

E-Dossier Series Nr. 2

French Diplomatic Documents

ON THE 1956 HUNGARIAN
REVOLUTION

Edited by
Csaba Békés and Gusztáv D. Kecskés

COLD WAR HISTORY RESEARCH CENTER
BUDAPEST 2017

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Edited by
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Cold War History Research Center
Budapest 2017

ISBN 978-963-503-663-9
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French foreign policy and the 1956 Hungarian revolution

Gusztáv KECSKÉS D.

The liberalization in the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin, often described as a “thaw”, which later extended to the other European countries under Soviet influence, was favorably accommodated by Western diplomacy, including by the Quai d’Orsay. Nevertheless Western diplomats were perfectly conscious of their narrow room for maneuver stemming from the European *status quo* that resulted from the end of the Second World War, and the emerging reality of the Cold War: the bipolar international system. They did not want to accelerate the process by hasty steps. This passive and careful policy was continued after the outbreak of the Hungarian revolution on October 23, 1956, an event that surprised Paris – just as it surprised the leaderships in other western countries.

As is known, on July 26, 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser, president of Egypt, has announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. The meticulous preparation of the military response by France in collaboration with Great Britain and also with Israel, the Israeli attack of October 29 against Egypt, followed by the launching of the Franco-British intervention in the Suez Canal zone limited the number of options available, and was a source of the passivity of the French government whose attention was fixed self-evidently on the Middle East.¹

When the representatives of the French government expressed their sympathy towards the revolution and condemned the Soviet policy of repression carried out in Hungary, they attempted to avoid declarations that might cause tensions with the USSR. The UN provided the ideal framework and forum for such a policy. Later, however, the putting into the forefront of the Hungarian case in the United Nations still appeared necessary to the French Foreign Ministry, as well as to the British Foreign Office, who were eager to mitigate the fallout from the near-universal international condemnation of their policy in Suez. The two

¹ On October 22-24, 1956 secret Anglo-Franco-Israeli negotiations took place in Sèvres, during which the participants defined the scenario for the war of Suez. On the relations between the Suez campaign and the Hungarian revolution, see Kecskés D., Gusztáv: The Suez Crisis and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, *East European Quarterly*, vol. XXXV, Spring 2001/1, 47-58.

allies wished to attain that the extraordinary session of the General Assembly of the UN, convened on November 1 to deal with the war of Suez, have on its agenda the Hungarian issue as well. They thus hoped to divide, and partly divert, attention from the crisis in the Middle East. However, with a view to the position of the Third World countries in the matter the government of the United States blocked this project. Consequently the question of the Hungarian revolution was officially discussed on the UN's agenda only after the invasion by the Soviet Army on the 4th of November.

The policy of prudence and non-intervention was also manifest in the fact that French diplomacy did not take any initiative to influence the events within the Soviet bloc. The activities of the Quai d'Orsay were limited to the collection, transmission and interpretation of information. Even though the French diplomats did good work in this respect, their conclusions did not weigh heavily in the balance. The obvious priorities were Suez and the maintenance of the European status quo.

The Hungarian case and French domestic politics

Under the conditions of the Cold War, French foreign policy was inextricably intertwined with internal ideological struggles.² Disputes over the principles of communism and the values of the "Free World" had reached a climax exactly over the Hungarian Revolution³, thus, contrary to how it may seem, it was an internal rather than an international event for France. The government considered the Algerian War (ongoing since 1954), the Suez Crisis, and the establishment of European integration, to be its foreign policy priorities.

The extremely intense reaction of the population⁴ and the political establishment can be explained by several factors. In the overly politicized atmosphere of the Cold War, French public opinion watched the freedom fight of the Hungarians living on the "other side" of the Iron Curtain closely. The French media devoted considerable space to the events, and the overwhelming majority of the population were outraged by the brutal actions of the Soviet

² Grosser, Alfred (1972): *La IVe République et sa politique extérieure*, A. Colin, Paris, 35.

³ Bernard, Jean-Pierre A. (1991): Novembre 1956 à Paris, *Vingtième siècle*, n° 30, avril-juin 1991, 80.

⁴ Regarding the reactions of the public: Archives nationales (thereafter AN), Paris, Synthèses des rapports mensuels des préfets (ministère de l'Intérieur), F1 C III 1235: 1956, août à décembre, mois de novembre 1956; documentations of the French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP) see *Sondage*, 1958/1, cf. (Bernard, 1991).

Union, as well as by the approval of these actions by the French Communist Party.⁵ The Hungarian Revolution represented freedom, i.e. the most important value in a Western mentality⁶, and it revived the French revolutionary tradition which was the constant theme of Republican cult. The mass publication in the French press of the images of combat in Budapest brought up intense memories of the Second World War in the consciousness of a major part of the population.

The crushing of the Hungarian Revolt by the Soviets, on the one hand, and the Suez Crisis, on the other, provided ammunition to both anti-communist and communist political forces whose confrontation lasted for a long time. Although the National Assembly seldom dealt with questions of foreign policy under the 4th Republic, the Hungarian uprising occupied an important place in the debates of October-November 1956.⁷ The parliamentary instruments were abundantly used: three requests for interpellation and four motions for a resolution were presented. The Committee on Foreign Affairs was also focused on the Hungarian question.

How can we explain this intense interest? The repression of the Hungarian Revolution by the Soviets provided a good opportunity to publicly take a stand against the French Communist Party which openly supported the approach of Moscow. The attitude of the Communist Party was condemned almost unanimously. In the face of these intense attacks, the communist deputies attacked the colonial policies of the government, in particular the Franco-British intervention in Suez. The extreme hostility between the two opposing sides clearly shows the great significance of these questions. On the 7th of November, the President of the National Assembly adjourned the meeting for 15 minutes because of unrest in the chamber. The use of

⁵ See the declaration of the Politburo of the French Communist Party, November 4th, 1956 in *L'Humanité*, on November 5, 1956. On the crisis and the tactics of the French Communist Party archival documents are accessible at the archives of the French Communist Party, Paris: II, Archives « papier », Archives de direction, archives du Secrétariat et du Bureau politique (1944-1971): Décisions du Secrétariat (1956-1958); Décisions du Bureau politique (1956-1958); Enregistrements audio des réunions du Comité central du Parti communiste français de 1952 à 1962.

⁶ Békés Csaba: *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics*. Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington D. C. September, 1996. Working paper, No. 16, 26.

⁷ Sources on the debates regarding the Hungarian Revolution are available at the National Assembly in: *Journal officiel de la République française* (thereafter JORF), Débats parlementaires, Assemblée nationale, compte-rendu *in extenso* des séances, questions écrites et réponses des ministres à ces questions, troisième législature, session ordinaire de 1956-1957. On the activity of the the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly: AN: la séance du 6 novembre 1956, AN : C//15749, procès-verbaux des séances de la commission des Affaires étrangères (cahiers manuscrits et dactylographiés), 8 février 1956-27 décembre 1956.

old arguments which did not have any relationship with the question discussed proves that this was a deeper conflict (for example the communist Members of Parliament often referred back to the Second World War: “Hitler”, “collaborator”, “Gestapo”, etc. were terms frequently used by them) .

Nevertheless most deputies attempted to express their solidarity with the Hungarian people through the resolution of November 7th:

“The National Assembly bows before those who sacrificed their lives in Hungary for the independence of their country as well as in defense of freedom and the holy rights of humanity; it expresses its admiration for the unshakeable courage of the martyr Hungarian nation, as it proved its dedication to true political and social democracy, stood up to an oppressor whose actions are against humanity; the Assembly requests that the government do everything possible, [...] in cooperation with other free nations, to help the Hungarians who remained in their country or escaped; and that the government take every step possible so that the free nations do everything to prevent the deportation of Hungarians who took part in the uprising...”⁸

The political tensions also translated into protests and solidarity marches in the streets. The resolution of November 7th marked the climax of tensions in Paris. On the initiative of the French Association for the Atlantic Community, a very broad range of political organizations called for a gathering on this day at the Triumphal Arch (*l'Arc de triomphe*) at 6 p.m.⁹ A demonstration of solidarity was held by about 30,000 people with the participation of several members of the Guy Mollet government, many representatives of the National Assembly, and former Prime Ministers. At the end of the demonstration about 5,000 participants, mostly young people, besieged the offices of the French Communist Party and its newspaper *L'Humanité*. Many people were wounded in the *melée* and three were killed.¹⁰

⁸ JORF, p. 4525.

⁹ For example: Centre des républicains sociaux, Centre national des indépendants, Parti radical socialiste, MRP, Anciens combattants de l'Indochine et de l'Union française, Anciens Évadés français en Hongrie, Campagne européenne de la jeunesse, Comité des réfugiés hongrois, Comité français pour l'Europe libre, Fédération nationale des femmes, Jeunesse fédéraliste de France, Mouvement fédéraliste européen, Union nationale des étudiants de France etc. See in: Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères (hereafter AMAE): Services des Pactes, carton 210, dossier Pays non signataires du Pactes. Pays Satellites, rapport sur la manifestation du 7 novembre 1956 à l'Arc-de-Triomphe, *Hommage national à la Hongrie*.

¹⁰ Bernard, 1991, 73-74.

The Hungarian affair provided an excellent opportunity for gaining internal political advantages. The Socialists began a forceful campaign against the Communists who compromised themselves through the Hungarian tragedy and attempted to lure away their voters. They even made serious efforts to win over Communist activists.¹¹ We might even suspect that there were political reasons behind the considerable government solidarity efforts (led by the socialists) and the help provided to Hungarian refugees. The cabinet of Guy Mollet thus used the Hungarian question as an instrument of domestic policy.

At the same time it is necessary to see the limits of the repercussions of the Hungarian uprising in France. A few weeks after the Soviet intervention of the 4th of November, at the end of December 1956, the interest of the public in the Hungarian tragedy decreased considerably. The French political establishment had already pulled the Hungarian cause off the agenda. In spite of the extraordinary speed of the reaction, the echoes of the Hungarian crisis in France did not bring any lasting or fundamental changes, neither in the views of the public, nor in the political life of the country. The direction of the PCF (*Partie communiste française*) led by Maurice Thorez managed to overcome its difficulties in a few weeks. The position occupied by the Communist Party in the French political life didn't really change: it kept its deputies and its electoral base.

We thus showed above how the French Government used the Hungarian Crisis in order to divert the attention from the Suez Crisis, while placing the Hungarian uprising center-stage. With the instrumentalisation of this cause, the Guy Mollet cabinet thus employed the same tactics it had used in domestic affairs. The Government contributed to the mobilization of public opinion against the Communists by using a national commemoration and charity event organized by the Interior Ministry as well as exploiting opportunities presented by the media (especially radio). The largest such event was a "national day" scheduled for November 18th, "for the cause of the Hungarian people".¹² We cannot find any traces of the effect of public pressure in the foreign policy decision-making regarding the Hungarian question. The great repercussions in France over the repression of the Hungarian insurrection were used again

¹¹ Office universitaire de recherche socialiste, Paris, Archives d'organisations, Parti socialiste SFIO (1944-1969): sténographie des réunions du Comité directeur de la SFIO, t. 13, 1er juillet 1956-21 juin 1957.

