
VOLUME VI

Post−Mediation Events – Part Three
(January, 1967 – September, 1967)

Edited by
Csaba Békés, James G. Hershberg, János Kemény
and Zoltán Szőke

COLD WAR HISTORY RESEARCH CENTER
BUDAPEST
2021
ON THE HUNGARIAN
MEDIATION EFFORTS BETWEEN
THE U.S. AND THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
(1965–1967)

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About this E-Dossier series

The E-Dossier series presenting the Hungarian mediation efforts between the U.S and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) started in 2017 with the aim of shedding light on this still little-known piece of diplomatic history. The first volume, with the subtitle The Early stages of the Mediation 1965 was published at the end of 2017, containing eight documents, describing the genesis of the diplomatic efforts.

The second volume was published in two parts at the end of 2018, because the amount of material made it advisable to split it into two: Mediation Efforts Part One and Mediation Efforts Part Two. Part One contains a short report about an ambassadorial meeting and two lengthy documents about the Hungarian efforts, one written to the foreign minister of the Hungarian People’s Republic, János Péter by the Hungarian charge d’affairs in Washington, János Radványi, the other being the minutes of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP) Politburo meeting covering the issue. Part Two contains 12 documents, covering Hungarian Foreign Ministry documents about communications with the Vietnamese, Polish and U.S. counterparts, as well as reports and minutes covering the issue.

The third volume was published at the end of 2019. It details the post-mediation diplomatic activities of the Hungarians, including some of the exchanges with the Vietnamese, Polish and Soviet partners. The volume contains documents of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry and the leading bodies of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, detailing communication between the Hungarian and North Vietnamese, the Polish, and the Soviet leadership, as well as Hungarian communication with US officials. It contains information provided to the Hungarian side by the Soviets about their dealings with the DRV, so the volume provides a valuable insight into Hungarian and Soviet Bloc thinking about the Vietnam War.

The fourth volume was published at the end of 2020. It contains 10 documents originating from the Hungarian Foreign Ministry and the HSWP, covering the second part of the post-mediation efforts (October, 1966 – December, 1966). It contains multiple memoranda from the János Radványi, long time charge d’affairs and short time ambassador of the Hungarian People’s Republic, about Hungarian efforts in Washington, information provided by the Soviet Union about Soviet-Vietnamese talks and the Soviet view of the war, the state of Soviet-Polish talks about Vietnam, a memorandum about talks with Polish officials about parallel diplomatic efforts, a memorandum about Le Duc Tho’s visit to Budapest, as well as a HSWP document on talks with a Vietnamese delegation in Budapest.
The current volume, building on the sources used in the earlier volumes, provides documents from the Hungarian Foreign Ministry and HSWP archives. It covers the period between January to September 1967, and was completed in 2021. For a more detailed overview see the Contents of the Current E-Dossier.

Contents of the current E-Dossier

The current E-Dossier contains four documents originating from Hungarian Foreign Ministry and HSWP archives. It provides an overview on the Hungarian and Soviet views of the post-mediation stage, providing a glimpse into the thinking of Hungarian officials.

Document 1 is a report of the Hungarian Embassy in Hanoi, and provides an overview of the Soviet-Vietnamese consultation in early 1967. The topics covered include the Vietnamese-Chinese relations, Vietnamese misgivings about the depth and speed of Soviet economic and military support provided to the DRV.

Document 2 is a report by János Radványi about his conversation with U.S. officials including William Bundy, Francis Bator and Walt Rostow at a White House event. The issue of Vietnam is prominent in the memorandum, besides Hungarian-U.S: relations.

Document 3 is a proposal for the Central Committee of the HSWP. It provides details about the Hungarian assistance efforts to the DRV, including providing air defense artillery systems and other military hardware of various types, as well as economic assistance.

Document 4 is a detailed analysis of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry about the Vietnamese-Chinese relations. It provides historical context for the state of relations in 1967, and the state of diplomatic and military relations between the DRV and the PRC.
ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Central Committee</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<td>COMECON</td>
<td>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance</td>
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<td>CP</td>
<td>Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPSU</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Soviet Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRV</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSWP</td>
<td>Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLF</td>
<td>National Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>State Department</td>
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<td>WPV</td>
<td>Workers’ Party of Vietnam</td>
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DOCUMENT 1

Top Secret!
3 copies made
2 for the Center
1 for the Embassy
Subject: Comrade Le Duc Tho’s Moscow Consultations

To Comrade Puja

Comrade Le Duc Tho, who headed the WPV delegation at the IX. Congress of the HSWP, following a preliminary consultation held upon his request, on his way home met Comrade Brezhnev in Moscow, and exchanged his views with him on current matters. Soviet Ambassador Comrade Shcherbakov, the Soviet ambassador in place, provided the following information:

The original plan of the Vietnamese comrades was that Comrade Le Duc Tho travelling to Budapest, joins up with Foreign Minister Trinh on his way back from Sofia, to meet Comrade Brezhnev—in Moscow. However, as the delegation coming to us, due to travel difficulties arrived in Moscow with delay, this meeting did not take place, so therefore, immediately after his arrival in Budapest, Comrade Tho contacted Comrade Brezhnev and they agreed to meet in Moscow after the WPV delegation completed its work in Budapest.
In the course of the consultations, which, for the most part, took place as a colloquial exchange, covered the following topics of greater importance:

1. Comrade Tho’s briefing on the Vietnamese situation;
2. Important issues of the international communist movement;
3. Problems concerning the military aid to be provided to the DRV.

Concerning issue 1: Comrade Tho presented the same briefing he presented to Comrade Komócsin, which, according to the Soviet comrades’ assessment, contained no new information. Only one question was raised, about their view on their understanding of fighting while negotiating and when this becomes feasible. Their response was that it becomes feasible when they will gain appropriate military superiority over the Americans, and when the Americans will prove with actions that they sincerely want peace. For the time being, however, negotiations are out of the question as the Americans are stepping up their aggression; they have even started to bomb downtown Hanoi.

Concerning issue 2: Regarding the consultative meeting of the sister parties, they presented the same position they had presented here. They do not oppose in principle the convening of such a meeting, but it involves the risk of making the split permanent and that would be an irreparable mistake. The CCP would convene a separate meeting which in itself would mean the division of the international communist movement into two camps. Comrade Tho did not declare whether the DRV would take part in such a meeting, or in which one. Comrade Brezhnev tried to convince Comrade Tho that the purpose of such a meeting would not be the expulsion of one sister parties, but on the contrary, to discuss the ways in which the unity could be strengthened, and to form a common position regarding the ways and forms of the manifold assistance to be provided for the Vietnamese people.

With regard to the unity Comrade Tho, again, presented the same position that he had presented to us, that they support it in principle, but due to the regrettably strained relations, they consider it unachievable. The WPV itself makes considerable efforts to restore unity and, in his view, the other sister parties should with great patience also work for this end primarily with the utilization of bilateral negotiations. When the Soviet comrades sharply criticized the CCP’s behavior as unity breaking, deviating from Marxism-Leninism and increasingly hostile towards the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, Comrade Tho - either as a result of his
talks with us or on his own accord -in his capacity as a leader of the WPV, now for the first time stated, that he did not agree with a series of the CCP’s activities. For example, he considered current form of cultural revolution damaging, he disagreed with the anti-Soviet resolution of the 11th Plenum, as it further strained relations between the Soviet Union and China, he also disagreed with the CCP’s charges against the CPSU. Regarding a number of other issues, Comrade Tho was of the opinion that those were the internal problems of the CCP which should be resolved by the CCP itself and that it would be inappropriate for other parties to interfere . Despite the fact that Comrade Tho did not condemn the CCP’s conduct unequivocally, what he said was regarded by the Soviet comrades as a positive change, and as another step in the direction of seeing these issues even more clearly in the future. The DRV’s exceptional dependency upon China must be taken into account as an important factor behind Comrade Tho’s cautious position.

Concerning issue 3: As it is known, during a private talks with us, Comrade Tho forcefully raised that the Soviet Union does not supply the DRV with the most advanced air defense equipment, meaning the anti-aircraft missiles that are more effective than the ones currently supplied. Comrade Tho had told us that he would also raise this matter during his talks with Comrade Brezhnev. He indeed did so, as he had raised it with us. Comrade Brezhnev ensured him, regarding both the missiles and the other advanced equipment, that he would provide the DRV with any kind of equipment, but a basic condition for that is, that the DRV had appropriately trained operating personnel, because without those even the most advanced weapons remain ineffective. A good example for this was, that during the December 13 air raids one hundred missiles were launched for shooting down a single plane, albeit the target kill probability of these weapons was one and a half per plane at the worst. Another condition was that they should follow the guidance and instructions of the Soviet advisers, at least until their own crews gain sufficient experience. Finally, Comrade Tho was given assurances that they would also receive the most advanced equipment in proportion with the number of returning fully trained crews.

Besides the above Comrade Ung Van Khiem took part in separate talks covering matters he was personally interested in, with special focus to the issue of the disabled. Like here, he also visited in the Soviet Union institutions designed to rehabilitate the disabled; factories that employ partially disabled workers etc. After a one week stay in Moscow, he traveled to the GDR, from where he would return to Moscow to continue his negotiations. The
Soviet comrades, too, had a very positive impression of Comrade Khiem who made exceptionally candid political statements, just as he had made to us. They already assured him of their full support to resolve his problems concerning the disabled, and promised him to meet all of his concrete requests – as best as they can. We agreed with Comrade Shcherbakov to give full support to Comrade Khiem to resolve his problems.

Finally, Comrade Shcherbakov informed me that, while I was away, there was a pleasingly eventful time that constitutes the first, initial steps of increased political-diplomatic activity. It seems that they - even if somewhat belatedly - are beginning to take the advice provided to them during their consultations with friendly delegations. In this respect, it was a useful step that they provided entry for U.S. citizens, with Salisbury among them, who was one of the 56 journalists who, responding to the initiative of the U.S. peace movement, had applied for entry, and he was selected because his paper had criticized Johnson for his Vietnam policy several times. Over here, he was - smartly - paired up with Burchett who accompanied him on all his trips and obviously influenced his work in his articles. The statements of Pham Van Dong and the Paris chief negotiator were also positive because these constitute the first steps out of the 4-point inflexibility inasmuch as they started, even if rather vaguely to explain the 4 point. There are signs suggesting that as a result of these early initiatives the Americans are already becoming bewildered, and, if the Vietnamese leaders realize this, they will hopefully not stop at these initial steps but continue even more actively. In this respect, our task is to make every effort to influence the comrades in this direction.

/ Dr. Imre Pehr /
Ambassador

Dear Comrade Házi!

Attached to this letter I’m sending my memorandum on the reception on the 26. April, which was given to the diplomatic corps by President Johnson in the White House. I managed to gather some information. Please consider these as an addition to my diplomatic mail, and communicate them to the leadership of the Ministry.

The situation is rather complex, the prospects are fairly pessimistic, the exasperation amongst the clear-sighted individuals is growing, from Lippmann to Bishop Blake. At the same time, Johnson practically wants to test the limits of the patience of the Soviet Union.

I hope my words fine you in good health, together with your dear family.

Greetings with lots of love

János Radványi
Memorandum

Subject: President Johnson’s reception for the Diplomatic Corps at the White House

The usual annual presidential reception took place on 26. April in the White House. Despite President Johnson, and his delegation only returning to Washington from West Germany in the afternoon on the 26. April, he gave the reception at 7:00 p.m.

The president and his wife received the arriving guests, talked to everyone for a shorter or longer period of time, then Vice President Humphrey and his wife, and after them, Secretary Rusk – together with his wife – greeted the guests.

Johnson looked fairly fresh, however, Rusk, W. Rostow and the others looked pretty tired. The reception gave me an opportunity to conduct conversations with the Americans, and other diplomats who were present at the reception.

Upon my arrival, President Johnson exchanged a couple of conventional words with me, he did not mention either international issues, or political issues related to our two countries, and neither did I mention anything like that.

Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy, the leader of the Far East Department\(^1\) of the State Department initiated a conversation, and said, that for now the President has no other choice, but to use military force. From their point of view, the biggest obstacle is Hanoi’s lack of understanding of the U.S. side, and their unwillingness to engage in negotiations. I noted, that he can use this argument with a journalist, but he shouldn’t use it with me. We both know that this is not the case, he should rather say whether the U.S. government wants to solve the issue of Vietnam solely by the force of arms, or by the use of diplomacy?! W. Bundy then answered that Hanoi is not willing to talk to them, and they cannot accept the pre-condition of unilaterally

\(^1\) Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
stopping the bombing of the DRV. If they stopped – he said – then the negotiation still would not happen, because Hanoi then would demand the withdrawal of their forces from South Vietnam. It would be great, he continued, if a situation would emerge again, where the Hungarian Foreign Minister, János Péter could provide support, before the situation worsened.

In my answer I noted, that throughout the years, whenever a peace-initiative moved on to a serious stage, the U.S. always answered with bombings, and the escalation of the war. For my part, I could only say that if he had anything official to offer on this topic, he certainly knows where, and how he can contact me.

During my conversation with the advisor of the President, Walter Rostow,² he said that he is disappointed in the Soviet Union. He anticipated the Soviet Union to make efforts to restore the peace in Vietnam. In contrast, in the past couple of weeks, Yuri Zhukov, the chief editor in chief of Pravda visited, and he talked with him, and other U.S. leaders, and during those conversations he used roughly the same threatening language, as Khrushchev did with Kennedy back in the day in Vienna. The President also knows about this, but the United States cannot be threatened.

I asked him whether he thinks that the United States is going too far with the war in Vietnam. Rostow answered that if needed, they are ready to clash with China as well, if that is the price of fulfilling their obligation in Vietnam.

Here, our conversation was cut short, as President Johnson unexpectedly approached Rostow, and asked him if the addition to the speech he is due to give to the physicists is ready. The President namely also gave a speech yesterday at a banquet, and in addition to the original speech, he also said that he is unconditionally for peace, he wants peace in Vietnam, and that he wants to achieve that through negotiations, but for now, he can only negotiate with himself. Looking back now, it seems likely the President was asking Rostow about this addition.

Rostow, excessively humble in his answer, said that the addition was ready, and he already showed it to Rusk, who agreed with him. The President then turned to me, and asked what is happening in Hungary, and if we expect good results from the new economic reform measures.

² The original report wrongly identifies Walt Rostow as Walter.
I answered, that this is a transitional year, and the reforms will only be implemented in 1968. The President wished good luck to the new Hungarian Prime Minister and the government, and went over to another group of people.

After that, I talked with Francis Bator, the President’s special advisor on European issues. Bator mentioned the issue of appointing an Ambassador. He said, that however strange it may sound, and whether we believe it or not, the reason it is still dragging on, is because the President has still not been able to make up his mind. President Johnson considers Hungary to be a really important country, and he would like to find someone similar to Ambassador Gronousky with Polish roots. They know in the White House, that dragging out the appointment of their new Ambassador is not a good thing, but they cannot do anything against it, because the issue is at the sole discretion of their President.

Ambassador Harriman tried to intervene with President Johnson about the issue in the past couple of weeks, but he waved him away as well, saying that he needs time to make the appropriate decision.

According to Bator, the President will more likely send a politician, rather than a career-diplomat to Hungary. I answered to Bator that appointing an Ambassador is the job of the President, and I do not have anything special to comment on that. It is however strange, that the President, through Assistant Secretary Leddy, asked for a reply as soon as possible on elevating our relations to the ambassadorial level. This is why it is incomprehensible for me, that if it was that urgent, then why is the appointment of the Ambassador dragging on this long. This is however – I said – is my personal opinion – I asked him to consider it as such.

Harriman introduced me to Ambassador Steve, the Head of the Personnel Department of the SD. In front of me, Harriman asked Steve about the situation concerning the Ambassador to be appointed to Budapest. Steve answered, that the list of recommended people has already been sent to the White House. There is a certain difference of opinion between the SD and the White House, as the SD thinks that sending a career-diplomat to Budapest is the most suitable,

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3 John A. Gronouski, Ambassador to Poland
4 John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
5 Radványi uses the initials of the State Department as an abbreviation in the original.
while the White House is sticking to appoint a politician. Steve stated, that he hopes that the issue will be resolved soon. I noted, that they should not wish to involve me in the argument between the White House, and the State Department.

I also had a short conversation with B.K. Nehru, the Indian Ambassador, who told me, that he will return to India permanently on the 30. June.

Comrade Chernyakow, the Soviet charge d’affaires said, that comrade Ambassador Dobrynin will return to Washington after the 1. May. According to comrade Chernyakov, new disagreements have arisen between the United States and its allies in relation to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and it is strongly questionable that in the current political climate they would quarrel with them because of the Soviet Union.

Comrade Chernyakow described the situation as generally unsettling, and dangerously tense.

Washington, 27. April, 1967

János Radványi

Translated by Dániel Kocsis]
Defense Minister of the
Hungarian People’s Republic

81/11

Dear Comrade Biszku!

Attached, I am sending the proposal of the Political Committee regarding the trip of the military delegation.

Comrades Rezső Nyers, Lajos Fehér, Mátyás Timár, József Bíró, Imre Párdi, János Péter, and Péter Vályi agree with its content.

The remarks of the above-mentioned comrades have been taken into consideration while drafting the proposal.

Comrade Borbándi is also familiar with the material, and agrees on it. I am sending the proposal directly to you due to his illness. Please, endorse it as urgently as possible, so it can be put on the agenda of the 9. May Political Committee session.

Budapest, 4. May 1967

With comradely greetings:

/ Lajos Czinege /
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

TOP SECRET!

Copies: 2

Nr.: 001618

1 copy: 7 pages

Copy Nr. 1.

Off. Copy Nr.: 363/60

P R O P O S A L

to the Political Committee of the CC of the HSWP

We plan to execute our approved trips to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea between the 13. May and 7. June, 1967, in coordination with the host countries.

The nature of our visit: political demonstration of the brotherly friendship and international solidarity between our parties, governments, armies, and people, as well as orientation, and exchanging information about mutually relevant military, and furthermore, domestic and foreign issues.

To carry these out, it is important, that the delegation receives appropriate principles and authorities for its trip, and the negotiations.

1./ In the course of the meetings, the delegation in both brotherly countries:
– expresses the brotherly greetings of our party, government, army, and the whole population;
– emphasizes the positions of our party and government on the current international issues;
– should provide information on our results so far in building socialism, the status of our armed forces, and its role in the Warsaw Pact.

2./ During the negotiations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the issue of further military and civilian assistance will undoubtedly arise, and the need for mutually exchanging information regarding that. Namely, we have already received supplemental requests from different bodies of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for delivering further aid, other than the coordinated, agreed, and the already ongoing deliveries for the year 1967.

a./ supplementary request from the Ministry of Defense of the DRV for 1967, and requests for 1968 without indicating quantities /as listed in appendix 1/;

b./ from the Interior Ministry /Ministry of Social Affairs/ of the DRV for 1967, and the following years.
We examined the feasibility of the above-mentioned new requests with the concerned partner agencies. The result of the review so far:

Regarding military assistance:
The government preliminarily approved 15 million rubles as the 1967 military aid allowance, from which 13.4 million rubles have already been fixed in the Hungarian-Vietnamese bilateral agreements. 73% of the military equipment assistance has been provided from the available inventory.

We are only able to grant significantly less part of the further military equipment requested as aid in the appendix, in excess of our own needs.

We took the approved 600 million forints /15 million rubles/ military aid budget for 1967 as the basis of our review.

The possibilities of satisfying the requests listed in Appendix 1:

a./ Without replacements, we can deliver requested equipment from our inventory worth 160 million forints /4 million rubles/ until the end of 1967, as a pre-delivery of the equipment requested for 1968.

b./ With replacements up until 1970, military equipment worth 300 million forints /7.5 million rubles/ can be delivered from the inventory of the military. Out of this amount, military equipment worth roughly 4 million rubles have to be replaced by special imports. /for the replacement of air defense equipment/

c./ Through production throughout 1968, equipment worth some 120-140 million forints /3-3.5 million rubles/ can be delivered.

There are more details about points a/, b/, and c/ in Appendix 2.

Among the requested equipment, there are items, that we cannot provide neither now, nor in the future /e.g. SON-9/A radars, 23mm anti-aircraft autocannons, various aggregators, etc./

Further equipment can also be offered, that were not requested by the Vietnamese comrades, but which we can provide from our inventory that are in excess of our needs. Such as: various infantry weapons – rifles, light machine guns – / ammunition for these only from production, /76mm field guns with shells, 85mm anti-aircraft guns with shells –/without radars, tow trucks, and other instruments/.

In case the Party and the Government at later stages – taking the evolution of the war into consideration – decides, to increase the assistance allowance of 15 million rubles for 1968,
then mostly the quantity of the equipment listed in point b. can be increased, and the equipment listed in points a/ and c/ only to a lesser extent.

**Regarding civilian assistance:**

The requests originating from the Interior Ministry of the DRV can be separated into three basic categories:

a/ the first category is of emergency aid nature, which includes food, medicine, and various textiles;

b/ the second category of needs is to support those, who have become crippled, unable to work, or those military and civilian personnel, whose working capacity have reduced. It also includes fully equipping 5 schools with dormitories /for 1000 orphans/, and sanatorium for 200 war disabled with tuberculosis;

c/ in the third category, they request factories and means of production for the various institutions that employ disabled people.

Based on preliminary calculations, the total value of the assistance requested by the Interior Ministry for the years 1967-68 is 120 million forints /3 million rubles/ at minimum.

This is a new area of requests for assistance, which means a multi-years commitment, because in addition to the one-time built-up of the above-mentioned institutions, the Vietnamese comrades also requested support not only for the duration of the war, but the continued supply after the war as well.

Out of the requests worth 120 million forints, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and the Ministry of Health, in case of a fast approval, and the provision of an allowance, sees the possibility of delivering an emergency aid worth 22 million forints /550 thousand rubles/ this year already. Half of it would be made up by the requested medicines, milk powder, etc., and the other half would be made up of equipment for the homes of disabled children.

According to the opinion provided by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the delivery of some items listed under points a/ and b/, like the equipment of the disabled children’s homes, the needs of the tuberculosis sanatorium, as well as various other working tools /sewing machines, knitting machines, etc./ in the year 1968 is possible in case of an approval, as part of an aid budget of around 60 million forints /1.5 million rubles/.

The delivery of equipment listed under point c/, the various factories /gloves, glass frames, bicycle parts, wooden furniture/ is not possible according to the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Likewise, the Ministry of Foreign Trade estimates that satisfying their request of large
amount of textiles and blankets is not possible either, with the exception of the needs for blankets at the disabled institutions.

\[x \times x\]

3./ Based on the above-mentioned considerations, I suggest, that the delegation led by me be authorized to do the following:

a./ the delegation should assure the leading Vietnamese comrades during the negotiations, that the Central Committee of the HSWP, and the Hungarian Government will continue to do its utmost to support the efforts of the heroic Vietnamese people against the American aggressors and their satellites. Accordingly, they will examine the possibilities of further assistance.

The government sees the possibility of delivering various types of military equipment in 1967, with a 4 million rubles budget. These deliveries have to be considered as a pre-delivery of the support planned for 1968, to be signed later as bilateral agreement. During the negotiations, military equipment can be offered that were not requested by the Vietnamese, but can be supplied from the available inventory without replacements.

The delegation should continue its negotiations based on the above-mentioned consideration, to further specify the needs for both the years 1967 and 1968.

b./ reply to the Interior Ministry of the DRV, that it sees the possibility of delivering emergency aid, with a budget of around 550 thousand rubles, of medicines, food, and working tools. The detailed negotiations should be carried out by the respective Ministries of Foreign Trade.

