Nazi Germany.²⁵ That did not help at all to keep off from the catastrophic effects of the Second World War. As most of Asia and Africa were under colonial domination, diplomatic ties existed with the world outside Europe (besides with the US since 1921 and with Japan since 1938) mostly with Latin American countries. The Younger Son of Regent Horthy, Miklós Horthy Jr. was for example envoy in Rio de Janeiro between 1939-1942. In the same time in Sao Paulo Hungarian consulate operated. In 1942 diplomatic relations were cut off and soon Brazil declared war to Hungary.²⁶ Diplomatic relations with Mexico were suspended already in 1941. In most Latin-American countries the representation of Hungary was taken over by Sweden in 1942.

„Years of Darkness”

In January 1944 the Soviet deputy foreign affairs commissar, Igor Maisky prepared his concept on „*the desired main principles of the future world*” in a memorandum prepared for V. Molotov, the foreign affairs commissar of the Soviet Union, outlined the Soviet foreign policy priorities for the post-war period in the different regions of the world. According to this Hungary after the Second World War as the other states of Central Europe was supposed to become the part of the Soviet sphere of influence and should have been treated as a country defeated in the war. The course, which was set by Soviet great power interests determined the Hungarian foreign policy nearly for the next half a century. Diplomatic ties were re-established between Budapest and Moscow September 25th 1945.²⁷ The Hungarian regime had little freedom to define its own foreign policy interests owing to its structural links with the

²⁴ Dénes Halmosy, *Nemzetközi szerződések 1918-1945 (International Treaties 1918-1945)* Budapest 1983, 98-110.

²⁵ Peter Pastor, Major Trends in Hungarian Foreign Policy from the Collapse of the Monarchy to the Peace Treaty of Trianon, in: *Hungarian Studies* 17 (2003) 1 3-11.

²⁶ Ágnes Judit Szilágyi, János Sáringer, Ifj. Horthy Miklós, a Kormányzó kisebbik fia (Miklós Horthy Jr., the Younger Son of the Regent) Budapest 2002, 33-45.

²⁷ Originally the diplomatic ties were established February 4th 1934.

Soviet Union. During these years, practically no independent foreign policy initiative or position was taken. This was an alignment with the Soviet Union, adopted under the force of circumstances, or as Gyula Szekfű, the eminent historian and Hungarian ambassador in Moscow in 1946 put it out: „*we have just one neighbour, the Soviet Union*”²⁸

The absence of options facing Hungarian foreign policy after 1945 was not initially apparent. Only after the Paris peace treaty was signed in 1947 it became obvious for all the Hungarian political forces, that the Soviet occupational forces will not leave Hungary. The reason was the need to keep connection with the Soviet zone in Austria but in the same time it was political backing for the Hungarian Communist Party lead by Mátyás Rákosi in order to seize the power and to eliminate all the political enemies. In March 1947, in a debate on foreign relations in the National Assembly the majority of the speakers took the position that the country should avoid any one-sided orientation, while the Communist Party maintained that Hungary should join the bloc being created by the Soviet Union. „*If we miss that we'll be isolated from the truly democratic countries, ... and facilitate Hungary becoming a base for the Anglo-American imperialist circles.*”²⁹ By 1948 a monolithic, communist-controlled system was imposed upon every country under the occupation of the Red Army, and Hungary, too, became „*a captive nation,*” a satellite of the Soviet Union.³⁰

With the formation of the Information Office of the Communist and Workers' parties (Cominform) on September 22, 1947 the expectations and concrete demands of the Soviet Stalinist leadership were transmitted towards the „*fraternal*” communist and workers' parties. Deviation from the guidance of Moscow could result in serious sanctions, as the Tito led Yugoslavia experienced it after May 1948. The Communist Party's takeover from 1947 and the ensuing sovietisation of Hungary led to the rule of Mátyás Rákosi, „*Stalin's best pupil*” and of his fellow „*Homo cominternicus*”. Show trials, executions, forced settlement of hundreds of thousands, imprisonment, harassment, forced industrial development, a drop in living standards, and long years of Stalinist dictatorship followed. The Hungarian communist leadership feared both, the local population and the resentment of Moscow. The head of the Soviet empire mistrusted everybody, especially people like Rákosi and would not hesitate to eliminate him. Such mistrust explains why the Soviets built out in 1948-50

²⁸ From: Gyula Szekfű, *Forradalom után (After the Revolution)*. Budapest, (1947) 120-121. Quoted by Ignác Romsics, *From Christian Shield to EU Member. Perceptions of Hungary's Situation and Role in Europe*, in: *The Hungarian Quarterly*, XLVIII. (2007) 188, 3-27.