¹² AN: rapports des préfets 1954-1959, F1 C III 1350: Voeux et motions concernant la Hongrie (extraits de presse, secours à la Hongrie, journée nationale du 18 novembre), 1956, dossier: Secours à la Hongrie, le 10 novembre 1956, télégramme du ministère de l'Intérieur (Affaires politiques) aux préfets de métropole y compris Seine, *journée nationale en faveur de la population hongroise*.

when the French diplomats cited the events in Hungary in their speeches on various international fora, in particular in the United Nations.¹³

French foreign policy and its sources in the international context

The behavior of the French Government in the diplomatic field after the defeat of the Hungarian Revolution fell perfectly in line with the general direction of Western policy at the time. The main effort remained the collection, transmission and interpretation of information. Let us enumerate and illustrate the factors which influenced the attitude of the Quai d'Orsay.

The evident explanation for the French attitude is the position of the country in the international system. Considering the close relations of France to the “Western camp”, it appears normal that the French Government expressed in public its condemnation of the Soviet Union and the Kádár government, which came to power in Hungary as a consequence of crushing the revolution. Such an attitude corresponded with the expectations of the public. French diplomacy showed its disapproval in the course of the debates of resolutions of the UN General Assembly, in its bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union and Hungary by adopting the diplomatic boycott of the NATO countries, by receiving large numbers of Hungarian refugees, and finally by the support granted to the Hungarian political émigré organizations. However the French decision-makers did not want to go beyond a certain point. In short, they continued to play painstakingly according to the rules of the Cold War, in particular sticking to the inviolable taboo of the spheres of influence. This prudence was translated in the general attitude and approach of the French Foreign Ministry in this area: it did not try to exert its influence on the course of the Hungarian revolutionary events, or in their aftermath. Consequently, the major part of the diplomatic activities of the French Government was carried out outside of the area directly affected by the crisis, in the negotiating rooms and halls of the United Nations and NATO.

In the United Nations where the Hungarian question was on the agenda of the General Assembly for more than six years, until December 1962, the aim set by the French Government became more and more obvious: in collaboration with the Americans, it wished to exert an influence on world public opinion, especially on Third World countries by

¹³ See the speech of Foreign Minister Christian Pineau, delivered in the General Assembly of the United Nations on November 19, 1956. AMAE: Nations unies et organisations internationales, boîte 243, n° 2526 (November 19, 1956), télégramme de V. Broustra, chef de la Mission permanente de la France auprès de l'Organisation des nations unies.

showing them “the true face” of the Soviet Union. The Atlantic Alliance, in addition to the consultations between the ministries of foreign affairs, was used to harmonize the policies of its member countries. Even if Paris took a zealous part in the diplomatic boycott against Moscow and Budapest, it is characteristic of its behavior that the retaliatory measures of NATO were removed vis-à-vis the USSR, in January 1957, without keeping any account of the Western public opinion.¹⁴ However, they held the Kádár government in isolation for much longer, even as they knew that it was only a puppet government. The maintenance of the boycott against the official Hungarian authorities appeared to carry less risk, and cause less harm, for the Quai d’Orsay which could thus satisfy the expectations of French public opinion. In spite of this “reservedness,” the French Government did not intend to break relations completely. It meticulously avoided any action that could have endangered the operations and/or the existence of the French legation in Hungary.¹⁵ Therefore, it should not have come as a surprise that the French diplomatic mission in Budapest used its contacts with resistance groups and the opposition of the Kádár regime merely as sources of information. Isolated examples of cooperation occurred in the first few months after the suppression of the revolution.

There was a certain caution in handling the question of political emigration. For example, although the French authorities permitted the Hungarian Revolutionary Council to hold its founding conference in Strasbourg in early January 1957, they declared at the same time unequivocally that they would not allow the refugees to acquire weapons or transport them on French territory.¹⁶ Such a gesture could have led to an open conflict with the Soviet Union. Finally, the French representative in NATO opposed the idea of publicizing the fact that the Alliance was deliberating on the Hungarian question,¹⁷ not only during the revolution but also

¹⁴ AMAE: Service des pactes, carton 210, n° 50.012 (January 9, 1957), télégramme d’Alexandre Parodi, représentant permanent de la France auprès du Conseil de l’Atlantique Nord, Assistance des représentants des pays atlantiques aux réceptions soviétiques.

¹⁵ Note de la sous-direction d’Europe orientale du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Relations diplomatiques avec la Hongrie (early 1957?), *Documents diplomatiques français* (hereafter *DDF*), 1957, t. I (1^{er} janvier-30 juin), Paris, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 1990, 2-4.

¹⁶ AMAE: Europe 1944-1960, Hongrie, dossier 97, (December 13, 1956). Note de la Sous-direction d’Europe orientale pour le secrétaire général, *Création en Occident d’un « Comité national révolutionnaire » hongrois*.

¹⁷ AMAE: Nations unies et organisations internationales, boîte 242, n° 50.408 (October 27, 1956), télégramme d’A. Parodi, représentant permanent de France au Conseil de l’OTAN.

in December 1956. Regarding the assistance to the refugee students, the Quai d'Orsay stated that "it would be preferable to avoid any direct action of NATO."¹⁸

In close connection with the previously described factors, a second factor influenced the French diplomatic behavior, which was the intention to coordinate its actions in a tightknit multilateral co-operation, meaning close cooperation with the United States and Great Britain. French diplomats conducted intensive discussions with their allies about the relations with the Kádár Government, the taking in of Hungarian refugees, and the actions intended to provide humanitarian aid to the population of Hungary. If an initiative by the French had not been supported by the NATO allies, the Quai d'Orsay abandoned it; this was the fate of a French proposal for economic aid to Hungary in the first month of 1957.¹⁹

Once the Suez Crisis passed, the influence of this factor decreased gradually on French decision-making and the Algerian problem took a more prominent role, with the war there lasting until 1962. The policy carried out in Algeria reduced to a certain extent the room for manoeuvre of France at the United Nations. All in all, we can say that the bipolar system of international relations did not cease to be a determining factor for French diplomacy towards Hungary during the aftermath of the revolution. It was its strategic determinant and French interests in the Middle East were the tactical and temporary drivers of French policy.

The division of the world into separate spheres of influence meant a policy of non-intervention, even a passive stance, for the French Government. The policy of the peaceful subversion of the socialist countries, which meant encouraging them to pursue more independent foreign policies from the Soviet Union, and more liberal policies at home, through economic, political and cultural contacts²⁰ was the line from which France never deviated. More energetic measures were, however, not envisioned. The acceptance of Hungary's neutrality during the revolution or foreign minister Pineau's proposal for

¹⁸ Archives du secrétariat international de l'OTAN (thereafter ASIO, Bruxelles): AC/52-R/67 (January 8, 1957), procès-verbal de la réunion du Comité de l'information et des relations culturelles tenue au Palais de Chaillot, Paris, le 18 décembre 1956 à 15 heures.

¹⁹ AMAE: Service des pactes, carton 210, n° 50.132 (March 6, 1957), télégramme d'A. Parodi, représentant permanent de la France auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord, *Aide à la Hongrie*.

²⁰ Békés Csaba: *Az 1956-os forradalom a világpolitikában* [The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics]. Tanulmány és válogatott dokumentumok. Budapest, 1956-os Intézet, 1996, 77.

Hungary's neutralization presented at the National Assembly²¹ on December 18, 1956 cannot be considered as serious political moves. The international weight of France did not allow for such grand initiatives to be effective. In the same way, similar remarks by Jean Paul-Boncour, minister of France in Hungary, addressed to Chou En-lai, president of the Chinese Council of Ministers in January 1957 in Budapest, were in fact only a simple attempt at demonstrating France's "proactive" policy at no great risk.²²

The other factors, namely the impact of the Suez Crisis and later the War in Algeria were not without influence on French foreign policy, in particular in the United Nations. However, these conflicts played only a minor role and were of a tactical nature compared to the European *status quo*. The extremely intense reaction of French society and the French political establishment had only a limited impact on the decision making at the Quai d'Orsay. Admittedly, French diplomats felt towards Hungary a similar compassion to the one expressed by the greater public²³ nevertheless, the great emotional reaction and the individual demonstrations of sympathy did not have any impact on the eventual policy.

The Hungarian crisis remained beyond the sphere of French interest. Its representatives acted directly only in the UN, NATO, and in working for the Hungarian refugees. In other words, Paris concentrated its activities in areas where it could act without the fear of direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. French diplomacy considered the continuation of disarmament and détente as its primary objective, and it therefore believed that the maintenance of dialogue with the Soviet Union was more important than providing support for the liberation of the peoples of East-Central Europe. This position was stated clearly when Imre Nagy, the former Hungarian Prime Minister, was executed; the two issues would not be linked.

²¹ JORF, *Débats parlementaires, Assemblée nationale*, compte rendu *in extenso* des séances, questions écrites et réponses des ministres à ces questions, troisième législature, session ordinaire de 1956-1957, 1^{ère} séance du 18 décembre 1956, 6090.

²² Télégramme de Jean Paul-Boncour, ministre de France en Hongrie, n° 65 à 69 (January 18, 1957), *DDF, 1957*, t. I, *op. cit.*, 104-105.

²³ Kecskés D., Gusztáv: De l'autre côté du "rideau de fer"... La révolution hongroise de 1956 et la politique étrangère française à la lumière de quelques entretiens avec d'anciens diplomates, *Specimina Nova*, 1999, 155-171.

As Étienne de Crouy-Chanel, the French permanent representative in the NATO Council on June 20, 1958 stated:²⁴

“The dialogue between East and West belongs to a different page, its stake is too high for us to be led solely by our emotion. Public opinion, which would probably understand if we discontinued the dialogue with the Soviet Union today because of the execution of Nagy, in a few months, however, would probably rebuke us for doing so. Therefore, we do not believe in breaking off relations.”

It is evident from the available sources that the government of Guy Mollet did not consider the Hungarian uprising to be of primary concern, neither internally nor diplomatically. During meetings of the Council of Ministers at the time of the Hungarian Revolution, the issue was discussed only once. The first decision concerning the Hungarian Revolution was made on November 7th, when they made a decision on accepting refugees.²⁵

In November-December 1956, during discussions with the most important allies of the French Government, the Hungarian Revolution was rarely mentioned, or was entirely neglected. At a meeting between the German chancellor Konrad Adenauer, and Guy Mollet on November 6th, the major topic of discussion was European integration.²⁶ Hervé Alphand, the French ambassador to Washington, when visiting President Eisenhower on November 8th, emphasized that the alliance between the United States, Great Britain, and France, should be strengthened because the Suez Crisis shook the foundations of mutual confidence²⁷. Finally, the British and French negotiations concentrated on the Suez Crisis and its consequences²⁸. Undoubtedly, the Hungarian Revolution was not of primary importance for either Paris or the

²⁴ AMAE: Services des pactes, boîte 241, n° 57 (June 20, 1958), télégramme d'Étienne de Crouy-Chanel, représentant permanent de France au Conseil de l'OTAN.