The needs for the care of those who have been crippled by the war, the civilian and military personnel that are incapable to work due to it, and the continuous sustainment of the institutions that are to be established for them, are currently being looked at by competent government bodies, with the goal to fulfill the requests to the most of our capacities. The results of our review will be communicated to the Vietnamese comrades at the next bilateral negotiations.

c./ to provide a notification during the negotiations, that on top of the financial and material assistance, our Government also sees other possibilities to provide assistance:

– for training, and vocational training of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the People’s Army of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Hungary /operating and maintaining equipment/; sending Hungarian support units to Vietnam to maintain and provide training for the equipment sent by us previously, the numbers will be negotiated later on;
– by sending specialized support units to assist in the repair of damaged roads and rail networks;
– by sending Hungarian doctors, and medical personnel to the hospitals and field first aid stations we provided.

d./ the invitation of a Vietnamese military delegation to a date that is the most suitable for them;
– to award around 100-150 medals, to the military personnel who participated directly in battles /the different levels of the “For Service of the Homeland Merit Medal” that was founded by the Council of Ministers, and can be awarded by the Minister of Defense, based on consultations on site/.

4./ I would like to get authorization, to propose to the Vietnamese comrades the necessity, and expediency of the creation of a technical supporting body consisting of the representatives of socialist countries, to coordinate and strengthen the assistance for Vietnam.

5./ The delegation for the negotiations to be held in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should be given authorization for the following:
– the invitation of a Korean delegation, led by the Defense Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with noting, that we consider the previous holiday invitation of the Korean Defense Minister to be still standing;
– to initiate the mutual exchange of defense attaches, noting that we would like the exchange to be realized as soon as possible;
– broadening the relations between the Hungarian and Korean People’s Army on a professional, sporting, and cultural level /holiday exchanges for officers, Hungarian field trips for Korean experts, friendly matches of military sportsmen, informative exchange regarding the life of the People’s Army, etc./;
– to start preliminary negotiations, in case of a Korean initiative, about providing assistance to the Korean People’s Army, /assistance free of charge can only be promised after reviewing the available inventory / as well as about the selling of military equipment based on trade agreements;
– awarding 50 medals, primarily to military personnel who are stationed in endangered areas / different levels of the “For Service of the Homeland Merit Medal” that was founded by the Council of Ministers, and can be awarded by the Minister of Defense, based on local consultations /.
6. Our news media will deal with our trip based on our current practice, and also taking the media customs of the host country into consideration.

7. I suggest, that the Planning Office, with the involvement of the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, reviews in detail the possible means of further assistance, including the means of the replacements necessary for the Ministry of Defense, so we will be ready in time to sign further bilateral agreements on assistance, taking into account the information and observations our delegation will return with.

Appendices:
1. Statement on the requests of the DRV. Official Copy Nr. 363/61. /2 pages/
2. Statement on the options of granting the requests of the DRV. Official Copy Nr. 363/62. /3 pages/

Budapest, 4. May 1967

/: Lajos Czinege :/

Appendix 1 for Nr. …….

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL!

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STATEMENT
on the list of the main military equipment
requested by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
/supplemental request for year 1967, claims for year 1968/

ARMAMENTS:
57mm S-60 anti-aircraft guns
23mm anti-aircraft autocannons
AK type assault rifles
rifles with sniper optics
SON-9 radars
E-2 anti-aircraft targeting systems
SNAR artillery reconnaissance radar
SPO-30 electricity generating devices for the 57mm anti-aircraft batteries
ammunition for 37mm, 57mm anti-aircraft guns
Reserve components for previously delivered radars and anti-aircraft guns

**SIGNALING MATERIALS**

various ultra-shortwave radio transceivers / R-105, R-108, R-109, R-114 /
various sort wave radio transceivers / R-104, R-125, R-102 /
various radio relays / R-403, R-401, R-405 /
various radio reconnaissance tools / VU-21, VU-31 receivers, UP-3, UP-3M panorama adapters, M-5, M-6 tape recorders /
heavy and light field phone wires

**TECHNICAL AND CHEMICAL PROTECTION MATERIALS**

various inflatable boats
anti-tank mines
mine detecting, mine-clearance equipment
various types of smoke grenades

**VEHICLES**

D-344 type all-terrain trucks
tow trucks
tools facilitating electrical and technological tests, or “SZERO” cars

**VARIOUS MEDICAL SUPPLIES, CLOTHING, FUEL RELATED ITEMS**

medical supplies, primarily
“DELAGIL” and “ATEBEIN” pills against malaria
clothing materials
fuel storage units / barrels and cans /
fuel pumps and fuel transporting pipelines
fuel lab
STATEMENT

on the options of supplying the main military equipment
and material requests of the DRV

a./ Devices, materials, that can be granted from the stockpiles / storages of the Hungarian People’s Army without replacements:

- 1000 sniper rifles of caliber 7,62mm with 10 rounds of ammunition
- 200 000 fragmentation mortar shells of caliber 81mm / modified 82mm shells/
- 10 sets of R-30 radio transceiver / medium range /
- 10 sets of R-50 radio transceiver / long range /
- 200 sets of various inflatable boats
- 500 sets of mine clearing equipment
- 200 000 anti-tank mines
- 15 000 smoke screens and smoke grenades
- 30 type Cs-800 tow trucks
- 100 000 pills of anti-malaria drug “ATEBRIN”
- 50 000 quinine pills
- 100 000 individual wound dressing packs

Various hand-held medical instruments for first-aid worth 2,2 million forints
Various components and spare parts worth 3 million forints.

The total value of the above-listed equipment is about 160 million forints, or 4 million rubles.

b./ Devices, materials, that can be granted from the stockpiles of the Hungarian People’s Army to be replaced up until 1970:

- 2 complete 37mm anti-aircraft artillery regiments / 72 guns / with the necessary instruments, accessories, spare parts, and ammunition, /as replacement, we request the special import of air defense equipment/.
20,000 assault rifles of caliber 7.62mm /as replacement, we request AMD-65 assault rifles/
100 all-terrain lorries of the type ZIS-151 with accessories and spare parts /as replacement, we request CsD-576 all-terrain lorries after 1970/.
10 sets of R-104AM/G division level radio transceiver vehicles
100 sets of R-105D regimental radio transceiver
30 sets of R-109D artillery radio transceiver
50 sets of R-114D cooperative radio transceiver
10 sets of R-104AM/G division level radio transceiver vehicles
10 sets of R-125G commander radio transceiver vehicles
20 sets of R-30 radio transceivers without vehicles /as replacement, we request type R-125/G/
10 sets of R-50 radio transceiver without vehicles /as replacement, we request the stable versions of the R-102M radio transceiver /
23 sets of R-118BM/G army-division type radio transceiver for vehicles /as replacement, we request R-102M-I/G radio transceiver /
4 sets R-405M/G radio relay vehicles
1000 kilometers of field easy-wirings without building equipment
25 pieces of 3m³ steel containers
400 pieces of manual petrol pumps
10 pieces of fuel pumps /electric/
Various pieces of clothing worth roughly 12.5 million forints.
The total value of the items we can give that have to be replaced: some 300 million forints, or 7.5 million rubles.

c./ Military equipment and materials, that can only be granted through industrial production:
6 sets of E-2 anti-aircraft targeting systems
200 sets of R-108D artillery radio transceiver
100 sets of R-105D regimental radio transceiver
100 sets of R-109D artillery radio transceiver
30 million rounds of PPS submachine gun ammunition / this adds up to 5 rounds per submachine gun designated for handover. As a preliminary gesture, we plan to transfer, 10 millions rounds / 1 round per gun / from the stockpiles of the Hungarian
People’s Army.

50,000 fragmentation shells for 57mm S-60 anti-aircraft guns.

The total value of the above-listed equipment: around **120 million forints**, or 3 million rubles.
The total value of the military equipment and materials in the statement: **580 million forints**, or **14.5 million rubles**.

Study on Vietnamese-Chinese Relations

Possibly, there is no other single socialist country where you can feel as strongly and as evidently the consequences of the nearly one-decade-long conflict evoked by the Chinese CP leaders in the international communist and workers’ movement, as in Vietnam. The relations between the DRV and the PRC are full of increasing contradictions and changes, which is difficult to analyze from both sides, there is little available information which would allow an accurate assessment. My assessment and its conclusion are based on the observations and impressions gathered during my 18-month stay here, and on the conversations I had with Vietnamese friends and European diplomats. I do not intend this study to be a final view. It has two goals: to describe the main features and trends of the economic, political and cultural relations between the two countries, and the contradictions present in these relations; to draw conclusions about the policy and behavior towards the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; to attempt to give an answer to the problem which justifiably asked by everyone: what is our position in Vietnam, whose influence is prevailing? / Before finalizing the document, I consulted with my Soviet partner. /

I.

Regarding relations between Vietnam and China, there are objective factors which are determinative: the geographical situation, the historical relations, the intertwining of the liberation and workers’ movements of the two countries, and the currently ongoing war.

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam has a border of roughly 800 kilometers with the People’s Republic of China, from the Gulf of Tonkin to the border with Laos. At the same time, China is the only socialist country with whom Vietnam has a common border. Two railway lines: Hanoi-Nanning-Wuhan, Hanoi-Lao Cai-Kunming and three main hardtop
highways: Haiphong-Canton\(^6\) on the coast of the South China Sea; Hanoi-Nanning, Hanoi-Chungking\(^7\) ensure overland connection between the two countries. Apart from these, the Chinese civilian airline has a regular flight from Beijing to Hanoi. Deliveries to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are possible using two routs: one is: by land, on railway or highway through China; the other: by sea, to the Haiphong and Hon Gai\(^8\) harbors.

Some 600,000 ethnic Chinese live on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The majority of them settled there in this century. The last large migration wave took place in the years following World War II. A large part of the Chinese living here assimilated, took up Vietnamese citizenship and enjoy the rights granted to Vietnamese citizens, a smaller part, especially those who arrived recently, remain Chinese citizens. The Chinese can be members of the WPV irrespectively from their citizenship. / However, Vietnamese citizens living in China cannot become members of the CCP. / 

Chinese conquests, Chinese rulers’ influence on the Vietnamese dynasties and anti-Chinese struggles played a big role in the past 2,000 years of the history of Vietnam, apart from the 100-year French rule. In the end, the northern and central part of Vietnam was under Chinese rule for some 900 years, which had a strong influence on independent Vietnam even in recent times.

The natural treasures of Indochina / anthracite, phosphate, zinc, tin, manganese, gold, silver, etc. /; its precious woods / camphor, bamboo, ironwood / and the richness of its arable lands attracted the neighboring conquering Chinese, just like other foreign conquerors.

The effects of Chinese influence on social life was felt in nearly all fields. After the conquest of Vietnam, Chinese religious views became dominant, Chinese was the written language until the French conquest, and the social order also mirrored Chinese feudalism. The fundamental trait of the penetration of Chinese culture is that it was already present at the formation of Vietnamese civilization, therefore, the first Vietnamese culture was half barbaric and half Chinese.

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\(^6\) Guangzhou  
\(^7\) Chongqing  
\(^8\) Ha Long
The 900-year Chinese rule triggered a whole series of independence movements and rebellions, the traditions of which are still alive today in tales, recounted in allegorical fairy plays, folk songs, paintings, and in the pagodas set up for the commemoration of victories achieved over the Chinese, and occasionally also in current political articles and declarations. The occupation and the looting of Tonkin by the over half-a-million-strong horde of Chang Kai-shek in 1945 is still remembered, has left unpleasant scars which are felt still today.

The Chinese economic, political and cultural influence largely decreased after the French colonizers began to colonize Indochina in 1774, and after later in 1882 they created French Indochina, which was composed of five colonies or protectorates / Tonkin, Annam, CochinChina, Cambodia and Laos /. French culture spread mainly among the landowners, those working in the state administration, the personnel serving the French and the strata of the then small Vietnamese intelligentsia, and has still strong influence today. Since then, the written Vietnamese language uses the Latin alphabet. A significant part of the intelligentsia, the older city dwellers and the functionaries understand and speak the French language still today, while only a significantly smaller number of the young speak it.