²⁹ Position taken by the Political Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party on March 20, 1947. Quoted by Géza Jeszenszky, *Hungary's Foreign Policy Dilemmas*, in: *The Hungarian Quarterly*, 34 (Summer 1993) 3-13.

³⁰ Géza Jeszenszky, *Hungary's Foreign Policy Dilemmas After Regaining Sovereignty*, in: *Society and Economy, Journal of the Corvinus University of Budapest*, vol. 29. (2007) 1, 43-64.

such an extraordinary controlling apparatus in Hungary. Besides the „normal” diplomatic representation there was the continuing military occupation, the party-level ties and they infiltrated the Hungarian state structures with legal advisors and illegal agents.³¹

To break the international isolation immediately after the war the Hungarian government tried to re-establish trade and diplomatic relations with the Latin-American countries in the first place besides Europe. The political efforts and petitions of the Hungarian government concerning this matter were usually turned down by the Allied Control Commission directed by the representatives of the Soviet Union. This is why the representation of Hungarian interests by Sweden continued in many Latin-American countries until 1948, even after in 1946 the first diplomat was sent back to Latin America, legation counsellor Ádám Koós to Brazil.³² He was running a bureau defending Hungarian interests at the Rio de Janeiro representation of Sweden, but in 1948 protesting the communist turn in Hungary he refused to return home. A great number of emigrants from Hungary who fled after the war from the communist regime arrived in Latin American countries, Argentina’s share was between 12 and 14 thousand, Brazil got „some” ten-thousands, Venezuela about 4 thousand, Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, Peru, Colombia and some of the Caribbean Countries a couple of hundreds each. Quite successful were the economic links based on the complementary character of Latin American and Hungarian exports, raw materials and food in exchange for machinery such as transport equipment to Uruguay and Argentina, and they were backed by the Hungarian emigrants active in the Latin American business community.³³

The war psychosis was out of all proportion to the scale of the international tensions. This led to a constant search for enemies. Joseph C. Kun, an associate of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs at Columbia University in his work, „*Hungarian Foreign Policy. The Experience of a New Democracy*” after he deals with the Hungarian foreign policy before 1945 calls the years between 1945 and 1980 as „years of darkness”.³⁴ He sees „light at the end of the tunnel” only in the 1980s. For any cases by 1947 the pluralist era was over in Hungary. In the foreign ministry aristocrats and members of the former ruling classes were branded as the reactionary enemies of the people, they lost their civil service posts one by one. It was in the foreign diplomatic service that they were tolerated the longest, class cleansing started there only after the Treaty of

³¹ János Rainer M., Magyarország a szovjet érdekszférában (Hungary in the Soviet Sphere of Interests), in: János Gyurgyák (Hrsg), *Mi a politika? Bevezetés a politika világába* (What is Politics? Introduction to the World of Politics) Budapest 1994, 325- 361.

³² Szilágyi, Sáringer, op. cit. 33-45.

³³ András Inotai, Latin American Studies in Hungary. in: *Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe* (European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies) 72, (2002) 1, 115-121.

³⁴ Joseph C. Kun: *Hungarian Foreign Policy. The Experience of a New Democracy*. Westport, 1993, 168.