²⁵ The author did not have an opportunity to study the minutes of the meetings of the Council of Ministers. The article relies here on the remarks made by Patricia Gillet, archivist at the Section of the 20th century of the National Archives (Paris), who communicated certain information to the author, and on the examination of the cartons F60 2766 (Ordre du jour du Conseil des ministres, 1956-1958, dossier: janvier 1956-décembre 1956) and F60 2772 (communiqués de presse des Conseils des ministres, dossier: janvier 1956-décembre 1959).

²⁶ AMAE: Secrétariat général (1945-1966), « Entretiens et message », 3 septembre 1956-septembre 1957, procès-verbal de l'entretien du 6 novembre 1956 entre G. Mollet et K. Adenauer (*DDF, 1956, t. III, 24 octobre-31 décembre*, Paris, 1990, 231-238.).

²⁷ AMAE: Secrétariat général (1945-1960), Suez, 82, n° 7028 à 7038 (November 8, 1956), télégramme de Hervé Alphand, ambassadeur de France aux États-Unis (*DDF, 1956, t. III. op. cit., 251-253*).

²⁸ AMAE: Secrétariat général (1945-1966), « Entretiens et message », 3 septembre 1956-septembre 1957, n° 278/SGL (December 4, 1956), rapport de Jean Chauvel, ambassadeur de France en Grande-Bretagne.

other Western capitals. The Council of the Western European Union²⁹ and the ministerial level NATO Council meetings of December 10th and December 11th-14th (both held in Paris) expressed similar attitudes. Beside the Guy Mollet Government other Western governments were also aware of the fact – in contrast to their own public opinions – that their possibilities to influence the revolutionary events in Hungary were indeed limited. More energetic steps, let alone a military intervention in the Soviet Bloc, did not occur as a possibility to them.

²⁹ Compte-rendu de la séance du Conseil de l'UEO du 10 décembre 1956, *DDF, 1956*, t. III, *op. cit.*, 512-518.

The secret negotiations of the Western Great Powers during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution

Csaba BÉKÉS

The leaders of the Western great powers, the United States, Great Britain and France — unlike their public opinion which expressed vivid solidarity with the Hungarian revolution from the beginning—were acutely aware of their extremely limited room to maneuver within the existing European status quo and reacted with great caution to the uprising in Hungary from its very beginning. Consequently, in most instances, they went so far as to give explicit public endorsement of the principle of nonintervention. Behind the Western response to the Hungarian Revolution was the realization that under the prevailing international political circumstances, any sort of Western military intervention in Hungary contained the implicit threat of a third world war with the Soviet Union, to be waged with thermonuclear weapons, which would likely first lead to the obliteration of the very Eastern European peoples which intervention was designed to liberate, and then of the rest of the World.³⁰

It was at this time that the Eisenhower administration was confronted with the fact that, contrary to one of the predominant themes of the massive liberation propaganda it aimed at Eastern Europe since 1953, even the United States, the world's greatest military power, had extremely limited options regarding any sort of intervention within the Soviet sphere of influence. It was nonetheless very important for Washington to conceal this impotence in order to preserve its international prestige, therefore the US administration decided on 25 October that in concert with its closest allies, it would initiate discussion in the United Nations on the subject of the Hungarian uprising.³¹ The British and French initially expressed reluctance when US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proposed on 26 October that the three countries

³⁰ On the international context of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution see: Csaba Békés: *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics*. Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington D.C., September, 1996. Working Paper No. 16.

³¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-57. Eastern Europe*. Volume XXV. United States Government Printing Office Washington D.C., 1990. (Henceforth: FRUS Vol. XXV) 290-291.

launch a joint initiative to convene a meeting of the UN Security Council.³² With the Suez campaign having already been definitely decided upon, the British and French leadership was worried that if the question of Soviet intervention in Hungary were put on the agenda and discussed in the UN, it might serve as a precedent for a similar procedure regarding the joint Israeli-British-French attack on Egypt which was to take place at the end of October. But since they had not informed the United States of their plans, they were forced to accede to American pressure and on 27 October the United States, Great Britain³³ and France³⁴ submitted a joint request that the Security Council be convened to examine the situation in Hungary.

From this date until 3 November the representatives of these three Western great powers met continually behind the scenes in order to work out a UN strategy which all could agree on; the comportment of the United States, Britain, and France during the three Security Council sessions which dealt with the Hungarian question on 28 October, 2 and 3 November was completely planned in advance during these secret negotiations.³⁵

In the days preceding the Israeli attack on Egypt the UN representatives of the three Western great powers agreed that it was imperative to voice emphatic public condemnation of the Soviet intervention and that beyond this action they would employ a wait-and-see policy until the

³² Public Record Office, London-Kew, Foreign Office, General Correspondence, 371 (Henceforth: PRO, FO) 122378 NH 10110/188 Foreign Office minute, 26 October, 1956; *Documents diplomatiques français 1956. Tome III. (24 octobre-31 decembre)*. Paris, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, 1990, 1956, Tome III. 19.

³³ On British policy towards the Hungarian crisis see: Békés Csaba: A brit kormány és az 1956-os magyar forradalom [The British Government and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution] In: *Évkönyv, 1992, 1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 19–38.* [Yearbook, 1992, Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution]; See also: James Cable: Britain and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. *International Relations*, Vol. 9, Issue 4, 1988. For British documents produced during the revolution, see: Éva Haraszty-Taylor (ed.): *The Hungarian Revolution of 1956. A Collection of Documents from the British Foreign Office*, Astra Press, Nottingham, 1995. This selection primarily includes reports sent by the British legation in Budapest to London, with the Foreign Office's comments, and thus with some exceptions do not touch on the deliberations at the U.N.

³⁴ On French policy towards the Hungarian Revolution see: Gusztáv Kecskés: Gusztáv D. Kecskés: French Foreign policy and the 1956 Hungarian revolution. *COJOURN*, (Corvinus Journal of International Affairs) Vol. 1. No. 3. 2016. (<http://cojourn.blogspot.hu>)

³⁵ For the story of the secret talks of the three Western Great Powers on the Hungarian situation see: Csaba Békés: The Hungarian Question on the UN Agenda. British Foreign Office Documents from 1956. *The Hungarian Quarterly*, Spring, 2000, 103-122.

confused situation in Hungary became more transparent.³⁶ The consequence of this policy was that the three Western powers which had placed the Hungarian question on the agenda did not even introduce a draft resolution during the 28 October session of the Security Council. After the widening of the armed conflict in the Middle East with the engagement of Great Britain and France on 31 October, the tenor of the negotiations among the Western great powers regarding Hungary changed completely. Eisenhower and Dulles, who had placed increasing importance on establishing good relations with the Arab world with the aim of expanding American influence in the Middle East, reacted furiously to the actions of their European allies. Not only did they publicly condemn the Suez action, but they also instructed the American UN representative to submit a draft proposal calling for the immediate cessation of all military operations in the Middle East, a motion which brought about a circumstance which had no precedent in the history of the UN with the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union voting in concert against Great Britain and France.³⁷

As a result of the sudden deterioration in relations between the Western great powers, subsequent discussions between them regarding the Hungarian question were conducted in an increasingly icy atmosphere in which the negotiating partners were not really interested in condemning, much less impeding Soviet intervention, but wanted rather to exploit the Hungarian crisis in the name of their own, in this case drastically conflicting, great power interests. Beginning at this time, the British and French undertook to get the Hungarian question moved from the Security Council to the first emergency session of the General Assembly—which had been convened to discuss the Suez crisis on 31 October—where they hoped that the simultaneous treatment of the two issues would lead to a mitigation of the censure they had been receiving. Transfer of the Hungarian question to the General Assembly would have been of incidental benefit to the forces of change in Hungary, for in the General Assembly there is no veto power, which left at least the theoretical possibility that the UN would pass a resolution having a positive influence on the outcome of events in Hungary. The sole objective of the American leadership, however, under the existing circumstances was to resolve the Middle Eastern crisis, which they did; therefore they did everything within their

³⁶ See especially the following documents: Telegram by UK UN representative Sir Pierson Dixon to the Foreign Office, 27 October, 1956. PRO FO 371 122376 NH10110/110; Telegram by UK UN representative Sir Pierson Dixon to the Foreign Office, 28 October, 1956. PRO FO 371 122376 NH10110/111; Foreign Office telegram to the UK representative at the UN, 28 October, 1956. PRO FO 371 122376 NH10110/107; Telegram by UK UN representative Sir Pierson Dixon to the Foreign Office, 29 October, 1956. PRO FO 371 122380 NH10110/241.

³⁷ On the history of the Suez crisis see: Kyle Keith: *Suez*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.

powers to frustrate the aforementioned strategy of the British and French. Thus, until 4 November the Americans succeeded in preventing them from submitting a draft resolution concerning the Hungarian question in the Security Council and further blocked them from referring the question to the emergency session of the General Assembly via the ‘uniting for peace’ procedure.³⁸

After the second Soviet intervention on 4 November, the American UN representative, Henry Cabot Lodge, unilaterally implemented the former British–French strategy without asking for the cooperation of his European Security Council allies, with whom he had broken off negotiations regarding Hungary the previous day as a method of punishment for British and French actions in Suez. When the Security Council was subsequently convened upon the arrival of the news regarding renewed Soviet intervention on 4 November, Lodge himself initiated a “uniting for peace” procedure which effectively circumvented the Soviet veto and referred the Hungarian question directly to the second emergency session of the General Assembly. On the afternoon of the very same day a large majority of this body voted to adopt a draft resolution—likewise submitted unilaterally by the US representative—which condemned the intervention of the Soviet Union, called for it to withdraw its troops from Hungary, and recognized the right of the Hungarian people to a government which would represent its national interests.³⁹

At the same time, this resolution, made not even a reference to Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the recognition of Hungary’s neutrality, declared on 1 November, for which Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy had so emphatically appealed in his messages to the UN secretary general on 1 and 2 November.⁴⁰

³⁸ On the the emerging sharp conflict between the US and British (and French) governments during the secret trilateral talks in the UN see the reports by the UK UN representative, Sir Pierson Dixon: Telegram by UK UN representative Sir Pierson Dixon to the Foreign Office, 2 November, 1956. PRO FO 371 122381 NH10110/292; Telegram by UK UN representative Sir Pierson Dixon to the Foreign Office, 3 November, 1956. PRO FO 371 122381 NH10110/293; Telegram by UK UN representative Sir Pierson Dixon to the Foreign Office, 3 November, 1956. PRO FO 371 122381 NH10110/280.

³⁹United Nations. General Assembly. Official Records. First and Second Emergency Special Sessions, 1–10 November 1956. Plenary Meetings and Annexes. New York: 1956. Minutes of the plenary meeting on 4 November, 1956. A/3286.

⁴⁰ On the history of Hungary’s neutrality in 1956 see: Csaba Békés: The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Declaration of Neutrality. *Cold War History*, Vol. 6. No. 4. November, 2006. 477–500.