The relation with China in this century, beginning with the mid-twenties, broadens with a new momentum, the memories and traditions of which still strongly affect relations between the two parties. Vietnamese comrades also took part on the foundation and in the later activity of the Chinese Communist Party, among others, for example, the President Ho Chi Minh and Truong Chinh, the Chairman of the National Assembly. The Central Committee of the Indochinese Communist Party, founded in 1930, held its first plenum in Canton, and later it directed the Indochinese movement for a long time based from there, especially at the beginning of the thirties, when the French answered the insurgency in Vietnam with a bloody crackdown. Vietnamese comrades also studied in the military schools organized by the Chinese Communist Party of the time, among them, for example, Giap, the current defense minister, and some of them took even part in the Long March. During this and later times a close personal relation and camaraderie developed between the Vietnamese and the Chinese party leaders.

After the formation of the People’s Republic of China the Chinese influence showed again an increasing trend. The Government of the People’s Republic of China was one of the first to recognize the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. In the war of liberation against the
French they could provide the closest support to the Vietnamese people’s army, although, by judging its dimensions, this support is minimal compared to that provided in Korea.

After the 1954 Geneva Accords Chinese influences grew stronger. The relations between the two parties’ leaderships and the two governments became even closer. In sum, the Vietnamese comrades consulted with the Chinese on every important question of international and domestic politics, and they adjusted their steps accordingly. Chinese advisors appeared in the country, and the first Vietnamese scholarship fellows were sent to China. The Vietnamese implemented the land reform and began the socialist reorganization of agriculture using Chinese methods and with the support of Chinese advisors. They committed such severe mistakes in this period that in 1958 they had to relieve from his office the then secretary general of the party, Truong Chinh. / They had shot by the hundred even those small landowners who had taken part in the resistance, and serious difficulties arose in supplying the population. /

The initial major achievements of the People’s Republic of China and of the Chinese Communist Party in international and domestic affairs, their growing authority among Asian and African countries and parties further strengthened the influence and the stance of the Chinese also in the DRV, the only South-East Asian socialist country. The more the differences between China and the European socialist countries - and between the Chinese CP and the large majority of the communist and workers’ parties - became obvious, the more Chinese pressure increased. This trend grew ever stronger until the 1963 visit of Liu Shaoqi to the DRV. During this period, the pro-Soviet and internationalist elements were pushed into the background in the state leadership and in the Central Committee, except those people who won an international reputation for themselves during the years of resistance. The pro-China leaders gained influence especially in the area of propaganda, internal security, foreign policy and in the army. In this period the DRV was heavily isolated internationally, which was also due to the fact, that as a consequence of the growing Chinese influence, the relations with the other countries of the socialist camp grew weaker.

The robust growth of Chinese influence did not result in the clear approval neither inside the party, nor in the masses outside of the party, especially among intellectuals. During the CC plenum of the fall of 1963, the proposal of Le Duan was meant to bring forward a resolution which would have further increased Chinese influence, and which would have put the policy of the WPV and of the DRV even more to the Chinese line, however, there was no
sufficient political will and majority to do this, as on the one hand they met a growing resistance, on the other the course of events changed. On a special party plenum held at the beginning of 1964 Ho Chi Minh and his circle moved more decisively against the ever growing, all-encompassing Chinese influence.

After the incident which took place on August 5, 1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin, it became obvious to the DRV leadership that the U.S., in some way, was extending the war also to the North. This situation brought a significant change in the foreign and domestic policy of the DRV. The main points of the new political line were: to win the support of all socialist countries, primarily of the Soviet Union, for the struggle against the U.S.; to maintain neutrality on the controversial issues of the international communist and workers’ movement; in domestic politics, conversely, to unite all forces, all political currents in the struggle against the U.S., in order to support the South. The resolution of the CPSU plenum of October 1964 about the removal of comrade Khrushchev played a major role in this change. Following this, a slow process of reversal compared to the previous years begins: the Chinese influence markedly decreases and the influence of other socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union, increases.

II.
On the current status of relations of the DRV and of the PRC

1. On the economic level:

The economic, and probably also the military support of the People’s Republic of China is second only to that of the Soviet Union. In 1965-66 Chinese aid had an annual value of 40-40 million Rubles, on top of this the goods exchange agreement valued at 20 million Rubles. According to the economic agreement for the year 1967, China is already giving 600 million Yuan of aid and of commodity credit to the DRV. However, to our knowledge this is calculated on the domestic exchange rate of the Yuan, and to the most optimistic estimates equals to 120-180 Rubles. This sum covers the expenses of the sustenance of the some 200.000 Chinese technical advisors and anti-aircraft personnel.

The details of the 600-million-yuan aid and commodity credit are not known, we only know that China exports to Vietnam 15 million meters of cotton tissue, 300.000 tons of grain / of which 250.000 tons are rice /, 50.000 tons of oil-seed and somewhere between 400 and 1.500 trucks. / The ongoing turmoil in China puts into doubt the fulfilment of these target
So far, we have no information on the economic and military agreements for the year 1968.

The Thai Nguyen Integrated Metalwork Factory, the cotton industry factory of Hanoi, the biscuit factory, more smaller electric power plants, the new dual gauge railway from the Chinese border to Thai Nguyen, the new hardtop roads for military use in the northern part of the country, etc., were built with Chinese support. Chinese geologists are also taking part in the exploration of the natural resources of the DRV, a part of them are looking for uranium ore. However, there are no Vietnamese-Chinese joint companies.

The quality and quantity of the Chinese military aid is unknown. From the so far available information one may conclude that the Chinese are delivering mainly obsolete armaments, at best modern infantry weapons and a few radar devices.

One of the most important fields of economic cooperation and of dependence at the same time is transportation. A significant part of the support arriving not only from China, but also from other socialist countries, comes on the two main Chinese railway lines, although these are utilized for the interests of the DRV only about 30-35%, at most. The monthly permeability capacity of the Vietnamese-Chinese border stations is more than 30 thousand tons, but the present utilization is approx. 10 thousand. The fast flow of shipments through China is an increasingly growing problem for the Vietnamese side, because the Chinese reject all efforts directed at coordinating deliveries. Basically, the Chinese decide what can be transported to Vietnam, and they often make this difficult. It is not possible to estimate the quantity of goods and military equipment destined to Vietnam which are presently stored or held back in China. Some important equipment and instruments arrive only late to their place of destination, or they do not arrive at all. For example, for a long time we did not have any reliable information on the fate of the arms shipment sent to the Pathet Lao. For a long time, the Vietnamese comrades remained passive on this issue, with a few exceptions, they did not protest the delays, quite to the contrary, they stressed the “objective logistical difficulties” present in China. In April of this year in Beijing, Prime Minister Pham van Dong more decisively pressed the issue of coordinating of deliveries. No significant change happened, the Chinese side continues to decide the urgency and the necessity of the shipments. This triggered dissatisfaction among Vietnamese leaders.
The bombing of Haiphong and the potential destruction of the seaport will only increase the dependency on the issue of logistics. After all, this may reduce deliveries to Vietnam to routes leading through China.

The effect of Chinese pressure was felt and is felt also in the sense, that Vietnamese leaders, especially at the beginning of the war, required support from the other socialist countries which was unnecessary, in many cases they asked for equipment which they do not need at all in the current situation. Many of the Vietnamese do not want to acknowledge that the countries of the socialist bloc cannot support them – and especially the struggle of the NLF – objectively as effectively as the U.S. supports the Saigon government. Presumably, Pham van Dong’s plea in April of this year, was made on the suggestion of the Chinese, when he declared: “If the U.S. is capable of spending 7 million dollars daily in the Vietnam War, it is also the duty of socialist countries to do that”.

The Chinese leadership observes the events taking place in China with profound worry. There is a justified fear that the turmoil which has been going on in China for more than one year may reduce production, and that this may reduce the potential of economic support towards Vietnam, as well as hampering the military and other shipments through China, with a civil war in China would completely paralyze these.

2./ On the political and diplomatic level:

There are many more facts, information and observations available on political relations. China’s political pressure and the contradictions present in the political relations with China can be observed with more clarity.

The Tonkin incident, the bombing of the DRV, but primarily comrade Kosygin’s visit in Vietnam in February of 1965 opened the gates and started a process which may lead to stemming and progressively reversing Chinese influence. /So far still cautiously./ Many political and diplomatic events indicate this:

- A Hungarian party and government delegation paid a visit in 1965, under the leadership of comrade Fock;
- In January 1966 Selepin led a Soviet delegation to the DRV; in the fall of 1966 the Czechoslovakian, Bulgarian, Italian, Cuban party and government delegations paid visits;

- In 1967 a Hungarian military delegation visited Vietnam;
- The Polish party delegation in 1967;
- The visits of other trade union, youth, women’s, cultural and peace movement delegations, etc. to the DRV.

On the other hand, since 1963 the DRV did not receive a high-level Chinese delegation. In the first half of the past year, the possible visits first of Liu Shaoqi, then shortly afterwards of Mehmet Shehu, who happened to be in China - to counterbalance the effect of the 23. Congress of the CPSU – came up, but the Vietnamese leadership rejected these.

Despite the fact that since 1963 no high-level Chinese delegations visited the DRV, the Vietnamese party and state leadership often visits Beijing, until present day, the Vietnamese leadership consult on every important domestic and foreign policy decision with the Chinese leadership, and looks with “one eye” at China when taking any action. Every Vietnamese delegation travelling through China conducts talks in Beijing on their way in and out of country. When developing their positions, the Vietnamese always take into consideration Beijing’s explicit or implicit opinion. In the Soviet comrades’ opinion, in recent times there is a certain change in this respect, the sincerity of the Vietnamese also diminished towards the Chinese leadership. So far, however, they did not reach the point of sincerely informing at least the Soviet leadership on the ideas and the intentions of the Chinese leaders regarding the Vietnam War.

The WPV and the state leadership look united on the implementation of the current foreign and domestic policies, but in my opinion this is only because of the war, because of the struggle against the Americans and because of the alliance of the various domestic political forces. In reality, even the highest leadership is divided. It is widely known that two people in the Politburo of the party are pro-Chinese. One is Truong Chinh, the other is Hoang van Hoan. Also, Hoang Quoc Viet, the president of the trade unions’ league, belongs here, who is not a member of the Politburo, but has numerous important state and social positions. It is beyond
doubt that they also consequently implement the resolutions, moreover, at last year’s Albanian party congress Hoan van Hoan defended the Soviet Union to a certain extent, while Truong Chinh declared to the Italian CP delegation: “They say about me that I am pro-Chinese, but I read Dante and Shakespeare”, one of Viet’s children studies in the Soviet Union and another in Hungary, despite that, they remain notoriously pro-Chinese in the top-leadership. According to certain opinions, recently there is a somewhat positive change in Truong Chinh’s behavior.

However, in the party and state leadership the group around Ho Chi Minh, Pham van Dong, Le Duan and Giap has the largest influence. Presently, this four-person team is decisive in the development and in the implementation of Vietnamese foreign and domestic policies. Ho Chi Minh also secures the success of this group with his immense personal authority. According to the Vietnamese, he is the only one who dares to criticize Mao Zedong in the Far East. This group is internationalist, it believes in the unity of the communist movement and in intensive relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, but at the same time they realistically evaluate China’s overbearing closeness and dominant position in the Vietnam War.

In this closed world it is very difficult to precisely assess power relations and loyalties, however, it seems certain that in the party’s Politburo there is a stable, reliable majority against the pro-Chinese direction, but not in the Central Committee. There are many who are wavering, and there are very few people, like for example the Minister of the Interior Ung van Khiem, who openly and clearly is pro-Soviet. At the same time, the number of those who are dissatisfied is increasing, and their opinion is that ties with China do not bring anything positive.

The number of articles, reports and other publications on the life in the People’s Republic of China decreased, but they are still published in larger quantity than those about any other socialist country, including the Soviet Union. The ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam have a small Chinese-language daily newspaper, which has 30,000 copies, it is practically under the direction of the Chinese embassy, and apart from popularizing the PRC, regularly attacks the Soviet Union. The Vietnamese do not thwart this propaganda. A positive change can be felt also in the Vietnamese press, but they still use any opportunity to popularize of China. The Vietnamese press systematically praises Chinese nuclear experiments, as well as the political and diplomatic declarations of the Chinese government on the matter of the support to the DRV
and of the war. The Vietnamese press deceives public opinion with reporting the clamorous, “fighting” and demagogic statements of Chinese leaders and stating their support to the Vietnamese people, and the Vietnamese people only know of the events unfolding in China and of the maneuvers against Vietnam by the Chinese only through whispering propaganda.