Paris was signed. In January 1948 one hundred persons were fired from the staff of the ministry. At the same time the state president Zoltán Tildy was placed under house arrest (lasted eight years, until 1956) and after his son-in-law, Viktor Csornoky the Hungarian minister to Egypt an agent, Béla Szász was sent to gather evidence against him, as he was suspected by the increasingly communist-dominated administration of having unauthorised contacts with western governments. Csornoky was ordered home to face investigation. He was tried and hanged for currency speculation and for trying to contact a Western intelligence in Cairo with the purpose to sell Hungary's diplomatic code to „*a foreign power*”.³⁵

During the Stalinist dictatorship the country had become a peripheral part of the Soviet empire, little diplomatic intercourse happened with the outside world. In 1947 Hungary established diplomatic ties with Egypt (in the same year as with Turkey), so this country became the first on the list of the foreign ministry from the „*third world*”.³⁶ In 1948 followed India and North Korea, the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Argentina took place in 1949, in the following year diplomatic relations were established with Israel, Vietnam and Mongolia, in 1951 with Iran. In later years only Syria followed in 1954 and in the year of the Bandung Conference Indonesia. In December 1955 Hungary joined the UN together with 15 other countries.³⁷ (In May of the same year it had to accede to the Warsaw Treaty.) In 1956 with Sudan and Uruguay were diplomatic relations established, but the later was pending until 1964 because of the Soviet military intervention later in that year.

The experience of 1956, when Hungarians had „*gone too far*”, had shown that the Soviet Union would not accept any major deviation from Moscow's policy line. Relations between the Kádár regime and Moscow were clearly characterised by asymmetric interdependence. Furthermore, after „*the first war among socialist states*”³⁸ in 1956, the Soviet Union strengthened its control over Hungarian foreign policy through inter-party contacts, diplomatic representatives, the Soviet military and the security police. That led to a

³⁵ Charles Gati, *Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian revolt*. Stanford, 2006, 80-81.

³⁶ Diplomatic relations with Ecuador were re-established in August 1969 but Ecuador asked to modify the date to 1946. This is why in some studies Ecuador stays as first. See: János Dömény, *Hungarian-Latin-American Relations after World War II. A Chronology*. Cold War History Research Center, Budapest. http://www.coldwar.hu/html/en/chronologies/hung_latin.html#1960 and also: Miklós Nagy (Hrsg), *A magyar külpolitika 1956-1989 történelmi kronológia*. Hrsg, Miklós Nagy, MTA Jelenkorkutató Bizottság, 1993 (Hungarian Foreign Politics 1956-1989, Historical Chronology. Compiled by Miklós Nagy, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Committee for Contemporary History, 1993).

³⁷ Those countries were: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Kingdom of Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Romania and Spain. With that the original membership of 51 countries in 1945 grew to 76 countries.

³⁸ This term was introduced by Béla Kiraly, in 1956 commander-in-chief of the military guard and military commander of Budapest.

negative image and the partial isolation of Hungary and from the West for a number of years.

Aftermath and consequences of the Hungarian uprising for the Non-Aligned Movement

US secretary of state, John Foster Dulles had suggested already on October 24th that the UN Security Council be convened to discuss the situation in Hungary. The issue was placed on the agenda at the October 28th meeting of the Security Council, the vote was 9 to 1, only Yugoslavia was abstaining.³⁹ On November 2nd, 3rd and 4th the Hungarian question was also discussed. The Soviet Union had used its veto to prevent the passage of an anti-intervention resolution in the Security Council. Britain and France managed to shift the Hungarian question from the Security Council to the emergency session of the General Assembly as for the Suez conflict they hoped to gain time. The shift of the issue to the General Assembly elevated the position of the third world countries. 4th November 1956 on „*The Situation in Hungary*” Resolution 1004 (ES-II) was affirming „*the right of the Hungarian people to a government responsive to its national aspirations and dedicated to its independence.*” It was adopted by 50 votes to 8 with 15 abstentions. 50 countries voted in favour, 8 against (Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Ukraine, USSR), with 15 abstentions (Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Finland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen and Yugoslavia).⁴⁰ Those countries voted at later resolutions in the Hungarian question mostly also with abstention.