This is all the more interesting as the British and the French did support Hungary's neutrality from the outset⁴¹, hoping that an issue of such importance and an unprecedented move by a Soviet Bloc state would help transfer the Hungarian issue from the Security Council to the General Assembly. Neglecting this crucial issue in the UN GA resolution was due to the fact that for Washington, now acting unilaterally in the UN in the case of Hungary, the country's neutrality was unacceptable. While the concept of Hungarian neutrality engendered a good deal of support in the State Department where it had already surfaced as a topic of discussion days before Nagy launched his appeals to the UN, for the leading personalities of the American leadership this option was unacceptable for different reasons. Dulles, who had sharp misgivings regarding the increasingly powerful nonaligned movement, and was therefore generally ill-disposed toward the idea of neutrality, not surprisingly, came out against the idea with regard to Hungary. He firmly believed that if, perchance, Hungary were to succeed in its struggle to free itself of Soviet domination, the United States should not rest satisfied with the country's neutrality when there existed the real possibility of incorporating it into the Western sphere of influence.⁴² President Eisenhower himself sympathized with the idea of establishing a zone of neutral states in Central and Eastern Europe but he hoped to achieve this aim through negotiations with the Soviets in a framework of general reconstruction of East-West relationships. It is a paradox of history that although the evolutionary views of Eisenhower and Imre Nagy on neutrality were very similar, the Hungarian decision made in an extraordinary situation simply could not be supported by Washington taking into account real political considerations. Overtly supporting the unilateral radical move of the Hungarian government, that is recognizing their neutrality, had the possible danger that the American government would take on an international responsibility which would be extremely difficult to cast off after the suppression of the Hungarian uprising, which was seemingly close at hand. However, it was even more important for Eisenhower that such a diplomatic move, due to the probably vehement Soviet reaction, would have seriously jeopardized the well improving Soviet-American relations, and indirectly the whole détente process unfolding after 1953.

In the early hours of the morning of 4 November, the United States nonetheless fervently condemned renewed Soviet intervention in Hungary—Eisenhower even sent a personal

⁴¹ Foreign Office telegram to the UK representative at the UN, 1 November, 1956. PRO FO 371 122382 NH10110/332.

⁴² D. D. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversations Series. Minute of discussion between Harold E. Stassen and John Foster Dulles, 26 October, 1956. Printed In: FRUS 1955-1957 Vol. XXV. 305.

message of protest to Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin—and in this way succeeded in leading the world to believe that it had, from the very outset, played a constructive role in attempts to settle both the Suez and Hungarian crises.

The real clash of conflicting viewpoints in the United Nations, contrary to earlier interpretations, took place not between the Western powers and the Soviet Union during meetings of the Security Council where what was said on both sides was primarily for public consumption, but behind the scenes, in the course of secret negotiations between the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and France. The result of the discord which arose in relations between the Western great powers over the Suez crisis was that the UN was unable to take firm steps toward the resolution of the Hungarian question at a time (from 1–3 November) when the circumstances in Hungary, such as Nagy's request for UN mediation, made such steps feasible.

One should not overestimate, however, the potential influence of any UN resolution by the Second Emergency Session of the General Assembly condemning Soviet intervention, a measure which remained a distinct possibility right up until 3 November. The Soviet Union, in light of its status as a world superpower and the reassuring pledges it had received from the United States, was by no means disposed to let the moral authority of UN resolutions prevent it from intervening militarily, if necessary, to restore order in a country within its own sphere of influence.

The discord among the Western powers which came about as a result of the Middle Eastern conflict no doubt made things easier for the Soviets, though it is fairly certain that even without the Suez crisis they would have pursued a similar policy. To verify this statement is sufficient to examine the circumstances of the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia: at that time the Western alliance's freedom of movement was not restricted by any internal conflict, the West still responded to the invasion aimed at rescuing the communist regime with the same passivity than in 1956. Moreover, we now know that US President Lyndon B. Johnson who at the end of August 1968 condemned the intervention in Czechoslovakia in a high-sounding declaration for the public, barely a few weeks (!) later, in September proposed a summit

meeting with Brezhnev via diplomatic channels on Vietnam, the situation in the Middle East, as well as to discuss the issue of anti-missile systems.⁴³

Therefore, Western passivity in 1956 was not caused by the Suez crisis, but by a limitation to its range of options in Eastern Europe implicit in the prevailing European status quo and the notion of spheres of influence. The Suez crisis simply served as a handy excuse, especially for the United States, in order to explain why, after years of liberation propaganda, it was not capable of extending even the smallest amount of support to an East European nation which had risen in arms in an attempt to liberate itself from Soviet domination.

⁴³ Békés Csaba: *Európából Európába. Magyarország konfliktusok keresztjében, 1945–1990*. [From Europe to Europe. Hungary in the Crossfire of Conflicts, 1945–1990] Budapest, Gondolat Kiadó, 2004, 236; Anatoly Dobrinin: *In confidence. Moscow's ambassador to America's six Cold War presidents (1962–1986)*. New York, Random House, 1995, 189-195.

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DOCUMENTS

Document 1

Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 24 1956⁴⁴

CABLE 1

Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest

T. n°622 to 624. Urgent.

Budapest, 24 October 1956, 2h
(Received: 13h. 32, 12h. 50)

Unlike the rumpus of Petöfi club five months ago, student demonstrations to which the public has massively joined, reflect a sickness that is beginning to be unleashed throughout the Hungarian nation.

We have just learned about a meeting of a thousand people last week in Györ under the chairmanship of Gyula Hay, who is known to the Ministry by the reports of my cultural attaché, as he had the leading role on the occasion of the recent National Congress of Writers.

Characteristic of the state of mind of the populations of the provinces is the way in which orators ask if it has really become possible to expose publicly what everyone wants or claims.

There were vows of the same order that the students loudly expressed today in the streets of the capital.

There is also the restoration of Cardinal Mindszenty in his position as primate of Hungary; it is remarkable that the crowd of Budapest has said nothing until today; moreover, when the demonstrators hooted at the lit-up star at the top of the parliament, voices have risen in the crowd to blame them.

⁴⁴ The source of all documents in this collection is: *Documents diplomatiques français 1956. [DDF] Tome III. (24 octobre-31 decembre)*. Paris, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, 1990, 1956, Tome III. – The footnotes of the documents written by the editors of DDF are not translated here.

Document 2

Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ambassadors of France in London and Washington – October 26 1956

CABLE 19

Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to ambassadors from France to London and Washington

Paris, 26 october 1956, 21h10

T. n° 11343 to 11345; 11528 to 11530. Very urgent. Priority. Reserved.

The embassy of the United States has consulted today the Ministry in order to know if it would be convenient to take steps in the United Nations concerning the intervention of the Soviet troops in Hungary.

The State Department thinks that a letter could be addressed to the President of the Security Council to bring the attention of the Council to the situation created in Hungary by the use of Soviet forces against the Hungarian people who claim the rights and freedoms registered in the Charter and the guaranties by the peace treaty. The letter would request the members of the Security Council to examine the situation in order to determine if it is likely to endanger peace and the security, and if it is the case, to consider constructive measures that the Council could decide. One could also think about a resolution which would propose the establishment of a commission which would have to establish the facts and to submit report with the Council.

I estimate that, if the principle of this approach were to be retained, it would be eminently desirable that the initiative would be taken by a European state, a signatory to the treaty with Hungary.

I fear indeed that Soviet propaganda may not argue from an American approach to try to justify their allegations concerning collusion between the United States and the insurrectionists.

The press announces in addition that the insurrectionists asked the minister from England in Budapest that Great Britain intervenes in the United Nations.

I would thus wish, before making a decision, to know the intentions of the Foreign Office for this subject.

Document 3
**Report of Mr. De Boisanger, Ambassador of France in Prague,
to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 26 1956**

CABLE 22

Mr. De Boisanger, Ambassador of France in Prague,
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign affairs.

T. n°1096. Reserved.
19 h.

Prague, October 26, 1956,

(Received: 23 h. 14.)

Although a complete calm continues to prevail in Czechoslovakia, it is clear that the events in Hungary cause great concern to the leaders in Prague. This concern is manifested both by the security measures that are openly taken and by the extremely violent tone taken by the Communist Party's newspaper towards the "intrigues of reaction".

If the uprising in Budapest had to have some echo here, it is probably in Slovakia first that it is perceptible, both because of the immediate vicinity of Hungary and the presence of a large Hungarian minority that has feelings of autonomy of their population towards Prague and of the hostility more marked than elsewhere towards the regime.

Document 4

**Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of
Foreign Affairs – October 26 1956**

CABLE 23

Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest, to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Budapest, 26 October 1956.

T. n°640. Top Secret.

Description of the military aspects of the situation, according to the military attaché.

The popularity of Imre Nagy is compromised by the bloody Soviet repression as well as his attempt to obtain the pacification of the country by the promise of the dismissal of Gerö and
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the evacuation of the Soviet troops from Hungary. The newspaper of the Communist party is, this morning, moreover was more evasive than the government regarding the evacuation of the Soviet troops, as indeed is for an amnesty. The insurrectionists, after taking over a printing works last night, succeeded in sending into the province trucks from the Communist party in charge of proclamations, announcing that a provisional left government had just been made up, to which Kadar and Nagy had been invited to join without taking « direction » of it.

Intended for Imre Nagy, the newspaper of the Hungarian central trade-union published a vast program whose immediate interest is reduced to call on the intelligentsia and workers so that, associated in company councils, they immediately take over the direction of the factories with the central trade-union.

I must report that part of the crowd, beseeching the protective intervention of marshal Tito, after being massacred on the outskirts of the Parliament, went yesterday outside the legation of Yugoslavia. My car was stopped by other groups requesting an intervention in the U.N.; many phone calls reached us for the same ends.

Document 5

Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 26 1956

CABLE 24

Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest,
to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Budapest, 26th October 1956.

D. n°1022.

We know that since the Poznan affair, the Hungarian intelligentsia, increasingly followed by the mass of people divided between new hopes and an intense feeling of oppression, did not stop gradually overheating spirits to the point of, starting from October 23rd, bloody riots whose observers however had, up to that point, dismissed the hypothesis.

The starting point of the situation must be sought in the circulation of an article published by a new newspaper, *The Engineer of the Future*, an organ of the students of the technical

University. This article claimed, inter alia needs, the immediate departure of the Russian troops, the re-establishment of the Hungarian national flag and the demolition of the statue of Stalin, a monument both colossal and, in the eyes of everyone, symbolic. At the same time, the students of the technical University circulate a leaflet inviting the population to a demonstration of sympathy for the Polish people.

The initial reaction of the public authorities is to prohibit this demonstration. But since the word on the street is that flowers are being placed on the statue of General Bem, a Polish - hero of Hungarian war of independence, the government resigns itself to give its authorization.

From this moment, the events begin to move quickly; one ultimately reckons that 200.000 people made up the crowd of students, then, increasingly, of workers and soldiers who, with tricolor flags on their heads, march in front of the statue of Bem while singing the national anthem and then *La Marseillaise*. The demonstrators, passing in front of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, demand, and obtain, that this building is draped with the tricolor colors. In front of the ministry of the Interior, they claim the return of Nagy to power and the election of a free Parliament.

In the evening of the 23rd workers, having finished work, unite with the crowd. They all then move towards the Parliament, and then towards the Radio with the hope of putting pressure on Gerö who was about to speak there: it was a waste of time, because he makes a speech which is the flattest bunch of slogans that could grow in the brain of a party member, and in which, in particular, there was sharp praise of the behaviour of the U.S.S.R. Far from alleviating spirits, this declaration raises the temperature and, in a few hours, the demonstrators spread themselves across all parts of the city, occupying the crossroads, stopping and emptying official cars of their contents.