Contradictions and similarities in ideological and political issues.

The first and the main contradiction between the Vietnamese and the Chinese appears in their view of the Soviet Union and of the other socialist countries. The Chinese claim that in the Soviet Union the restoration of capitalism and the liquidation of socialism is ongoing, that the Soviet party and state leadership is in the hands of modern revisionists who collude with the Americans and betray the Vietnamese people. In April of this year Zhou Enlai repeated this nonsense in front of Pham van Dong, but the Vietnamese prime minister did not accept it. The Vietnamese position: it is that the socialist revolution succeeded first in the Soviet Union, that they are building communism and that the Soviet Union is the biggest supporter of the struggle of the Vietnamese people, which they express also by mentioning the Soviet Union always in the first place in this respect. Though the Vietnamese leaders speak unfavorably of Khrushchev, they always speak positively of the current Soviet leadership and blame the Chinese for ignoring the changes which took place in the Soviet Union. This year, in the DRV they will be celebrating in a big fashion the 50. anniversary of the October Revolution. In this respect they created a very prestigious party and state committee, whose leader is Le Duan, the first secretary of the party. It is also beyond doubt that from to time there are unsettling moments in the popularization of the achievements and of the assistance of the Soviet Union, and there are often debates with the Vietnamese on the realization of certain program points. Apart from the already mentioned division, the cause of this is that the Vietnamese are afraid that a wider propagation of the friendship with the Soviet Union could provoke the Chinese.

In principle, the Vietnamese leadership agrees that in the socialist camp and within the international communist and workers’ movement there is a need for unity, and unity of effort must be created for a more effective support of the struggle of the Vietnamese people. In private conversations, the highest ranking leaders declare that they are also working for this end, in public however they only dare to speak about this in very general terms and in a cautious way. They refer to the fact that they have already raised this issue in many ways to the Chinese leadership, but the Chinese do not even want to hear about this. There is no doubt that the
Vietnamese position is evolving also in this respect. They warmly welcomed the Bucharest Declaration of the member states of the Warsaw Pact, as well as the Karlovy Vary Statement. In principle, they do not even oppose the organizing an international conference of the communist and workers’ movement, however, in their opinion, presently such a conference would only deepen the rift and would make the split final. In their opinion, the Chinese would not participate, and they would probably organize a competing conference. In our assessment, the Vietnamese leadership hesitates on this issue and is not stalwart enough, apparently, the continuous, stiff rejections of the Chinese are also affecting them.

Regarding the issue of the Vietnam War, the Chinese position prevails in its main events. In 1965 the Chinese reassured the Vietnamese stating that China needs 5-6 more years to prepare for and to start a war with the U.S. The main idea behind the long 5-10-15-year war can largely be traced back to this. Together with the Chinese leadership, the Vietnamese also hope that the long war will break the Americans’ fighting spirit, and that it will lead to the failure of their war policies. Supposedly, in 1965 the Chinese signed a secret agreement for mutual defense with the Vietnamese, which implied sending 300,000 Chinese soldiers to Vietnam. According to this agreement, the Chinese will begin military action if the U.S. troops and their proxies reach the Red River Valley. It is becoming obvious, also for the Vietnamese leadership, that the commitment of the Chinese cannot be taken seriously, they cannot count on a Chinese intervention even if Vietnam loses the war. The events unfolding in China make it impossible for the Chinese to enter a military conflict. There is no political unity and no stable leadership behind the nuclear and thermonuclear experiments, there is a deficiency to utilize the domestic economic, political and moral factors. In the long term there is no realistic threat that the U.S. will try to invade the DRV. The presence of 200,000 Chinese soldiers causes an incredible amount of problems. Apart from their supply needs, they make evacuations difficult, because these Chinese troops are deployed to the north of the Red River, along the main evacuation routes.

The Chinese leadership consistently pushes the Vietnamese into the direction of a military solution. In this respect, Chinese and U.S. intentions meet, while the Vietnamese so far cannot escape out of the grip of this situation, because on the one hand, the U.S. is escalating militarily, on the other hand, the Chinese categorically resist against any other solution. In this, the fact that the U.S. could not achieve decisive military successes in the South also plays a
large role, while the government of the DRV cannot start talks without the South, because the NLF would feel betrayed.

However, there are contradictions also in the issue of the war. Primarily regarding the peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese situation. The Chinese react in a hostile fashion even to the slightest proposal hinting at this direction. For example, the Chinese openly labelled the statement of Foreign Minister Trinh to the Australian journalist Burchett in January of this year / in which he stated, that if the U.S. permanently stop the bombing of the DRV and other military activities, a possibility opens up to start discussions on negotiations / as defeatist and as betrayal. The Vietnamese leadership – though not openly – rejected Chinese criticism. The view among Vietnamese leaders is gaining strength according to which the Vietnamese issue must be solved without reliance on the Chinese, on their own.

The DRV leadership so far has strongly resisted Chinese efforts to expand the war to the whole Indochina. Their goal remains to limit the war to South Vietnam. According our information, the Chinese leadership on high level already proposed the expansion of the war on two occasions, but the DRV leadership ruled that out in both cases.

The Chinese and the Vietnamese approach in the issue on people’s war is also not identical. The Chinese theory became rigid, and is mainly based on low-tech military means, on the peasant masses and guerrilla warfare, in contrast to that, the Vietnamese, based on their own experience, interpret people’s war in more modern fashion. There is no doubt that in the South guerrilla formations still constitute the main force considering their number, and that they popularize forms of guerrilla warfare, however, in the last dry season one of the main efforts of the NLF was to take their regular forces out of the way of U.S. attacks and to ensure their capabilities. In the North there is increasingly less talk about defending the DRV’s airspace with rifles. The newspapers are popularizing the air force, the anti-aircraft missile and the anti-aircraft artillery personnel. Ultimately, in the past two years – though not perfectly – they learnt to operate the modern anti-aircraft guns, radars, missiles, and to fly modern jet fighters. One noteworthy effort of the NLF in the South is that, regarding the armaments of their ground forces, they intend decrease the huge technological difference between U.S. weapons and their own. Obviously, this is impossible with air and seaborne forces.
The Chinese advisors’ influence in the organization of air defense forces brought bitter experiences to the Vietnamese. The Chinese air defense system is based on a lower-level technology, while the DRV got and gets much more sophisticated equipment from the Soviet Union and from other socialist countries. This contradiction caused and continues to cause serious damage, however, one can feel the effects of the intervention of the Soviet military delegation which visited the DRV last year, and which decisively stepped up to eliminate these problems.

One can also experience a slow development in the joint application and combined use of the military, political and diplomatic struggles, which also contradicts the rigid Chinese doctrine. Beginning in the fall of the last year, there were a few statements / the statements of the DRV’s Paris representative and of the foreign minister; the invitation to Hanoi of numerous Western personalities and publicists – including Americans /, which caused embarrassment in U.S. political circles. Generally, however, we still cannot evaluate these activities to be satisfactory. In this, their own rigidity is a major obstacle, because they regard any suggestion which does not conform to their 4- or 5-point proposals as anti-Vietnamese.

So far, the Vietnamese consider the receiving of volunteers a political act. The main causes of this may be:

- Primarily, the rigid stance of the Chinese leadership, according to which Vietnam does not need foreign volunteers, its own force will suffice, and shall the need arise, Chinese troops are ready to intervene.
- The presence of volunteers arriving from European socialist countries would bring with itself Chinese demands to let in an even a higher number of Chinese volunteers. This would further increase Chinese influence. The parallel presence of volunteers from China and from other countries also brings in itself numerous opportunities for provocation.
- Finally, apart from other practical difficulties / climate, supply problems, etc./ the possibility that this may increase the number of those countries openly taking part beside the U.S., and broaden the war itself, also forces the Vietnamese leadership to reconsider.
The depreciation of Mao Zedong’s persona in Vietnam is a new remarkable reality. The sways of the Cultural Revolution going on in China, the chaos, the setbacks suffered in the field of foreign policy progressively undermine Mao Zedong’s personal standing also in Vietnam. An important milestone in May of this year was an article in *Hep Tap*\(^9\) / the theoretical journal of the party/ on the occasion of comrade Ho Chi Minh’s birthday, which articulated sharp criticism against the personality cult without mentioning anyone by name. However, everybody knows that this was meant against Mao Zedong. In wider publications and in official telegrams they still mention Mao as the great leader of the CCP and of the Chinese people, however, on the occasion of September 2. celebrations Pham van Dong only spoke about the Chinese people and about China as struggling Vietnam’s great rear area, without mentioning Mao’s name.

The Vietnamese comrades essentially share the Chinese leadership’s views on Yugoslavia and of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. They do not consider Yugoslavia to be a socialist country. The newspapers are silent on the positive Yugoslav steps, while they sharply attack Yugoslavia when its stance differs from that of the socialist countries. The Vietnamese are ignoring the fact that Yugoslavia has a considerable influence on the countries of the third world.

This rigid behavior is also present in the case of India. Even though the Vietnamese never had disagreements with the Indians, but the deterioration of the Chinese-Indian relations also overshadows the relations between the DRV and India. The fact that the International Control Commission sides with the Canadians on almost every substantial issue also is part of the picture.

The diplomatic relations of the DRV with the PRC is very strong and vivid, possibly the most active. The PRC has its largest diplomatic delegation in Hanoi, in numbers, 30 diplomats work at the embassy and in the trade mission. The previous Beijing ambassador of the DRV / who he recently passed away / was a member of the WPV CC, the present one is only a reserve member. The Hanoi ambassador of the PRC and his first deputy have been absent for a long time, probably because their moderate activity here did not correspond with the extreme

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\(^9\) The author probably meant the official party journal Tạp chí Học tập.
Chinese methods. What is certain is that after departure Chinese provocations against local Soviet diplomats and the anti-Soviet propaganda of the Chinese embassy intensified.

For a while, the official bodies of the DRV wanted to minimize provocations by reducing diplomatic events and, when it was possible, they avoided those gatherings where the whole diplomatic corps was present. For example, they do not invite the diplomatic corps to the exhibitions and film screenings organized on the occasion of the national holidays, and at receptions they reduced the speeches to be delivered to short, 2-3-minute toasts and greetings. The Soviet and Chinese embassies are exempted. On occasion of the Day of the Chinese People’s Army, the military attaché’s speech lasted some 15 minutes, and among those present the Chinese spread various propaganda materials.

A new element in the work of the Chinese embassy is the increasing activity which it conducts among the ethnic Chinese minority. They bring the Chinese native speakers to the embassy from Hanoi and from the countryside on buses, mainly on Saturdays and Sundays. They organize cocktails, the show movies and they hold propaganda sessions for them. They provide them with brochures and flyers on every occasion, so that they can spread them in among the Vietnamese. The goal of this activity is obvious: on the one hand, to keep the ethnic Chinese minority under their political influence, on the other hand, to widen the social base of the Chinese policy towards Vietnam, and to counterbalance the influence of socialist countries. Allegedly, the majority of the flyers handed out by the embassy for circulation are handed in to the Vietnamese police, because a significant part of the local ethnic Chinese minority falls closer the Vietnamese.

During the spring the Chinese embassy began to exercise a disturbing activity which continues until today, and which is directed at creating rifts in the leadership. For example, they spread flysheets which state that defense minister Giap is intending to take power away from Ho Chi Minh. / By the way, also the Vietnamese-language radio bulletin broadcast from Canton covered this news item /. The attack of the Chinese is directed mainly at the defense minister, whom they regard as the main revisionist, though they also accuse a significant part of the northern leadership in similar fashion. In Hanoi they even spread flysheets claiming that the DRV leadership is betraying the NLF. Similar provocation is also going on in the South. We have information, that the Chinese are trying to create a rift between the members of the NLF
and soldiers sent from the North. Until now, the Vietnamese leadership didn’t undertake any
effective countermeasures to stop this destructive activity.

3. Cultural relations.

The opposition to the Chinese Cultural Revolution can almost unequivocally be
qualified as positive. The general opinion is that what is happening in China is neither a
revolution and nor culture.