November 14th the prime ministers of India, Burma, Indonesia, and Ceylon already expressed their uneasiness about the events both in Egypt⁴¹ and in Hungary and their strong disapproval and their chagrin in connection with the aggression and the intervention of great powers against weak countries. They called it a violation of a condition of the UN Charter and of the spirit and letter

³⁹ Samir N. Anabtawi, *The Afro-Asian States and the Hungarian Question*. In: *International Organization*, Vol. 17(1963) 04, 872-900.

⁴⁰ United Nations Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during its Second Emergency Special Session from 4 to 10 November 1956 Supplement No. 1 (A 3355) New York, 1956.

⁴¹ What most historians describe as the „*Suez Crisis*” was the tripartite invasion of the Suez Canal zone. It had started with the withdrawal of the American promise of a big loan for the construction of Aswan Dam. The Russians were coming in when the Americans left. On July 26 Nasser addressed a rally at Alexandria. His speech against British imperialism was also his most vehement, but what foxed his audience was his frequent reference by name to the French builder of the Suez Canal, Ferdinand de Lesseps. Only after the rally did the world discover that „*De Lesseps*” was the codeword for the Egyptian Army to start the seizure and nationalisation of the canal. The British prime minister Eden called him „*Grabber Nasser*”. The Suez Canal, Eden said, was Britain’s „*great imperial lifeline,*” especially for oil. After unproductive discussions at meetings of the Suez Canal Users’ Association the war followed.

of the Bandung Conference declaration and the principles expressed in it. They demanded that Soviet forces be quickly withdrawn from Hungary, and that the Hungarian people be granted the right „to decide for themselves the question of their future and to create the government that it wishes to have, without any sort of outside meddling.”⁴²

On November 21 the Assembly adopted a resolution sponsored by Ceylon, India and Indonesia which called on Hungary „without prejudice to its sovereignty” to permit United Nations observers to enter. A second resolution sponsored by Cuba urged the Soviet Union and Hungarian authorities to end the deportation of Hungarian citizens. The Cuban Delegate introduced with the following preface the resolution: „Hungary has become one big cemetery. The acts perpetrated by the army of the Soviet Union in Hungary beggar description. ... Men, women and children are led forcibly outside Hungarian territory. Executions have felled hundreds every day. And all this is being done despite indignant humanity which turns to the U.N. ... as the only means of putting this slaughter, this butchery, to an end.” The resolution repeated the U.N.’s previous demand for withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, called upon the Russians „to cease the deportation of Hungarian citizens and to return promptly to their homes those who have been deported.” A Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, composed of the representatives of Australia, Ceylon Denmark, Tunisia and Uruguay, was established by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 January 1957. It was charged by the General Assembly with the duty of providing the Assembly and all members of the U.N. with the fullest information regarding the situation created by the intervention of the Soviet Union through its use of armed force in the internal affairs of Hungary.⁴³

During the days of the uprising and in the months after it there were strong hopes among certain Hungarian intellectuals that India, with her special relationship with the Soviet Union would intervene into the Hungarian-Soviet conflict to reduce the extent of retaliation. There were attempts to send a memorandum outside Hungary via the recently established Indian Embassy. Charge de Affairs Mohammad Ataur Rahman put a lot of effort into making

⁴² Third World Reaction to Hungary and Suez, 1956: A Soviet Foreign Ministry Analysis, Cold War International History Project, Virtual Archive, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=82DDDEAF-D628-BF3A-FBBD65B5A0ABBCE4&sort=Coverage&item=Asia

⁴³ On 14 March 1957, the Committee requested the Secretary-General to inform the Government of Romania that the Committee desired to meet Imre Nagy in the interest of a full and effective performance of the functions entrusted to it by the General Assembly. The Permanent Representative of Romania replied on 30 March that his Government considered the establishment of the Committee as contrary to the spirit and provisions of the United Nations Charter, as well as to the interests of international co-operation.