In the same time, a group moves towards the statue of Stalin: which resists their efforts to make it rock. Over the course of an hour, with the gleam of lit fires on all sides, specialists attack it with the blowtorch. Finally, around 10 p.m, it is on the ground. Already the demonstration had become a riot; around 11 p.m, the machine-guns start to fire.

The disorders change aspect owing to the fact that the students are now doubled in number by older men, helped by numerous girls and women who were not the least courageous. The objectives take shape: initially at 10 p.m., the Radio which, over the next few days, changes hands on several occasions, then the newspaper of the party, *Szabad Nep*, whose presses are broken. Soon the rioters, requisitioning the trucks of the factories and the public services, are able to transport the theatre of the operations from one point to another; they are looked after by medical students provided with ambulances. The few weapons which they were able to get at the beginning increase with those obtained from fraternization with the *Honved* and, later on, from plundering a barrack.

During the day of 24 October, the Central Committee of the party had a constant session and the reaction of the government manifested itself in two different fields. Initially, on the

political plan, it endeavoured to give the government a new face by announcing that morning the entry of Imre Nagy into the Central Bureau of the party, and the reorganization of this organization like that of the Central committee. However, the insurrectionists have no illusions about the actual extent of this measure: Nagy, although promoted at the Political Committee, remains there in the minority and becomes – in a certain sense – a hostage; Gerö and Hegedus continue to occupy the premier positions. Very quickly, public opinion is angry at Nagy to have given into this comedy.

In addition, these illusory concessions do not prevent military repression: troops armed with machine-guns, tanks and armored cars patrol everywhere in the city where they encounter strong resistance. At the same time, the government demands surrender, initially for October 24th at 2 p.m., then for 6 p.m., then for the 25th at 7 a.m., otherwise martial law will be applied in all its rigor. With general consternation, it is now Imre Nagy who is made the spokesperson for these ultimata.

Those do not seem besides to impress anybody if one judges by the corpses and the many casualties who, after midday on the 24th, strew the streets and among whom many are women.

However, in an increasingly frequent way, the officers and troops refuse to shoot at the crowd and instead fraternize with it. Tanks pass the insurrectionists and, on the 24th in the evening, about ten between them take part in guarding Stalin Bridge. Thereafter, their manpower does not stop being reinforced.

Under these conditions, it is inevitable that the initiative of the operations passes quickly to the Russian troops. Their tanks and their manpower arrive by the Eastern Railway Station, and by the road at a rapid pace, from 2 in the morning.

They double up and supervise the Hungarian soldiers everywhere and are not long in releasing the besieged Soviet embassy. Soon, the streets in the center are damaged by the cannon; the museum of Budapest burns, as well as the Astoria hotel. Soviet planes fly over the city, but are obstructed by the fog.

On the 25th, in the morning, the situation appeared almost desperate for the insurrectionists and the crowd, who had received the order to go to work, seemed to move around freely again. However, the bridges and the crossroads were kept by the Russians.

But in the morning, the engagements begin again, in particular between Russian and Hungarian tanks. At midday, the insurrectionists try to attack the Parliament, but are encircled and dispersed by the Soviet tanks.

However, in other sectors, certain information, which this legation initially refused to put faith in, indicates a wavering in the attitude of the Soviets. One of their motorized detachments, taken by surprise, is encircled and disarmed by the crowd, which, in particular, seizes two tanks under the windows of French Institute. Nobody affirms that under different

circumstances, the Russians would have let themselves disarm without resistance or would have even voluntarily delivered their equipment.

At this point of time – on the 25th at 12:30, the radio announces that the Political Committee has just relieved Gerö of his functions and that he is to be replaced by Kadar (First secretary of the party) and Nagy (president of the Council).

At 15h20, the radio disperses a call of these two leaders. The first requires the re-establishment of the order, but promises to start negotiations with the USSR on an equal footing. The second guarantees the amnesty for all those who surrender and announces, “in his capacity as president of the Council”, that the government is currently in talks with the Soviet government “for the withdrawal of the foreign troops”.

Document 6

Report of Mr. Alphand, Ambassador of France in Washington to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 27 1956

CABLE 26

Mr. Alphand, ambassador of France in Washington,
to Mr. Pineau, minister of Foreign Affairs

Washington, 27 october 1956, 3h30

T. n°6737 to 6741. Absolute Priority. Reserved.

I refer to your n°11528

One of my colleagues had the occasion to discuss on the evening of October 26th with Mr. Beam, a possible recourse to the United Nations about the intervention of Soviet troops in Hungary. This question had been examined all day between the Secretary of State and his principal colleagues. No decision had been made yet by the evening of the 26th, waiting for the reaction of countries friendly towards the the United States – which had been consulted the very same day.

One tends in the present hour to consider in Washington that a request in the United Nations should be signed by the greatest possible number of signatories of the peace treaties in addition to France. The US government estimates, for its part, that it cannot neither be the only signatory of this letter, but nor can it abstain from affixing its signature for the action which would be brought forth. Approaches were made in this direction not only in London, but also towards the Commonwealth state signatories of the peace treaty. Discretion is left to the ambassador of the United States in Yugoslavia in order to judge if it is useful or not to approach Marshal Tito on this subject. France would be the only country not a signatory of the peace treaties whose participation seems essential. The British have already given a first answer to the move taken towards them this morning. They are agreed to take it to the United Nations, but reckon that it is possible to wait the moment when the General Assembly will meet. The State Department considers it impossible to delay for such a long time and wishes to make a decision over the weekend.

Mr. Foster Dulles has not yet come to a conclusion on whether it would be sufficient for the states which are signatories to the letter to ask for registration of the question in the agenda – and to draw the attention of international opinion to the gravity of the situation in Hungary without putting forward a practical measure. He will have also examined this evening the possibility of putting forward a resolution creating a committee of the Council charged to supervise the evolution of the events of Budapest. It is quite certain that a resolution of this kind would encounter a Soviet veto and perhaps a negative veto or a Yugoslav abstention. Nevertheless, the United States believes to be able to count on a solid majority of nine states.

On no account, a possible recourse to the Security Council would not be based on the violation of the peace treaty of 1947. An argument of this kind could be embarrassing if the USSR would object to the peace treaty with Italy, signed at the same time, as since then it has been greatly modified in its practical application. The State Department thus prefers to base its argumentation on the violation of the principles of the Charter and on the declaration of the Human rights. Mr. Dillon gave an account today, of the first discussion which he had this morning with Your Excellence on this subject. One would wish in Washington to know the final position of the French government for tomorrow.

Document 7

Report of Mr. Chauvel, Ambassador of France in London to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 27 1956

Cable 27

Mr. Chauvel, ambassador of France, London,
to Mr. Pineau, Minister of the Foreign Affairs

London, 27 October 1956, 14h.

T. n°5659 to 4664. Absolute priority. Reserved.

On the basis of the information given on the telephone by the chief executive officer of the Political Affairs at the Ministry, I questioned yesterday afternoon the permanent under-secretary about the English provisions concerning the appeal which Hungarian insurrectionists had made to the English legation in Budapest.

Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick assured me of the fact that the English legation had been appealed to by the insurrectionists. I communicated that the legation of the United States appeared to have been appealed to too; my interlocutor answered me that he had not received anything from Washington on this subject.

On the follow-up to this call, he was very reserved. The news available to him at that time marked the extent of the movement, but one might fear that the insurrection will be quickly curbed. In addition, expressions of sympathy, in an acute crisis period, would likely be rather badly received by people more interested in effective support being given to them.

Lastly, the affair did not appear to conveniently conclude – in terms of an appeal to the Council.

For these reasons, the trend of the British government was to hold in reserve the arguments which the intervention of the Soviet troops provided us in Hungary, for the case where the Russians would attack us later on about actions that circumstances would lead us to undertake elsewhere. Without further specification, I had the impression that my interlocutor thought of Levant and particularly Jordan. He mentioned at no time the affairs of North Africa.

This morning, on a received communication of the general secretary of the Ministry, I asked to see again the permanent under-secretary of State who called me on the telephone a moment ago. It was to tell me that the British government had been greeted yesterday afternoon by an American proposal moving towards a joint approach at the Council.

The Prime Minister had decided to achieve this request, marking however that if this action was taken, he would wish that France had to join it.

Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick added that the news of the morning and the received information of the legation from England in Budapest presented the insurrection as being liable to spread. In these conditions, it appeared preferable to act right now. As I said to him that we were ourselves disposed to join to an approach if the British government took part in it, he added

that instructions were going to be sent to Sir Pierson Dixon to ask him to get in touch with his French and American colleagues on the terms of a letter to be addressed to the president of the Council. The instructions concerning the terms of this letter would be given on a sufficiently broad basis to facilitate the common work of the writing.

Document 8

Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Cornut-Gentile, Chief of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations. – October 27 1956

CABLE 28

Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs,

to Mr. Cornut-Gentile, chief of the permanent mission of France to the United Nations.

Paris, 27 October 1956, 21h55.

T. n° 3283, 3284. Absolute priority. Reserved.

I refer to your telegram n°1998 as well as the telegram from Washington n°6670 which was communicated to you under the n°1265.

I am sending to you, under the following numbers, the text of a preliminary draft of resolution of which you will be able to discuss with your American and British colleagues. As you will see it, it focuses only on the shipment of weapons carried out by Egypt on the *Athos*, without mentioning previous interferences by this country.

We indeed have an interest in avoiding as all far as possible a debate on the whole Algerian question. That said, it does not exclude that, during your interventions, you evoke at the right moment previous interferences by Egypt, notably in the field of propaganda.

The limited character of our draft resolution should moreover allow us, as your two colleagues also think, to more easily defeat the Egyptian counter-plots and to push aside the registration, and possibly the discussion, of the counterclaims which the adversary would allege to bring to the Council.

Lastly, it is essential that the draft is drawn up in its final form in order to rally the biggest number of votes.

Document 9

Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to ambassadors of France in London and Washington – October 27 1956

CABLE 29

Mr. Pineau, Minister of the Foreign Affairs,

to ambassadors of France in London and Washington

Paris, 27 October 1956, 22h25.

T. n° 11404-11408; 11581-11585.

I refer to the telegram from London n°4634-4635.

The Ministry estimates that the approach considered in Bonn is likely to be platonic, since it does not bring any new element and our position is already known by the government of the Federal republic and by the government of Vienna. Under these conditions, it does not seem very convenient to go back to the planned memorandum.

The department has the feeling that only a more constructive attitude, on our part, would be, it seems, likely to incite the German and Austrian governments to postpone, for the moment and in the interest of the Western solidarity, the dispatch of observers to a forthcoming session of the Commission of Budapest. This is why we proposed pentilateral talks on this subject.