The Vietnamese-Chinese cultural cooperation plan is not public. One can draw
conclusions on cultural relations only based on observation. Interpreting the signs, the relations
show a decreasing trend, because the Chinese “Cultural Revolution” raised uncertainty and
resistance primarily in this field. Last year 4,000 Vietnamese scholarship recipients returned
home from China, after schools and universities were shut and the Vietnamese government
forbade the students in China to take part in the Cultural Revolution. In the past year only one
Chinese music band and one Chinese circus company toured the DRV. However, it is also true
that 60-70% of the foreign movies shown in Vietnam are Chinese made, and especially in the
minor war-related theatre plays, acts you can strongly feel the rigid Chinese revolutionary
formal and content influence in the extremely schematic portrayal of heroes and of antiheroes.

The DRV’s government goes to extraordinary pains to keep and to increase the
level of primary and higher education despite the difficult wartime situation. In two years, they
carried out the evacuation of all educational institutions, and they did not interrupt teaching.
Periodic courses are held in the cities. Scholarship recipients and skilled workers are sent in
great numbers to European socialist countries for training. This effort of the Vietnamese
government must be valued positively, because it objectively implies a tendency for
independence, and the wish to approximate the cultural and technological levels of the
European socialist countries in the future. Vietnamese elementary schools have three levels and
continue for 10 years. The graduating from the 3. level corresponds to finishing high-school.
Here pupils can choose between two foreign languages: Russian and Chinese. According to our
information, most students choose the Russian language. We cannot know for sure the reason
behind this. Perhaps the difficulty of Chinese characters, perhaps a silent resistance, but the
most likely is: an orientation towards the modern world. Further proof is fact that in technical
colleges students prefer to study the English language, since the English technical literature is the richest.

While in China in the second half of the last year they banned and destroyed European and Chinese classics from museums and cultural institutions, in the DRV not only are their national and European cultural traditions preserved, but they also some were revived, like the anniversary celebrations of Cervantes, Thomas Mann and Rustaveli. In dramatic and puppet theaters they played again Tao San,\textsuperscript{10} the classical Vietnamese drama, they performed Verdi, Liszt, etc. concerts, there is also jazz and Schrammelmusik. The museum of fine arts which was opened last year doesn’t show any works and relics which are a reminder of the common Chinese-Vietnamese heritage. Last year in May in the city theater of Hanoi they organized an exhibition about the history of theater, according to which, before the war they played Russian classics and Soviet pieces in the most, but also showed Brecht, Molière, Shakespeare plays. The number of performed Chinese plays was significantly smaller. The head of the theatre and its directors perfectly know world dramatic literature, from the ancient Greeks to Arthur Miller.

The representatives and the workers of Vietnamese cultural and artistic life almost unequivocally condemn all that happens in China under the sign of the Cultural Revolution. Because of this, Chinese leaders already expressed their dissatisfaction more than once, and labelled it as anti-Mao Vietnamese behavior. The Vietnamese declared that in Vietnam there is not going to be a cultural revolution, and they replied to Zhou Enlai’s proposal only that after the war they will strengthen the struggle against revisionism again.

4./ There are substantial differences in the mentality and in the national character of the Vietnamese and of the Chinese. The Chinese are the easiest to organize among Asian peoples: in China there is an extraordinarily deep tradition for blind discipline, dogmatism, hypocrisy and personality cult. Their inner world is completely closed, perhaps, they never show their real feelings. They are incredibly teachable and diligent, but they are liable to extremist methods and mercilessness. Not by chance are they called the Germans of Asia.

\textsuperscript{10} It is unclear, what play the author is exactly referring to.
In the Vietnamese, one can feel the southern flavor and the French moral impact. They are much less closed and mendacious, merrier and more easygoing, they have a well-developed sense for humor. Also their thinking is not nearly as dogmatic as that of the Chinese. In Vietnam one could not have proclaimed slogans like they did in China, like: “in the interest of the revolution all is permitted, and the revolution sanctifies everything”, and the personality cult also does not have as much basis. There is no artificiality and no perversity in the general respect and love which developed around Ho Chi Minh.

The Vietnamese are blessed with a special ability for adaption, they learn quickly and are flexible, modest and friendly. Almost all those who visit Vietnam say that here, despite the war, they do not feel the anxiety and the fear they feel in China. Their nationalism is not based in great power efforts, since they never ruled over other peoples, but by contrast, it is based on self-defense, self-perseverance and the unification of the nation gives Vietnamese nationalism its mental and sentimental base. Their patriotism and their national pride, which are also of an incomparably high level, are based on the successes achieved in the liberation and resistance struggle, which really deserve recognition and this is increased by their brave, strenuous struggle against the Americans.

III.

Conclusions.

The causes of the positive developments happening in the DRV can be explained by the following:

- The People’s Republic of China suffered a series of foreign policy failures in the international arena. The Chinese positions and influence in Africa and in Asia weakened in the last years; the tragedy of the Indonesian Communist Party, the victory of Ghanaian reactionary forces, the provocative behavior of Chinese leaders in the Indian-Pakistani conflict, the drifting away of the Korean Workers’ Party and of the Japanese CP from the Chinese CP made the Vietnamese leadership deeply reflective, and made it careful.

- The unrelenting, irreconcilable anti-Soviet behavior of the Chinese leadership has mortified Vietnam, which reached a point where it’s not about theoretical issues, but about dark methods of great power chauvinism. All this astonishes the Vietnamese leadership, and
even though they may be afraid of openly condemning this, they are ashamed, and they express their regret. Even a part of the real, ultra pro-China loyalists are disconcerted, they do not understand what the Chinese leaders want.

The ongoing “Cultural Revolution” in China, the power struggle between the party committees, and the mob attacks against tried and tested fighters also undermine friendly relations to China, and shake confidence. All this caused astonishment and fear especially in the ranks of the Vietnamese intelligentsia, but also in the ranks of state institutions and among the functionaries of political organizations.

Not long ago, Le Duan remarked, that the Chinese-Vietnamese relation is in a crisis. Officially, however, the Vietnamese leadership did not take a position regarding the Chinese events, it regards these as an internal Chinese matter.

The ever increasing economic and military support of the socialist camp, its commitment on political and diplomatic issues, and its steadfast effort to create unity of action in the interest of supporting the struggle of the Vietnamese people caused a thorough inner melting in all strata of society. It is impossible to suppress news of this support, and slowly everyone will realize, that the Soviet Union and European socialist countries help the Vietnamese people incomparably more actively than China.

The policy of the Central Committee of our party and of our government on the Vietnamese issue is proving correct in all respects. The sincere and efficient internationalist support, the profound understanding towards the difficult and complicated situation of the Vietnamese is a great help in the development of Vietnamese foreign and domestic policy, mainly in respect of its great help strengthen the ever-growing relations with the European socialist countries. Even if this development is not obvious in all respects, and even though there are disturbing moments, setbacks and pauses, and on part of Vietnamese leaders there is not always complete sincerity, overall the trends are positive. A great contribution to this was the honest exchange of ideas consistently conducted at high levels and with different social organizations, which were coupled with a high degree helpfulness, patience and understanding.

The two most important traits of the local political and diplomatic behavior are: patience and understanding this must continue, but this cannot mean passivity and expediency. Forcing
spectacular results does not usually lead to achieving one’s goals, only a slow, tenacious, well-based work can. For the time being, we must steer clear of putting the Vietnamese leadership in binding situations too often, preferably, we must avoid raising delicate issues regarding China with them or demanding a clear stance from them.

This requirement must predominate also when selecting the diplomatic cadres working in Vietnam. Political preparedness, knowledge of the international class struggle are of primary importance, diplomatic routine can only mean an advantage in this context. It is useful if the cadres working here have experience in party or mass organizations work.

A complicated, open question which occupies many is, what will happen after the war? Will the present unity unravel? Will the competition among different factions increase? Will there be opportunity to influence the course of events into the correct direction? At the end, which faction will come out on top? This is a difficult question. What is sure is that we cannot measure support to the struggle of the Vietnamese people from this point of view, because the effects are of historical importance, and a people never forgets who stood by its side and who stayed indifferent in a difficult situation.

On the other hand, reconstruction in Vietnam will be a task of such an immense proportions, that no single socialist country can undertake it by itself. From this follows, that reconstruction and the strengthening of socialism also after the war needs the national unity of the Vietnamese people and the support of the countries of the socialist camp. Therefore, the opportunity for influence will objectively remain.

We must note that Vietnam will remain a front line in the struggle for a long time for the correct ideological line in the international communist and workers’ movement, and will stop to be that only if China comes back to the right path and the rifts end or diminish to a minimal level.

In our analysis in the present situation the conditions for a more active engagement to deepen our influence are getting ideal. Opportunities and possibilities for this must be worked out on the economic, political and cultural levels.

/: Ferenc Hidvégi :/
December 28.
KÜ/3114/3

To comrade JÁNOS BERECZ
Party Committee of the Foreign Ministry

Dear Comrade Berecz!

I am sending attached – to be returned – comrade Hidvégi’s letter. In the letter he proposes to honor comrade Pehr with an award and cites the circumstances, as the Soviets consider work in their Hanoi embassy as frontline service. Perhaps it would be useful if the Party Committee of the Foreign Ministry initiate the awarding process of comrade Pehr and a special praise for the Hanoi working collective.

Comradely greetings:
/Ferenc Lázár/

MAIN ACTORS

APRÓ, Antal (1913-1994) raised in an orphanage, he became a painter. He joined the trade union in 1929, and in 1930 he joined a union dominated by communists and became a member of the illegal communist party in 1931. He participated in organizing strikes and other illegal activities at the time. Due to his activities, he was imprisoned seven times by the authorities before and during the Second World War. After the war he was entrusted with organizing and leading the trade union department of the communist party, became a member of the provisional national legislature. From 1946 he became a member of the Central Leadership of the Hungarian Workers’ Party and held various positions mostly in connection with organizational work at the trade unions. In 1953 he became the minister for the building material industry but in the Nagy government he lost some of his important roles temporarily. He became a figure for the rehabilitation of victims of show trials, during the Nagy government. As the 1956 revolution broke out, he became a member of the newly established Military Committee, which was formally tasked with defeating the revolution and became a member of the Soviet supported Kádár government. From 1957 until 1971 he was a deputy in the Council of Ministers. From 1961 he led the government commission on foreign affairs and was the permanent delegate to the Comecon. He became president of the Hungarian parliament in 1971, and he held this position until 1984. He went into retirement at the end of 1984.11

BERECZ, János (1930- ) was born into a peasant family. He joined the Hungarian Workers’ Party in 1951, during his university studies. He graduated in 1955, after which he worked in the youth movement. In 1956 he was accepted as member in the HSWP, he worked in party organs in the higher education. Starting in 1963, he studied for three years in the Soviet Union, at the Social Sciences Academy of the CPSU, earned a doctorate in history, which was naturalized by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. From 1966 he was a member of party committee of the Hungarian foreign ministry. From 1972 he was deputy head of the Foreign Relations Department of the HSWP CC, (from 1974 he was director). He became a member of the HSWP CC only in 1980. In 1982 he was named chief editor of the Hungarian daily Népszabadság. He was named a member of the HSWP Secretariat in 1985, overseeing “agitation and propaganda” issues. Also in 1985, he was elected to the Hungarian parliament. In 1987 he became a member

11 Apró Antal, Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottsága
https://www.neb.hu
of the HSWP Politburo. He was a staunch supporter of single party system, and became unpopular even within the party, so he lost his high positions in 1989. He tried to remain active in Hungarian political life but was unsuccessful.\(^\text{12}\)

Bíró, József (1921- ) technician, welder, economist. He became head of the London Trade Office (1957-1960), and deputy minister (1962-1963). From 1963 until 1979 he was minister for foreign trade.\(^\text{13}\)

Biszku, Béla (1921-2016) Born into a peasant family, his family moved to Budapest in 1929. There he finished his schools and learnt to become a tool mechanic and worked as such until 1942. He joined a union of steel workers, and actively participated in the resistance by supplying weapons. In 1945 he became a member of the communist party and worked in party organs in Budapest. In 1951 he was demoted from his position, due to family issues. He remained active in the party organization and in 1956 he joined Kádár and started to the reorganize the party apparatus in Budapest. He became a central figure in the new regime and was named interior minister (1957-1961) and played a central role in the retaliation. He became a Member of Parliament and remained a member until 1985. In 1961 he was made vice president of the Ministerial Committee (1961-1962), and in 1962 he was named a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee (1962-1978). He had an important role in party organizational work. Because of the economic reform plans, he distanced himself from Kádár and became opposed to him. He was relieved from his duties as secretary of the Central Committee in 1978 and was sent into retirement, in 1980 he was removed from the Politburo, and in 1985 from the Central Committee proper. Until 1989 he held a position in the Central Council of the Hungarian Trade Unions. He was tried for his activities in 1956 and its aftermath in 2014-2015, receiving a short prison sentence.\(^\text{14}\)

Borbándi, János (1923-1994) was originally an engine fitter, joined the Communist Party in 1945. He worked after the war as a party secretary in factories between 1945 and 1955. He finished various schools and worked as Secretary of the HSWP City Committee of Budapest.