General Assembly Official Records: Eleventh Session Supplement No. 18 (A/3592) New York, 1957.

the Indian government and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru use their influence for the sake of Hungarians. Such hopes were almost dashed by a statement of Krishna Menon on October 28 that developments in Hungary were internal matters for the Hungarian people. His statements and the vote against the US resolution on Hungary gave the impression that he favoured the Soviet action in Hungary. He was even quoted as saying that the presence of US and British forces in West Germany was the equivalent of the Soviet occupation of Hungary: „*In the Hungary Question the United States – the U.K. too – was most shamefacedly using the U.N. as an instrument of the Cold War.*”⁴⁴

At the same time there were sharp differences between the Nehru and Krishna Menon. Nehru himself was the first to protest against the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt. He spoke of the „*collapse of the world conscience*” and called for the immediate withdrawal of the three invaders. On the events in Hungary, however, he was initially cautious in „*deploring*” the Soviet Union. For this he was widely criticised. Later, when Nehru spoke of Hungary more sharply, the Russians reminded him that Hungary was „*as important to the Soviet Union as Kashmir was to India.*”⁴⁵ In later months there was much criticism led by Nehru, and joined by Indonesia and Burma of Western policy towards the Soviet Union. Those countries repeatedly questioned the continued UN interest in the Hungarian question. On 17 August 1957 Nehru met in Delhi with the Hungarian deputy foreign minister Károly Szarka and Ambassador Aladár Tamás and told them that India is not agreeing to keep further the Hungarian question on the UN agenda.⁴⁶

Search for international recognition

Foreign policy of Hungary after the events of 1956 was connected with the search for political stability. Even in later years the total subservience to the Soviet Union in foreign policy was the price paid for the modest economic reforms. Without any doubt Moscow had a veto over Hungary's actions. This was easy to maintain because of the „*radiant*” character of the ties inside of the communist block, the Soviet Union had direct contact with all the partners but ties among the later group were much less closed. Kádár tried by means of pragmatic foreign policy to wring advantages. This was cumbersome but accomplished successfully. At the same time when Kádár remained faithful to

⁴⁴ Michael Brechter, *India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World*, London 1968 85-86.

⁴⁵ Inder Malhotra, *50 years after Suez and Hungary. The Asian Age*, Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, London, www.asianage.com/presentation/columnisthome/inder-malhotra/art-of-clinging-to-gilded-chairs.aspx - 36k -

⁴⁶ Csaba Békés, D. Gusztáv Kecskés, *A forradalom és a magyar kérdés az ENSZ-ben, 1956-1963 (The Revolution and the Hungarian Question in the United Nations, 1956-1963)* Magyar ENSZ Társaság, Budapest (2006) 152.

Moscow, he could by piecemeal methods gain international room for manoeuvre. Kádár benefited from the rapprochement strategy, which meant a gradual opening of the international arenas. He tried to achieve political stability through external, primarily Soviet, recognition and support. In foreign relations he established relations with the Third World, with pro-Soviet or non-aligned countries and pursued the policy of „*peaceful co-existence*” of the socialist and capitalist systems.

In 1957 Prince Wan Waithayakon from Thailand became the United Nations Special Representative in the Hungarian question appointed by General Assembly resolution 1133 (XI). On 12 October 1957 the Hungarian foreign ministry declared that the prince will not get entry visa for Hungary as the Hungarian government considers the resolution 1133 (XI). as invalid. The prince reported on 9 December to the General Assembly that he will not be able to deliver.⁴⁷ His function was taken over three days later by Sir Leslie Knox Munro from New Zealand and the Hungarian question slowly disappeared during the following years from the international agenda. In 1960 secret talks started and on 20 October 1962 ended with a non written agreement between Hungary and the United States and as result, the Hungarian question was not put before the UN General Assembly and as a related development Hungary proclaimed in 1963 a general amnesty for 1956. Leading scholars of the history of the 1956 uprising in Hungary are of the opinion that keeping the Hungarian question on the UN agenda was a US tactic to highlight Soviet imperialism and with that to promote American influence among non-aligned countries.⁴⁸ For the Hungarian side the most important issue in that period was international recognition to break out from a nearly pariah status. After the quick internal stabilisation the Kádár regime achieved in the early 1960s an external stabilisation as well. After the the revolution was put down, Hungary could count only on the fellow Warsaw Pact countries and on China. Already in August 1957 a Hungarian goodwill mission headed by a deputy foreign minister visited India, Burma, Indonesia, Nepal, Ceylon, Syria, Egypt and Sudan. The delegation was received by the leading personalities of the Third World, like Nehru, Nasser and others. In 1960 Sukarno, in 1961 Nkrumah visited Hungary. That was a great victory for the Hungarian diplomacy, especially for the minister in charge between 1958-1961, Endre Sík. In the years he was the head of the Hungarian foreign ministry, 20 African countries achieved independence and became members of the UN. With many of them diplomatic relations were established, missions were opened in Conakry, Guinea in 1959, in Accra, Ghana in 1961 and in Bamako, Mali in 1962. Others followed soon.