Furthermore, the Department sees only advantages in responding favourably to the American and British suggestions to discuss in advance, in discussions between the three, the proposals which should be made to the Germans and to the Austrians. In this regard, the Ministry, in what relates to it, estimates that these discussions should answer the following principle: as far as possible to preserve the international character of the river, and to prevent by means of their accession to the Commission of Budapest, Germany and Austria, as the only two bordering countries which are still apart from the current system, from joining an

organization, which of this fact, would constitute a kind of “selected club” from which the non-bordering countries would be excluded, whatever, moreover, might be their interests in the Danubian navigation.

On a concrete level, it seems that from these prospects, it would be desirable to start an ultimate attempt with the Eastern Bloc countries in order to obtain that the non-bordering western powers would be associated, in a form which remains to be determined, with the work of the Commission of Budapest, an attempt which, according to the information received at the Department, would not be displeasing to certain German circles and especially Austrians.

In practice, during possible negotiations on this problem with the Eastern Bloc countries, the various hypotheses envisaged in the report of the tripartite working group, relating to the regime of the Danube, on the 19th and 21st September 1955 could be examined again. We could, it seems, at the outset present the maximum claims which could consist of a fundamental modification of the convention of Belgrade, even to adopt as a last fallback position a minimum requirement which would be reduced to the simple sending of an observer by an organ of the United Nations, such as the European Economic commission, for example.

The Ministry would be obliged if these views would be exposed to the government of your residence. Request its approval, so that the tripartite conversations envisaged take place at the Ministry through representatives of the embassies on the 5th of November.

Document 10

Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations – October 27 1956

CABLE 31

Mr. Pineau, Minister of the Foreign Affairs,

to the permanent mission of France to the United Nations.

T. n° 3282. Absolute Priority. Secret. Reserved.

Paris, 27 October 1956, 23h.

To be communicated via tape-recording to Mr. Cornut-Gentile.

It is essential that the draft resolution which will be put before the Security Council on the Hungarian question does not contain any provision likely to obstruct our action in Algeria and our relations with Morocco and Tunisia. In particular, we are opposed to the creation of a commission of inquiry.

In addition, the resolution will have all the more sway with international opinion and in Hungary, and it will be more concise and stripped of worn-out options.

Document 11

Report of Mr. Francis Lacoste, Ambassador of France in Ottawa to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 27 1956

CABLE 33

Mr. Francis Lacoste, ambassador of France in Ottawa,
to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Ottawa, 27 October 1956, 20h10.

T. n° 613-614. Very urgent.

Acting on the instruction of his government, my American colleague yesterday asked the foreign minister about his feelings on the opportunity of an intervention of the United Nations in the events of Hungary, Mr. Pearson answered him that, in the opinion of the Canadian government, the International organization should be concerned with the question very urgently, in order to stop the bloodshed.

In addition, addressing this morning members of the Rotary Club of Toronto, the [thoughts of the] foreign minister should be expressed in the following sense:

« The Canadian government reckons that Hungary should be able to choose its own way. »

« The world opinion must be mobilized in favor of forces fighting for their national freedom and against military intervention or foreign domination. The United Nations constitutes the ideal place where such a feeling could be expressed, and the Soviet Union, like any other member of the Organization, has the right and the duty to cooperating in finding a solution.»

Document 12

Report of Mr. Fouques-Duparc, Ambassador of France in Rome to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 27 1956

CABLE 34

Mr. Fouques-Duparc, ambassador of France in Rome,
to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Rome, 27 October 1956, 19h.

T. n°1027,1028. Urgent.

In the spirit of the declarations made yesterday by Mr. Martino, the Chigi palace wishes that the West expresses, with the greatest possible radiance, its solidarity with the Hungarian people. According to the information given by a close colleague of the General secretary, it is considering an action on three plans:

- Immediate assistance by the sending of relief supplies, drugs, food, through national and international committees of the Red Cross;
- Actions on the European level within the framework of the Council of Europe or the Western European Union.

Mr. Alessandrini received the instruction to inquire today as to the views of the members of the Atlantic Pact on this subject.

- Lastly, the Italian government wishes to be able, in some manner, to join the action of the Security Council.

Mr. Brosio must take a step in this direction in Washington. Other information will be given in the days to come on the Italian projects which are inspired by the sympathy that one feels here for the cause of the insurrectionists, as at the same time as by the traditional links which link Italy and Hungary.

Document 13

Report of M. Paul-Boncourt, Minister of France in Budapest to M. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 27 1956

CABLE 36

Mr. Paul-Boncourt, Minister of France in Budapest,

to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Budapest, 27 October 1956.

T. n°647. Reserved.

Following my n°643.

The insurrection is developing in the provinces. The government had, by radio, to accept all the conditions of a certain Council of the revolution in Riezolnok, which is a Soviet garrison.

The workers' council, approved reluctantly by Nagy yesterday, are taking over the industrial centers.

In the capital, after one night of combat, the insurrectionists attacked some security police stations. Since this morning, a relative calm has reigned. However, the population was authorized to seek impossible supply – that is only between 6 a.m. and 10 hours. If they continue to travel, it is at their own risk, because the armored cars patrol and are mandated from time to time to recall it by shooting.

The aim pursued could be to exhaust the morale of the population, broached more and more by lassitude and deprivations.

The patriotic fever of these last days is undoubtedly falling and if the current truce were prolonged, it is possible that the insurrectionists would not find a great deal of support among the population.

Although the composition of the cabinet of Nagy constituted a disappointment, many wonder why the fighting continues – since the chief of the government, or the Central Committee, has accepted the major part of the insurrectionists' claims. Moreover, the leadership had the ability to appoint to a particularly capital role at the present time, that of the Commissar of

Supply, Vas, a communist, an organizer and a popular personality. He proved his organizing qualities as mayor of Budapest from the day following the liberation.

Document 14

Report of Mr. De la Tournelle, Ambassador of France in Madrid to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 27 1956

CABLE 37

Mr. De la Tournelle, ambassador of France in Madrid,
to Mr. Pineau, Minister of the Foreign Affairs.

Madrid, 27 October 1956, 20h.

T. n° 834 to 836.

The Council of Ministers, which met yesterday evening at El Pardo under the presidency of the General Franco, has charged the Spanish representative of the UNO to raise, in the name of his country, a protest « against the bloody action of the Soviet troops in the internal conflicts of Hungary and Poland and by requesting from the international agency its intervention ». Such a decision is well in line with the official anticommunist policy of Spain.

We should however note that Spain intervenes at the time when two officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are semi-officially in Moscow to regulate, in theory, the question relating to the return of Spanish emigrants, but rumors has it, that in spite of denials given, other subjects are to be approached (such as the restitution of the gold of the Bank of Spain).

In the same time, Madrid has preserved semi-official relationships with the diplomatic missions of the old governments of Central Europe established here: in addition to royal legations of Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, of Poland and Czechoslovakia they have a Croatian representation, and all enjoy many advantages.

The initiative of the Council of Ministers seems to be taken apart from any consultation of the interested Western countries and would tend to mark that Spain wants to act apart from the sphere of the Atlantic's pact. An editorial of the *A.B.C.* quotes again besides this morning the

idea of a Mediterranean pact anticommunist for which Spain and Turkey, which defend the entries to *Mare Nostrum*, should be promoters, and which would help to complete in another form « the partial co-operation between the countries of the anticommunist bloc of the western world ».

Document 15

Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 28 1956

CABLE 38

Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest,
to Mr. Pineau, Minister of the Foreign Affairs.

Budapest, 28 October 1956, 12h42.

T. n° 648 to 650. Absolute priority.

Prior to the the argumentation that the Soviet delegation undoubtedly prepares itself to develop before the Security Council, Radio-Moscow assigns the insurrection of Budapest to the “reactionary agents of capitalist powers”.

Neither Gerö, nor Nagy dared to accuse the western powers, at least publicly: the first spoke of « provocative elements » and the second of « counter-revolutionaries groups ». The broadcasting of the regime spoke at several times only about « premeditated provocations by fascistic reactionaries elements », when it accounted for the interrogation of insurgents taken as prisoners.

It has affirmed that they simply had been fooled by “hooligans” or “pillage professionals”.

Furthermore, any pejorative description was, relatively speaking, abandoned by the third day of the rising, to be partially resumed only at the start of the expiry of the ultimata. When the crews of the Soviet tanks fraternized with the crowd who overwhelmed them on October 25th and walked with them around midday outside the palace of the Parliament of...⁴⁵ the arsenals, who was the « provocative » element?

⁴⁵ Gap of decryption.

And who caused the general strike of the...⁴⁶ workers in all the country as well as the appropriation of the factories by the trade unions, elements which one believed faithful to the regime? The only Western factor having given some moral support to the rioters was Radio Free Europe. Still, it was generally limited to applauding them without encouraging them too much to continue the fight. In addition now they hold out for the Anglo-Franco-American appeal to the U.N.

Document 16

Report of Mr. François Seydoux, Ambassador of France in Vienna to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 28 1956

CABLE 39

Mr. François Seydoux, Ambassador of France in Vienna,
to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, 28 October 1956, 15h25

T. n° 535. Absolute priority.

I refer to my telegram n°532.

Mr. Figl indicated to us that, according to the information which he has laid out, the Soviet reinforcements in tanks and aviation will be entering into Hungary from Romania and the USSR or transiting through Czechoslovakia. There will be three armies representing a total of twenty-seven divisions.

Document 17

Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Cornut-Gentille, Chief of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations – October 28 1956

⁴⁶ Gap of decryption

CABLE 41

Mr. Pineau, Minister of the Foreign Affairs,

to Mr. Cornut-Gentile, chief of the permanent mission of France to the United Nations.

Paris, 28 October 1956, 16h10.

T. n° 3335-3336. Absolute Priority.

Our ambassador in Vienna had a call this afternoon with the general secretary of the Ministry. Mr Figl wished to notify him, and to inform also his American and British colleagues, that he just had asked Moscow that a ceasefire took place in the engagements between the Hungarian insurrectionists and the Soviet troops. The Austrian government also informed the secretary general of the U.N of its initiative.

This action has the support of the Austrian public opinion which, as far as possible, expresses its active sympathy (drugs and help) for the Hungarians. This is all the more important in the eyes of the Austrians that, according to the information they have given to Mr. Seydoux, three Soviet armies would go on Hungary.

Document 18

Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Cornut-Gentile, Chief of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nation – October 28 1956

CABLE 42

Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs

to Mr. Cornut-Gentile, chief of the permanent mission of France to the United Nation.

T. n° 3326,3327. Absolute priority. Reserved.

Paris, 28 October 1956, 16h20.

Referring to my former telegram relating to the draft Resolution intended to be put before the Security Council on the Hungarian question, I communicate to you with the following numbers a text mentioning certain topics which could be included in the project. They are simple suggestions which I transmit to you, purely for reference, for your discussions with your American and British colleagues.

There is no reference there to the violations of human rights. Maybe there are, ultimately, more disadvantages than advantages to retain this concept which is invoked against us in the Algerian affair and against the British in the affair of Cyprus; it would be likely to cause the debate to deviate and to open up the way for annoying and useless polemics.

Document 19

Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Cornut-Gentille, Chief of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations – October 29 1956

CABLE 44

Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs,

to Mr. Cornut-Gentille, chief of the permanent mission of France to the Organization of the United Nations.