\(^\text{12}\) Berecz János, Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottsága https://neb.hu/asset/phpNgC9Tt.pdf
\(^\text{13}\) Bíró József; Ki kicsoda? in: Bencsik Péter (ed.): Az államszocializmus kora Magyarországon és Kelet-Közép-Európában http://allamszocializmus.lapunk.hu/?modul=oldal&tartalom=718655
\(^\text{14}\) Biszku Béla Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottsága https://www.neb.hu/asset/phpc7CWuX.pdf
Betwenn 1961 and 1966 he was the leader of the Political Main Directorate of the Defense Ministry and deputy minister, with the rank of major-general. He also was a member of the HSWP’s Central Controlling Committee. From 1967 to 1974 he was the leader of the Administrative Office of the HSWP. From 1974 until 1984 he was deputy prime minister. He was a member of the HSWP CC between 1970 and 1985.\(^\text{15}\)

CZINEGE, Lajos (1924-1998) was born into a peasant family. After finishing six classes of primary school, he became a blacksmith’s apprentice, later worked as a blacksmith and as a seasonal farm worker. In 1944 he became a member of the 25. SS (Hungarian) Division Hunyadi. In 1945 he joined the Hungarian Communist Party, and he was a founding member of the city chapters of the youth organization of the communist party. He worked as an independent political worker in 1947, and later became a leading member in a city party chapter, later promoted to a deputy county leadership position. Because of an incident in 1950, he was demoted, and worked at a farm equipment repair station. He was promoted to deputy director a short time later at the same station. In 1951 he joined the armed forces and became a member of the Main Directorate for Political Affairs with the rank of a captain. He later became a political officer at the Artillery Command of the Hungarian Peoples’ Army, in 1952 he was promoted to Lt. Colonel. From 1954 on he worked at the central party organ responsible for the armed forces as a deputy leader, in 1955 he became the leader of it. In 1956 he was a member of the Military Committee of the Central Leadership of the Hungarian Workers’ Party. After the Soviet intervention of 4. November, he joined the government of János Kádár and was appointed as the responsible leader for the reorganization of the internal armed forces. In 1957 he was entrusted with the organization of the Workers’ Militia. Between 1958 and 1967 he was a member of the parliament, and the president of the parliamentary committee of the armed forces from 1960 on. In May 1960 he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General and was named as defense minister. In 1961 he became a member of the Political Committee. In April 1962 he was promoted to general. In 1963 he enrolled in the Voroshilov Military Academy as a corresponding student. He regularly took part on the defense ministerial meetings of the Warsaw Pact. His membership in the Political Committee ended in 1970 after a reform of the membership. In November 1978 he was promoted to the rank General of the Army. In 1984 he became deputy president in the Council of Ministers (he was defense minister for 24 years). In

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1987 he retired. In 1988 he lost his seat in the Central Committee. In 1989, due to a scandal he gave up his rank of General of the Army.\textsuperscript{16}

Dobi, István (1898-1968) was born into a poor peasant family. After finishing six primary school classes, he became a soldier in 1916 and fought in World War I. In 1919 as a red soldier, he was captured by the Romanians. He returned from captivity in 1920, where he was immediately recruited into the national army, leaving armed service at the end 1920. As a veteran, he received a small parcel of land, and besides its cultivation he worked as an unskilled worker by the Hungarian State Railway Company, later held various unskilled jobs. He joined a landholder association in 1920, and in 1930 he founded a local chapter of the Social Democratic Party in Szőny. In 1936 he switched over to the Independent Smallholder Party, where he rose in the ranks quickly. Thanks to his party affiliation he took higher paid jobs. In 1939 he ran as a candidate for parliament but was defeated. He was an active organizer, and he saw as his mission to protect the Hungarian peasantry. He came into contact with the illegal communist organization in 1942, and he shared their views sometimes during his work. In 1944 he was mobilized for military service and was captured. He returned in 1945. He became a member of the Communist Party, but he kept his membership of the Independent Smallholders Party, where he became a leader of the left wing. He held high posts at the Independent Smallholders Party. He became a member of the transitory legislature and was named minister. After the forced departure of Ferenc Nagy, the leader of the Independent Smallholders Party, he was chosen to be the new party leader. During his leadership, he was instrumental in upending the party structures in cooperation with the communists. He also helped the build-up of the communist system. He was Prime Minister between December 1948 and August 1952 but held no real power. In 1952 he became the leader of the collective state leadership (he was the leader of this organ until 1967 and stayed a member until his death). During the uprising of 1956 he stayed in his office and helped the Kádár government. In 1959 he joined the HSWP, and he was chosen to be a member of the Central Committee of the HSWP. He was a proponent of collectivization, but his views were increasingly disregarded. He held various positions in Hungarian agricultural organizations.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{17} Dobi István, Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottsága, https://www.neb.hu/asset/phpnFn602.pdf
ERDÉLYI, Károly (1928-1971) He earned a teacher’s degree in the Soviet Union. He worked in the Foreign Ministry from 1953, he was a consular of embassy, in Moscow. He arrived back home on the 28. October, and after 4 November he worked at the government secretariat, later he was the referent of Kádár in the party apparatus (1958-1962). He was deputy foreign minister (1962-1970), leader of the Foreign Policy Department of the HSWP (1970-1971), member of the Central Committee of the HSWP (1966-1971). According to some, he committed suicide, other believe, he was murdered.\(^{18}\)

FEHÉR Lajos (1917-1981) came from a poor family. Earned a degree as a secondary school teacher. After graduating he worked as a journalist for different party publications. In 1942 he became a member of the communist party, was arrested but let go. He went into illegality in 1943, and played a prominent role in the resistance movement, helping organize armed attacks. After 1945 he became a deputy leader of the newly formed counterintelligence service in Budapest (as part of the Budapest police department), with the rank of a lieutenant colonel. He was transferred to propaganda work in 1946, as a journalist, and later as an editor. In 1949 he was elected to parliament as a reserve member and became a full member in 1950 (remained in this position until 1953). In 1954 he became a member of the editorial committee of the Hungarian Worker’s Party’s central newspaper. He fell out of favor in 1955 and was demoted, returned to Budapest because of the revolution in 1956. He was elected to the military committee tasked to defeat the revolution and received important positions in the party and was a proponent of armed action against the revolution. He was appointed as ministerial commissioner for the supply of coal. He played an important role in agricultural policy and was instrumental in creating the agricultural collective system. He was deputy prime minister from 1962 to 1974, he was responsible for multiple special fields, including defense, administrative and justice issues. In the 1970s due to his role in the economic reforms, he was criticized by the Soviets and lost his positions.\(^{19}\)

FOCK, Jenő (1916-2001) He learned as a technician and before the war worked as one. In 1931 he joined the youth organization of the trade union, and in 1932 he participated in activities of the illegal Hungarian Association of the Communist Youth Workers. He also joined the Social


\(^{19}\) Fehér Lajos, Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottsága, undated https://neb.hu/asset/phpTowIV6.pdf
Democratic Party in 1933. He was drafted in 1939 and was arrested for his activities in 1940 and spent three years in military prisons. He escaped in 1944 and waited for the arrival of Soviet troops. He joined the Communist Party in 1945, became a member of the provisional legislative body. He worked on the workers’ issues of the heavy industries. He was named in 1951 as deputy minister for defense industry, a few months later as deputy for machine industry. In 1954 he became the leader of the Hungarian trade office in Berlin, in 1955 he became the one of the secretaries of Central Council of the Hungarian Trade Unions, and in 1956 he was elected as a substitute member of Central Leadership of the Hungarian Workers’ Party. After the defeat of rebellion in 1956, he became a member of the Kádár leadership circle. In 1957 he became the member of Politburo, in 1958 he became a Member of Parliament. He was in charge of economic issues. In 1961 he became a deputy in the Presidential Council. He took part in the planning of economic reforms, which would have given a bigger role for market economic methods. As these plans became shelved, he was sent into retirement in 1975, but remained a member of the Politburo until 1980 and a member of the Central Committee until 1989.

HÁZI, Vencel (1925-2007) he studied at the University of Technology in Budapest, was a member of youth organizations. In 1948 he was enrolled in a military course as education officer, and later was sent to a one-year military school in Leningrad. In 1949 he became an officer of Hungarian military intelligence service MNVK 2 (Magyar Néphadsereg Vezérkar 2. Csoportfőnökség – Hungarian People’s Army General Staff 2nd Directorate), and later was sent to the Hungarian embassy in London (1951-1953). After his return he worked at MNVK 2. In 1957 he was employed by the Foreign Ministry and was sent to Stockholm (1957-1958). He became the ambassador to Iraq in 1958. From 1961 he was ambassador to Greece. In 1965 he returned to Hungary, where he worked in the Foreign Ministry (1964-1968). He was deputy foreign minister between 1968 and 1970. In 1970 he became ambassador to Great Britain (1970-1976). After his return he became deputy foreign minister again (1976-1983), after that, he became Hungary’s ambassador to Washington (1983-1989). He retired in 1989.

ILKU, Pál (1912-1973) was born to a peasant family in Czechoslovakia. Having earned a degree as a teacher in 1932, he came into contact with the mass organizations with communist

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20 Fock Jenő, Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottsága
https://www.neb.hu/asset/php4wGGVm.pdf
background. He became a devoted member, publishing articles and taking an active role in organizations. He joined the Czechoslovak Communist Party in 1937, becoming a youth organizer. After the territory was re-annexed to Hungary, he was arrested, released and placed under police supervision. In 1944 he joined the armed resistance. After the war he relocated to Hungary, where he became a member of the Hungarian Communist Party. He organized and led a party school, held a party position in the city of Pécs and was elected to be a member of the provisional legislature, and he was a member of the legislature until his death (with the exception of one legislative period). He was named to be the deputy head of agitation and propaganda department. He was also named given the rank of colonel (later lieutenant general) of the Political Main Directorate of the Defense Ministry. He was sent to a military academy in the Soviet Union, from where he was called back in 1956 to lead and reorganize the armed forces. In 1958 he was named as deputy culture minister responsible for lower and middle education, becoming minister in 1961 until his death. He was also named a member of the Central Committee in 1958 and was named reserve member of the Politburo until 1970.22

KÁDÁR, János (1912-1989) born out of wedlock in Fiume, he was the son a solider and a maid. He took the family name of his mother, only took the name Kádár in 1945. He learned to be a typewriter mechanic but couldn’t find a permanent workplace. He joined the youth group of the illegally functioning communist party in 1931, was arrested multiple times before the war. In 1937 he joined the Social Democratic Party and worked in the party apparatus. In 1940 he joined the illegal communist movement, and later became a Central Committee member. He disbanded and reorganized the communist party as the Peace Party, for which he was reprimanded after the war. He had important party functions from 1945, becoming deputy secretary general in 1946 (he held the position until 1951). He was named interior minister in 1948 and played a role in the organization of show trials. He was arrested in 1951 with other officials but was rehabilitated in 1954. In 1956 he was chosen by the Soviets to head the new government. He was named a member of the Central Committee and Politburo, and first secretary (with also being the prime minister between 1957 and 1958, and also between 1958 and 1961) and held various other positions as well. He consolidated the communist system in Hungary. Kádár also took an interest in the improvement of living standards and initiated reforms in 1968 but had to backtrack. In foreign policy, from the 1970s he acted increasingly independently, but with Soviet interests in mind. Due to economic problems in Hungary, he