⁴⁷ Csaba Békés, D. Gusztáv Kecskés, A forradalom és a magyar kérdés az ENSZ-ben, 1956–1963 (The Revolution and the Hungarian Question in the United Nations, 1956-1963) Magyar ENSZ Társaság, Budapest (2006) 153.

⁴⁸ Csaba Bekes, The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics, Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution Budapest, Working Paper No. 16. 1996, 23.

Endre Sík, foreign minister with a „third world touch”

After 30 years in Soviet exile, in September 1945 Endre Sík returned home to Hungary. In the next year he was appointed as counsellor of the Hungarian embassy in Washington. In 1947-48 he became a ministerial counsellor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from June 1948 till September 1949 he represented Hungary in the United States. After his return from Washington he became the head of the political department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a position he held until 1954. In the same time he was also the director of the Academy for Foreign Policy. In 1954 he became deputy foreign minister and in the next year first deputy of the foreign minister. In the years 1954-57 he chaired the Danube Commission changing its seat from Belgrade to Budapest parallelly with his appointment. During the revolution and popular uprising in 1956 in Budapest he firmly held to the Soviet side and to the few collaborating fellow Hungarians.⁴⁹

In 1958 he became the country's foreign minister at a time when the „*Hungarian question*” was highly controversial at the UN and other international gatherings. In 1958 he published in French a pamphlet about the negative impact of the UN on the affairs in Hungary.⁵⁰ As a diplomat he had to make the dirty work in the years of the worst oppression. Being a shy person he tried to avoid too much international attention. Following blindly the Soviet line he earned however much attention while meeting with the Israeli foreign minister Golda Meir in 1959 during the UN General Assembly in New York to re-establish ties weakened after the Sues crisis. He retired in 1961 but by that time his name was stigmatized with the oppression of the anti-Soviet uprising.

From 1958 until 1970 Sík was a member of the central committee of the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party. From 1963 he became a member of the World Peace Council, from 1964 he became the president of the Hungarian Peace Council. In 1962 he made his doctorate in history at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.⁵¹ In 1962 a number of his literary works, mostly related to Africa, like tales from the continent but also an other political pamphlet, „*The colonial Policy of the Imperialists in Black Africa*” were published.⁵² He

⁴⁹ This is probably the reason why in many documents of the time and later memoirs his name is mentioned not as the former ambassador to Washington, but to Moscow. Such recollections usually contain references for the Jewish roots of his family as well. <http://hungaria.org/forum/index.php?topicid=1204&messageid=1275>

⁵⁰ La discussion de l'ordre du jour de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies Intervention. Budapest, 1958.

⁵¹ While his brother, Sándor Sík, a distinguished poet was excluded from the Academy more than a decade earlier.

⁵² Later in 5000 copies. Similiar number of copies could be found in the growing number of translated works on African politics. Besides the „classics” of Marxism-Leninism and the writings of the actual political leaders, this genre also belonged to the so-called „recycling literature” despite the rather limited number of copies.

also had translated three dramas of Chekhov into Hungarian. In 1964 he published the 1st and 2nd volume of his life-work, „*The History of Black Africa*.” The third volume followed in 1972 and the 4th a year later, in 1973. The French edition came out even before the Hungarian, already in 1961 and the English translation was published in 1966. Even a German edition was planned but that was never accomplished. In 1967 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the collective Soviet state leadership awarded him the International Lenin Prize for Strengthening Peace among Peoples.⁵³ Back at home he was greeted by the communist daily newspaper as „*the knight of the fight for peace*”.⁵⁴