T. n° 3330 to 3334. Absolute priority.

Paris, 29 October 1956, 16h

In the current circumstances and since we are not signatory of the Hungarian treaty, you would have interest to direct your intervention according to the following lines:

- a. We claim by no means to get involve in the interior affairs of a country. We note, on the contrary, that the incursion has been made by a foreign state.
- b. It is useless to claim that the Soviet troops should intervene under the treaty of Warsaw. It does not envisage in any of its clauses an action of this nature.
- c. If one affirms on the Soviet side that it was simply a question for the Soviet army of defending its lines of communication in Hungary, you will point out that we are witnessing, not defensive actions, but a mass intervention, and the prolongation of this alone led to the current tragedy.
- d. If, on the Soviet side, one declares that the intervention occurred at the request of Nagy's government, you will take note of this declaration while pointing out that, according to certain

information, the intervention occurred on the night of October 23rd, before even the constitution of this government, whose legal authority does not seem, besides, to have been shown, and which, in addition, same government has promised the insurrectionists to seek the departure of the Soviet troops of Hungary before January 1st, 1957.

e. You will insist, finally and especially, on the need to stop without delay the bloodshed, to allow supply to the population, and to restore the sovereignty of the Hungarian people.

f. If, on the Soviet side, one would claim that the insurrection was fomented by « imperialist » agents, you would leave it to your American colleague to refute these allegations. You would restrict yourselves to point out that it is about a generalized popular rising which *Szabad Nep*, an organ of the Hungarian Communist party, itself recognized on 26th October that it was due to the errors of the past and « the resentment » of the working class.

g. I cannot judge from here whether it would be beneficial to propose an immediate suspension of weapons, and the meeting before the Council of a representative of the Hungarian government who would come to make a statement on the real situation. This suggestion, which would avoid any recourse to a Committee of inquiry, to which we are unfavorable, could, in any case, bring immediate relief to the population.

Document 20

Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 29 1956

CABLE 45

Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest,
to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n° 663,664.

Budapest, 29 October 1956, 15h46, 16h. 2.

Having been to see the enrolment of the students into the national guard (my telegram n° 655), the military attaché collected the following intelligence close to the revolutionary committee of intellectuals, which was to sit in the recruitment's buildings, and which comprised outstanding personalities majority of which were known of him and some of myself.

1. The governmental declaration of yesterday gives satisfaction to the essential claims of the insurrectionists.
2. The foundation of the national guard confirms the complete dissolution of the political security police.
3. Although certain members of the Nagy cabinet do not profit from popular sympathies, the new president of the Council is regarded as the key man of the situation and the only personality able to restore order in the country.
4. The Committee was aware of the declarations of our representative at the Security Council and was sensitive to the tone of conciliation of this speech « which is in the French diplomatic tradition of mediation between the Soviet block and certain extreme trends, that are occasionally expressed in one or another ally of France ».

Document 21

Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 29 1956

CABLE 46

Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest,
to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n° 665,666. Urgent.

Budapest, 29 October 1956, 18h. 9.

For the first time, maybe, since its foundation, *Szabad Nep* argued against *Pravda* in connection with a particular article titled: “The collapse of an adventure directed against the Hungarian people”.

«It is a [purification], declares the official journal of the Hungarian Communist party, it was not an adventure. Finally, patriotic ideas won out and not those of the reaction or the counter-revolution. One does not want to live here in fear and terror anymore, one wants more goods; here is the adventure against the Hungarian people. This article wounds and offends the population of Budapest. Its fight was not caused by imperialist agents, but by despair. What do the people of Hungary want? National independence is its first requirement». «That Hungary is a free and an independent country».

Document 22

Report of Mr. Des Garets, Chargé d'Affaires of France in Belgrade to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 29 1956

CABLE 48

Mr. Des Garets, chargé d'affaires of France in Belgrade,
to Mr. Pineau, minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n°914 to 917.

Belgrade, 29 October 1956, 19h.

I have visited the new director of Western Europe this morning.

Mr. Zemijak pointed out that the Hungarian crisis came from slownesses with which democratization had been carried out. Due to a lack of an evolution in good time, they had a revolution.

One can reason, however, as he continued, that the new governmental program, which makes broad concessions at the requests of the insurrectionists, will make it possible to restore peace and to establish « something solid ».

Concerning Mr. Nagy, his popularity depends, undoubtedly, mainly, on the departure of the Soviet troops. It seems beside the point that that the intervention of these troops was required, not by Nagy, but by Gerö. The latter precipitated the crisis by his blunders.

My interlocutor admitted that Hungary had been much further way than Poland in the way of « Liberalization ».

He reckons that there is lack in Hungary of a key figure like that in Poland, with Mr. Gomulka, in who is exalted in his role.

The director of Western Europe spontaneously spoke to me about the « sensitive » situation in his country yesterday at the Security Council. « Undoubtedly, we do not tolerate the Soviet interventions. They are contrary with our principles. But, at the same time, we must take account of a set of elements. Our situation will be also extremely delicate during the discussion on the underlying problem. In any case, the Hungarian rising represents a serious failure for the USSR; this failure reached, not only stalinists, but also current leaders. It is an

event of a considerable importance, as important as the attitude of Yugoslavia in 1948 and, besides, of a similar nature: it is a... with the Soviet seizure. We do not know what will be the reaction of the USSR, but we hope — and the attitude that it has adopted with respect to Poland can, undoubtedly, confirm this hope — that it will be also able to take heed of Hungarian realities ».

Document 23

Report of Mr. De Boisanger, Ambassador of France in Prague to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 29 1956

CABLE 49

Mr. De Boisanger, ambassador of France in Prague,
to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n° 1106 to 1109. Urgent. Reserved.

Prague, 29 October 1956, 19h.

The more one measures the importance of the events in Poland and Hungary, the more one thinks that they could not have any consequences in Czechoslovakia. Without any doubt the situation of the country is very different from that of its neighbors. The standard of living of the inhabitants has not stopped improving for two years. Police despotism has been noticeably reduced and people have ceased to live in fear of arbitrary arrests. A series of liberal measurements or of practices — because destalinization, to be implemented stealthily, is noting less than a reality — made the regime less tyrannical, less troublesome, and has allowed the recovery, the increase in contacts with the West. Communism remains however abhorred by a majority of the population, not less than how they are shocked by the subordination of the authorities to the policy of Moscow.

The government cannot ignore this state of mind and the encouragement which the upheavals which occur in Poland and Hungary will give to the opposition. How will it react? Some of my colleagues, with the safety measures which have been taken over the past few days, believe in a hardening of policy. It is not my opinion.

Considering the careful temperament of the Czechs, I would rather incline to believe that the government, sensitive to the lessons of these last weeks, will endeavor to make remedy some of the subjects of the current climate of dissatisfaction.

But the evolution of Czechoslovakia as well as the evolution of the other countries of people's democracy also depends on another factor: the attitude of the western powers. One knows which party the Czechoslovakian government draws on with respect to the population, attached to certain advantages that the regime brought to it, attitudes or facts which could suggest that the re-establishment of the regime abolished in 1948 is the objective of the Western policy.

Isn't this the moment to definitively dissipate this ambiguity? A solemn proclamation of the principles which inspire the policy of France, of Great Britain, of the United States with respect to the people's democracies could have here, in the current circumstances, deep echoes – namely that they do not intend to support any shape of government, and that the choice of the regime to which a country wishes to be submitted to belongs only to the population without any external intervention. It would logically follow the debate that has just taken place at the Security Council.

Document 24

Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 29 1956

CABLE 53

Mr Paul-Boncour, Minister of France at Budapest

To Mr Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

D N°1024

Budapest, 29 October 1956

The calls of Nagy and Kadar did not bring about the cessation of the resistance in Budapest and did not stop its extension to Transdanubia.

And yet, in Budapest, the resistance became more and more difficult. If on the morning of the 26th, violent fights still occurred in the East and North of the Capital, and in the evening the

insurgents still managed to burn two tanks and one Russian armoured car with gas-cans; on the 27th, it is flat calm excepted a few isolated gunshots. Empty streets are kept everywhere by Soviet tanks. Hungarian troops were ordered by the government to withdraw into three barracks in the city but one part may have disappeared.

Anyway, to occupy Budapest by force, the Russian commander had to call on the closest troops, which are those in Transdanubia, between Budapest and the Austrian border, and which were rallied to the capital between 24th and 25th October. It was only on the 26th, 27th and 28th that the troops from the East arrived.

Therefore, Transdanubia was largely emptied of Russian troops and rapidly rose up. On the 27th at Győr; on the 28th at Vac, Szolnok and Hatvan, they fell into the hands of insurgents. On the night between the 27th and 28th, at the post of Hegyeshalom, the police, guards and troops were rallied to the resistance, opening thus a breach in the Austro-Hungarian border. On the morning of the 28th, it was announced that a school of tanks in Pata had done the same thing. Hence, we can say today, as far as our information from the province is exact, that Hungary is cut by a line determined by the bend of the Danube.

In this first phase, what are the government reactions?

On 27 October at 11:20, Nagy announced the composition of his government which mainly include communists and could have been conceivable before the 23 October. We can say therefore that most of the ministers were recruited among the non-Stalinists, opportunists and those who have been rehabilitated. Exceptions are the Minister of Agriculture, Bela Kovacs and the Minister of Finance, Istvan Kossa, former members of the smallholders's party.

My communications indicated to the Ministry that the composition of the Political Committee and the Central Committee has hardly changed. The men are the same, except the two chiefs of the executive and the party.

Admittedly, the situation is such that, at least in its declarations, this government is ready to make huge concessions. The first one is the departure of the Russians (and Nagy expressed his readiness to ask for the departure of Russian troops), but there is no reason today to claim that the U.S.S.R is willing to withdraw the troops. My communication on 28th October reported of the other concessions in foreign policy. A series of promises genuinely demagogic on internal and social policies was added and most of them were naturally, impossible to implement in the foreseeable future. One considers the right to work, the various conditions of the men of 1848, and the government of the second Republic. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that Kadar-Nagy team is striving to tangibly satisfy opinion:

1° The tone of the official press has changed considerably. In its editorial, Szabad Nep, on the 28th affirmed that "we do not recognize a fascist nature to the insurrection". This is a popular movement gathering workers, peasants and intellectuals. Here is what a great number of communists did not understand... Gero's speech played a fatal role.

2° Hungarian troops receive a general order to cease fire, except if they are attacked. It is true that the loyalty of these troops was more and more precarious.

3° The A.V.O (political police) has been abolished and will be replaced by a new state police, with a new composition (28 October).

In particular, a security service will be implanted in the capital (Nagy's speech on 28 October) gathering elements of the army, police and student and workers militias.

4° The government managed to get the Russian troops to begin to evacuate the capital in such a manner that the evacuation would be complete by the time the security service is organized. These concessions are determined by the split in the country and the threatening attitude of the workers (conditions of the factory in Gyor, and from the workers of oil wells in Zala) but the formulation of the speeches (Nagy's speech attached) are still expressed in a communist phraseology.

In the current confusion, it is still too early to put forward conclusions that could be ventured. It is clear that the country is split in two parts and the question arises of whether the part of Hungary that rose up will be regained or not by the Russians. If not, we will be witness to a game of demands from the revolutionaries, as is already occurring at the present time. It is questionable whether it is possible to reach an agreement between the conditions put forward and the minimum acceptable for the Hungarian government, for the U.S.S.R., and, let us not forget, for the Yugoslavians.