22 Ilku Pál, Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottsága
https://www.neb.hu/asset/phplZBiN.pdf
relied on Western partners to keep living standards at a relatively high level through loans. In 1985 he was named general secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party. In the 1980s the economic crisis deepened, and he denied the seriousness of the problems. In 1988 he was sidelined with some of his closest associates due to the popular pressure. Combined with his declining health, he was removed from all his positions and died shortly thereafter.23

KÁLLAI, Gyula (1910-1996) originally trained as a journalist, he was a member of the Hungarian Communist Party from 1931. He worked for the daily Népszava, and later for other dailies. After the war he held various state and party positions, becoming a member of the Central Leadership of the Hungarian Workers’ Party (1945-1951), and was named foreign minister in 1949 until his arrest on false charges in 1951. He was rehabilitated in 1954. He held cultural leadership positions, and only shortly before the revolution of 1956 he was named a member of the Central Leadership. After the revolution he became a member of the Central Committee and Politburo, minister of culture (1957-1958), state minister (1958-1960) deputy prime minister (1960-1965), prime minister (1965-1967), speaker of the Hungarian parliament (1967-1971) and a member of the Presidential Council (1967-1989).24

KOMÓCSIN, Zoltán (1932-1974) He had humble family origins, learned to become a trader. He joined the youth organization of the Social Democratic Party in 1938, he joined the trade union in 1939. After Soviet troops occupied Hungary, he joined the communist youth organization, a short time later also the party. He held various party position, until 1950, when he was elected as a member of parliament (1950-1974). He was sent to study to the Soviet Union, and after he came back, held high state and party positions. He was a member of the Provisional Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party and helped to reorganize the party. He led the youth organization (1957-1961), was named editor in chief of the Hungarian daily Népszabadság (1961-1965). He was named regular member of the Politburo (1962-1974) and became the secretary of the foreign relations of the Central Committee (1965-1974). He was opposed to the economic reform plans in 1968 and started to form opposition against Kádár inside the HSWP. He fell ill in 1973 and died a short time later.25

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23 Kádár János, Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottsága https://www.neb.hu/asset/phpuoKyAw.pdf
MARTIN Ferenc (1912-2001): he was born into a worker family. After finishing six primary school classes, he started working as an iron-founder apprentice, but after finishing the apprentice, he couldn’t find work. After a short period he found work as an unskilled worker. Only in 1936 was he able to find work as an iron-founder. He joined a trade union and took part in strikes for higher wages. During his mandatory military service, he served as a driver and took part in the operation of the occupation of Slovakian territory. In 1941 he served on the Eastern Front but was wounded and dismissed from military service. In 1943 he joined the Social Democratic Party. In 1945 he joined the Hungarian communist party; he became party secretary at the plant he worked at. In 1947 he became a worker at the Heavy Industry Centre, from 1949 he worked in the Ministry of Heavy Industry as a department leader. He became a secretary of the National Committee of Trade Unions in 1951. From 1953 he was the leader of the Trade Union for Metallurgy Workers. In 1956 he was dismissed from his positions, the Kádár government call him back, and served again as the trade union leader for metallurgy workers. In 1959 he was chosen to be a reserve member of the Central Committee, from 1960 he was a regular member until 1966. In 1960 he joined the Foreign Ministry, from 1960 until 1963 he was ambassador to China, from November 1963 until February 1968 he was ambassador to Poland, from December 1969 until October 1974 he was ambassador to Romania. Between 1953 and 1963 he was a two-term member of parliament.26

NEMES, Dezső (1908-1985): historian. He was a leader of a main department in the Ministry for Peoples’ Education (1950-1953), he was the director of the Szikra Press (1953-1956), later he became the leader of the Party Academy (1956). He didn’t have any role in the uprising of 1956. He was chief editor of the daily Népszabadság (1957-1961 and 1977-1980), was a member of the Central Committee of the HSWP (1957-1985), was secretary for foreign affairs (1961-1965), and a member of the Political Committee (1959-1980). He was the main director of the Institute for Party History (1965-1966), director (1980-1983), rector of the Political College (1966-1977). He was a member of the pro-Kádár faction in the 70s, and he was also a member of the faction.27

26 Martin Ferenc, Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottsága
https://www.neb.hu/asset/php8goser.pdf
27 Nemes Dezső; Ki kicsoda? in: Bencsik Péter (ed.): Az államszocializmus kora Magyarországon és Kelet-Közép-Európában
http://allamszocializmus.lapunk.hu/?modul=oldal&tartalom=718655
Nyers Rezső (1923-2018) after finishing four primary school classes, he worked as a delivery boy for four years, and in 1938 he became an apprentice at a printing-house. He became a member of the youth organization of the Social Democratic Party in 1939, became a member of the Party in 1940, and joined the trade union in 1942. After finishing his apprenticeship, he worked in various printing-houses. In 1944 he was called up for military service, and after the German occupation he deserted his unit and went into hiding until the arrival of Soviet troops. In 1945 he served for a short time as a policeman, and after that he became active in the Social Democratic Party. In 1946 he joined the printing-house of the daily Népszava, in 1947 he became a county official of the Party. He took part in the process of fusion with the Communist Party. In 1948 he became a member of parliament, and he remained a member until 1998 with the exception of one term between 1953 and 1958. In 1948 he became an accessory member of the Central Leadership of the Hungarian Workers’ Party (the communist party). He went to a party school and worked as a political worker in the field of agriculture. He enrolled as a student at the Karl Marx Economics University in Budapest and finished his studies in 1956. From 1952 he worked in the Ministry of Domestic Commerce, becoming a deputy minister in the Ministry of Domestic and International Trade in 1954. He was named Minister of Agriculture in 1956. He held this position shortly after the uprising of 1956 and was one of the first members of the newly constituted HSWP. He joined the Kádár government and acted as a government commissioner for the supply of the public. He was chosen to be a member of the Central Committee, and he remained a member up until 1989. He was named minister of finance in 1960. He was named as a reserve member of the Political Committee of the HSWP and leader of the Secretariat of the Central Committee in 1962. He was responsible for economic issues, as well as some political organizations of a few counties. In 1966 he became a regular member of the Political Committee. He was one of the architects of the so called new economic mechanism, which intended to mix elements of the planned economic system with elements of capitalism. Because of international events the program was abandoned. He was relieved as leader of the Secretariat of the Central Committee in 1974, and he was left out of the Political Committee in 1975. From 1974 he was the director of the Department of Economics at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, from 1981 until 1988 he was a scientific adviser for the institute. Due to the economic problems of the 1980s he returned to public life and helped some economic reforms. In 1989 he was chosen as the party secretary of the HSWP and after the election defeat he didn’t nominate himself again. He withdrew from public life in 1998.28

PÁRDI Imre (1922-?) originally worked as an engine fitter. Started his political career in the communist apparatus in the Hungarian countryside. Later he worked in the Economics Department of the CC of the HSWP between 1959 and 1967, later became the head of the National Planning Office between 1967 and 1973. He was a member of the CC of the HSWP.  

PEHR, Imre (1914-1977) He trained to be a doctor in Italy (1932-1938). After earning his university leaving certificate, he was drafted into the Hungarian army, served as a driver in Budapest (1940-1942), and was later transferred into the forced labor service (1942-1944). He was captured by the Soviets and was a prisoner of war until 1947. After the war, from 1948 to 1965, he became a civilian worker, later an officer of the Hungarian military intelligence service MNVK 2 (Magyar Néphadsereg Vezérkar 2. Csoportfőnökség – Hungarian People’s Army General Staff 2nd Directorate). He later became a diplomat, serving in Switzerland and Italy, becoming ambassador in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (1965-1970) also accredited to Laos. After 1970 he worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

PÉTER, János (1910-1999) A Calvinistic minister, he started working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1945. He became a bishop of the Calvinistic Church (1949-1956). After the revolution of 1956 he held positions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was a member of the Council of Ministers. He became deputy foreign minister (1958-1961), and joined the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party in 1961, becoming a member of Central Committee in 1968 and remained a member until 1980. He became foreign minister in 1961 and held the position until 1973. From 1973 he was deputy speaker for the Hungarian parliament.

PUJA, Frigyes (1921-2008) he finished 5 classes of high school, and learned to become a printer apprentice, and worked as such between 1942 and 1945. He worked as a party worker, later as a political worker. After he finished the Party College, he was invited to work for the Foreign Ministry. He became ambassador to Sweden (1953-1955), later to Austria (1955-1959). He was

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deputy foreign minister between 1959 and 1963, and he was the leader of the Foreign Relations Department of the Central Committee of the HSWP between 1963 and 1968. He was promoted to first deputy of the foreign minister in 1968, and state secretary in 1973, becoming foreign minister in the same year. In 1983 he was named as ambassador to Finland. He held this position until his retirement in 1986.32

RADVÁNYI, János (1922-2016) after finishing secondary education, he became a trainee for skilled work (1940-1944). During the Second World War he was drafted into the forced labor service. After the war he studied and joined the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1947. He worked as a junior diplomat in Turkey, Paris and Switzerland between 1948 and 1953. He was fired from the Ministry in 1954 but returned in 1957. He became charge d’affaires, consul-general and ambassador in Syria. He returned to the Ministry in 1958, until he was named charge d’affaires for the US in 1962. He defected to the US in 1967 for which he was sentenced to death in absentia. In 1971 he earned a doctoral degree at the Mississippi State University and taught history of diplomacy. He was founding member of the Center for International and Security Studies.33

SZILÁGYI, Béla (1908-1995) he finished the Textile Industrial College in Brno. Between 1934 and 1945 he worked in the textile industry at different plants. Between 1945 and 1946 he was the secretary of the Hungarian communist in the county Vas and was a member of the transitory legislature in 1945. He was acting director of Hungarian coal mines (1946-1948), and later the director of the Textile Industrial Directorate. Between 1949 and 1950 he was the director of the Institute of Industrial Quality Inspectorate. His diplomatic career began with a posting to India (1950-1952), and later became a head of department at the Ministry for International Commerce (1952-1958). He became a member of the Central Committee of the HSWP (1958-1965). He was the ambassador to London (1959-1963). He worked at the Foreign Ministry between 1963 and 1970. His last post as ambassador was to Greece, from 1970 to 1975. He retired in 1975.34

Sztanko, Pál (1928-1989): he started his career as an unskilled worker at a bank. He was later employed by a chicken processing plant (1942-1948). He was an educator in a technical school (1948-1949). From there he went to the Foreign Ministry’s Academy, and he became an employee of the Foreign Ministry in 1951. He became a diplomat at the embassy in Bratislava (1952-1953), and after a short stint at the ministry, he became the consul in Bratislava (1957-1960). After his return he was a deputy head of department at the ministry (1960-1966). In 1966 he became consul-general in Bratislava. He became temporary head of the embassy in Albania (1973-1978). After that he worked at the Foreign Ministry, until 1985, when he became consul-general at the Hungarian consulate in Leningrad. He retired in 1988.35

Timár, Mátyás (1923-2020) was originally a leatherworker and economist. He was twice deputy finance minister (between 1955 and 1957, later between 1960 and 1962). He became a lecturer at a Hungarian university. He was Hungarian finance minister between 1967 and 1975, and later became the head of the Hungarian National Bank. He played an important role in creating the new economic mechanism, but he was criticized by the Soviets and moved to the National Bank, until 1988. He was also a member of the CC of the HSWP.36

Vályi, Péter (1919-1973): originally a chemist. He became a member of the Communist Party in 1945. He was a member of the central apparatus of the Hungarian Workers’ Party and held positions in the National Planning Office and also led a state-owned chemical company. He was finance minister between 1967 and 1971. After that, he became a deputy prime minister, and later was delegated to COMECON as the permanent representative of Hungary. He was a member of the CC of the HSWP. He died in an accident.37

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