Natural allies

During and immediately after Sík’s ministry a real breakthrough happened in Hungary’s international relations. As since 1945 the country had no active foreign policy and 1956 put the country into isolation, the general amnesty in 1963 opened the gates, more and more foreign missions were opened abroad and in Budapest as well. In 1950 Hungary received only 24 such diplomatic missions (43rd place in world ranking), in 1955 the number of missions received grew to 32 (46th ranking), in 1960 40 missions worked in Budapest (41st ranking) but in 1965 the number of missions jumped to 59 (that secured the 34th place in world ranking). That number grew further to 64 in 1970 (36th ranking)⁵⁵ but the great leap and the time when relations with non-aligned countries were strategically important, was over. In 1970 Hungary had altogether with 55 developing countries diplomatic ties (19 Asian, 27 African, and 9 Latin American). A new era started, when ties with developing countries were kept up mainly from two reasons: the first was to meet the Soviet political expectations, the second was to establish beneficial economic relationships.

In the first case it was a must to help the developing socialist countries like North Korea, Mongolia, Vietnam, Cuba, or countries with „*socialist orientation*”, like Afghanistan, Angola, Benin, Ethiopia, Yemen, Congo (Brazzaville) and Mozambique. In such cases economic considerations played

⁵³ Until 1956 it was the Stalin Peace Prize. Then all previous recipients were asked to return their prize and it was replaced by the renamed International Lenin Prize. In 1989 the prize was again renamed as the International Lenin Peace Prize and ceased to be awarded two years later, in 1991.

⁵⁴ Gyula Kékesdi: A békeharc lovagja. In: Népszabadság, May 5th 1968. The Hungarian state television made a film about the life of Sík in 1972. After a long illness he died in 1978. Two obituaries were published, and some times later a conference devoted to him was held in the Institute of World Economy Of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. His personal papers were given to his former colleague from the foreign ministry, by that time a professor at the University of Economics in Budapest.

⁵⁵ Melvin Small, J. David Singer, The Diplomatic Importance of States, 1816-1970: An Extension and Refinement of the Indicator. in: *World Politics*, 25 (1973) 4, 577-599.

no significant role. In 1960 for example the Mongolian prime minister, Tsendenbal openly told the Hungarian ambassador that Soviet and Chinese aid was insufficient and the East European states had to increase their economic assistance. If donors pointed out that planned projects, like a sugar-refining factory, were incompatible with local economic and climatic conditions, the Mongolian leader did not hesitate to accuse them of being unwilling to assist Mongolia. When in the Hungarian ambassador told that neon lights would not survive the Mongolian winter, his local partner replied: „*Look, Comrade Ambassador, we are interested in the neon lights, not in why they cannot be installed. If the city council of Budapest really wants to help us, then they should rack their brains to make neon lights capable of withstanding even 50-60 degrees of frost.*”⁵⁶

The second reason was purely economic, to open up new markets and import badly needed goods for the country's economy and for the private consumers. But those expectations never came true, in the years 1966-70 the total value of the Hungarian trade with the developing world was yearly about 185 million USD, i.e. only 1,5 % of total foreign trade of Hungary⁵⁷ An other form of support was that in 1970 nearly 750 students were studying in Hungary from developing countries, with 21 countries functioned technical-scientific cooperation and 245 Hungarian experts worked in dozens of countries. (Out of nearly 300.000 altogether.) As the developing countries did not serve for Hungary as hard currency earners, the economic hardships in the 1970s and even more in the 1980s put an end to the economic cooperation. By 1989 Hungary had shrinking ties with them. In the same time the movement of the non-aligned countries lost totally its significance for the Hungarian diplomacy.

⁵⁶ Balázs Szalontai Tsendenbal's Mongolia and Communist Aid Donors: a reappraisal http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=100451

⁵⁷ The figures in 2005 were not much different, the exports 1,1%, the imports 0,1 % of the total foreign trade.