The mass of the people seems to expect a lot from Yugoslavia: in particular on the 25th, a crowd *en masse* came outside the Yugoslavian embassy shouting: "help us, help us!". But as of now, it is probable that the demands of liberated regions seem to exceed in a liberal way the Titoist conceptions of socialism. Concerning the Russians, different witnesses noticed their dismayed attitude and sometimes an unusual flabbiness in the repression made by their troops and a few cases of surrender. But it is obvious that we cannot draw general conclusions on the future attitude of Moscow.

One fact stays certain, the U.S.S.R. can no longer rely on an efficient local power in Hungary except if it resigns itself to give wide concessions, the most crucial of which is the evacuation of the troops. If the U.S.S.R. consents, nobody can predict how the regime will evolve. If the U.S.S.R. refuses, at this stage of public opinion, it is probable that it is destined to the governmental vacuum and the military administration.

Document 25

Report of Mr. Soutou, Chargé d'Affaires of France in Moscow to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 30 1956

CABLE 55

Mr Soutou, Chargé d'Affaires of France at Moscow,

To Mr Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T.n°4269 to 4275. Reserved

Moscow, 30 October 1956, 19h. 40.

During a few receptions of yesterday, the Soviets leaders displayed exuberance and joviality aimed at trying to show that they are free of any concerns. The consumed alcohol fostering their attitude, they multiplied jokes which did not make much sense, but which were inappropriate in the context of the events in Hungary.

Mr Khrushchev and Mr Bulganin avoided all discussion on the events of Poland and Hungary. Mr Bohlen after a vain effort to leave them from their reservation, had to fall back on the marshal Zhukov who said a few noteworthy statements even though he is also very discreet.

According to the leader of the Soviet army, Moscow was very reluctant to put its troops at the service of the government of Budapest. To support his statements, Marshal Zhukov quoted, as an example, the attitude of the U.S.S.R during the Polish crisis. He said that a massive intervention of the Soviet army may have been possible within a few hours and the "arrangement may have been sufficient to squash them like a bug. But I sent Marshal Koniev [to Poland] to make sure that the local commanders would not take any initiative and avoid intervening. The same attitude may have been adopted in Hungary if the Hungarian government had not called on the U.S.S.R., under the Treaty of Warsaw."

As he was immediately asked what dispositions of the treaty he refers to, he limited himself to state that the Warsaw organization is not only aimed at the defence of the member states but also socialism.

Concerning the potential withdrawal of the troops from Hungary, the Marshal Zhukov remained vague. He simply said, as did Mr Chepilov, that Soviet troops would leave Budapest for their usual bases as soon as the calm would be restored. Regarding the evacuation of the Hungarian territory, it is the field of competence of the Council of Warsaw organization and not of the U.S.S.R only.

We can feel that the Soviet leaders here are divided on this topic and on another. Those who were against the evacuation of Austria, as Mr Molotov, doubtlessly tend today to request the cessation of risky concession and improvisations. They are proponents of inertia, while Khrushchev is in favour of movement and spontaneity. It is perhaps due to their influence that was published a quote of a sentence of Ordzhonikidze in the Pravda of 28 on "the revolution which is not a joke" and the danger of destroying the party. However, another would be ready to draw the consequences from the current events and to take sides in the spirit of the

resolutions of the 20th Congress, which admit a sort of primacy of persuasion, of seduction, over simple violence. They still believe that the new policy opened “magnificent doors for communism” whereas the others, like Stalin [at the time], mainly trust on the presence of the Red army to maintain the communist order in peoples’ democracies.

Document 26

Report of Mr François Seydoux, Ambassador of France in Vienna to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 30 1956

CABLE 57

Mr François Seydoux, Ambassador of France at Vienna

To Mr Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs

T. N°s 563 to 566. Urgent
21:05

Vienna, 30 October 1956,

Mr Turbet-Delof, cultural attaché of our legation to Budapest, arrived at Vienna at 4pm. At the request of Mr Paul-Boncour, on his way he contacted the population and the local revolutionary authorities.

He provided us these following pieces of information:

1° A few units of Soviet armoured cars began to enter into Budapest on the 23rd October. They received important reinforcements of tanks on the night between the 26th and the 27th. On the 30th, at noon, the bulk of forces gathered at Pest and occupied the strategic places, in particular on the Danube. And yet, Buda, seemed evacuated – apart from some “safety caps” that were placed on the roads on the outskirts of the city. A few cases of fraternization between Soviet soldiers and the Hungarian population occurred in the morning of the 25.

2° In Western Hungary it is quiet, military speaking. The Russian garrisons and the Hungarian troops seem to monitor each other.

3° The general strike is observed throughout the Western part of Hungary. Workers, kolkhozians, railway workers and students would unanimously decide to return to work only when the Russian troops leave the country.

4° We can in the same region distinguish three trends in the attitude of the population towards the government (whose the reshuffle has just been announced) formed on the 27 October:

- Conditional loyalism in the army,

- A wait and see attitude among a part of the workers,
- Hostility among the majority, who demand the departure not only of the Russians but also the communists.

5° The administration of Western Hungary is controlled by workers councils and municipal revolutionary councils, where communist elements are still present. The population is generally hostile to this second category of authority body.

A meeting of delegates of all committees and councils should be held at Gyor tonight at 4 pm to decide whether to keep the current provisional organization; to suppress the most unpopular communist elements in these organizations; or to form a rival government to the one in Budapest.

According to public rumour at Gyor, Mr Zoltan Burian could take the lead.

Document 27

Report of Mr. Des Garets, Chargé d'Affaires of France in Belgrade to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 30 1956

CABLE 60

Mr des Garets, Chargé d'Affaires of France at Belgrade

To Mr Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs

T. n°924 to 927.
1956, 6pm

Belgrade, 30 October

This morning the Austrian ambassador reported to me the terms of a conversation held yesterday with Mr Prica.

The comments of the Under-secretary of State for Foreign Affairs confirmed those made by the director for Western Europe (my O.T n°914).

And yet, Mr Prica would have specified the following points:

1° we are “actively committed” to ending the fighting in Hungary.

2° We abstained in the Security Council so as not to aggravate the situation. Nevertheless, if the case is discussed “we would oppose the Soviet intervention”.

We rely on Nagy’s government to bring normalisation to the situation in Hungary because the programme of this government is in accord with the demands of local committees on most of the issues. Mr Wodak inferred from Mr Prica’s statements that the leaders of Belgrade entered into negotiations with Moscow on the Hungarian issue.

For the Austria’s Ambassador, the Yugoslavs pursue two objectives: on the one hand, to save the Hungarian socialist regime, and on the other hand, to substitute in this country the faltering Russian influence with a Yugoslav one, perhaps with the agreement of Moscow.

The realisation of such a scheme could permit the evasion of the revolution that occurs in Hungary. That is where the danger is all the more present for the Occident said Mr Wodak, since the conditions that permitted the riots of Budapest, Berlin, and Poznan (tacit approval of authorities to the first demonstration) would never happen in the future and a defeat of the Hungarian Liberals would discourage all similar efforts in the other satellite countries.

Document 28

Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 31 1956

CABLE 69

Mr Paul-Boncour, Minister of France at Budapest

To Mr Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs

T. n°669 to 673
1956, 8h. 50, 6h. 5, 6h. 20.

Budapest, 31 October

Closely surrounding Budapest and keeping in the centre only a security safeguard for their embassy, for their communications and for the government, the Russians strive to hide their military control of the capital; but some conflicts occur, like this afternoon during the attack on the headquarters of the communist party, as the result of which a correspondent of the *Paris-Match* newspaper was severely injured. The government is unable to bring order other than by displaying the Hungarian colours on Soviet tanks.

The complete evacuation promised to the population is subordinated by the Russians to the restoration of order whereas, the restoration of order in people's minds is obviously linked to the disappearance of Soviet soldiers.

Certainly, the truce of the past days has been kept as best they could today, but the population is visibly in turmoil: the regime's newspapers had been looted and burnt in public as soon as they were published this morning; the government's authority is openly scorned and Imre Nagy and his team are highly criticised by their own policemen. What we can see concerning the National Guard in training is that it can inspire confidence to neither the authorities nor to the population. Secret committees are forming almost everywhere, particularly in the factories where the workers subordinate their return to work to the effective departure of the Russians. The collusion of all of these revolutionary organizations with the province is going to happen.

Concerning the rest of the country, and particularly its western part – evacuated by the Soviet army – the government endeavours to make people believe that the national unity is protected under its auspices, without much success. In reality, the terms of its statements indicate how the local revolutionary committees subordinate their rallying to conditions less than acceptable, in particular concerning the elimination of one part of the communist members of the government. And yet, there was only one resignation, of the minister of Communications, Bebritz, who had already served in Rakosi's government. Tonight, Imre Nagy tries to give satisfaction by creating in his government one restricted cabinet comprising himself, Kadar, former President of the Republic, Zoltan Tildy, former from the Smallholders' Party, Bela [Kovacs], [Ferenc] Erdei, [Lo]sonczi and one socialist, who will be appointed by the Social Democrats, but once again, a secret leaflet demands the resignation of the whole government.

Document 29

Report of Mr. Francois Seydoux, Ambassador of France in Vienna to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 31 1956

CABLE 73

Mr. Francois Seydoux, Ambassador of France in Vienna,

To Mr. Pineau, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

T. n°580 to 582

Vienna, October 31st, 1956, 9 pm.

(Received: 9.10 pm)

As a result of the news about Hungary obtained last night, I was told today, at Ballhausplatz, that some optimism followed the apprehension that there had been during the previous days of seeing the insurgency fall into "deterioration".

Mr. Kreisky specified to me this afternoon that the departure of Soviet troops from Budapest wouldn't have meaning if it were not followed by the complete evacuation of Hungary. It would be, in effect, to fear that the USSR tries to buy time in order to return with force at the right time.

On the other hand, the secretary of state, back on ideas that he had exposed yesterday (my telegram n° 571 to 573) has insisted on the decisive interest that aims for a fast initiative of the Western powers, if they do not want to miss the "battle of Hungary". In this regard, he alluded to the creation by the United Nations of a commission that would check on the spot the realisation of commitments, as well as an economic assistance organized in the framework of OEEC. Formulating the latter suggestion, which obviously needs to be accurate, Mr. Kreisky wanted to emphasize the role that Europe must play in this context and he mentioned France.

Document 30

Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Cornut-Gentille, Head of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations – October 31 1956

CABLE 76

Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs,

To Mr. Cornut-Gentille, Head of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations.

T. n°3421 à 3423

Paris, 31 October 1956, 22h. 50.

Absolute priority. Retained.

The case of Suez risks, if we are not careful, eclipsing the Hungarian affair. It is important to avoid such a state of things that would play into the hands of our adversaries and which could also give the public the feeling that the Council is disinterested in the situation of Hungary. Without a doubt, the turn of events that seems to have been taken must encourage us to be cautious in order to avoid anything that could jeopardize this development. However, at the present stage, the Council should not be limited only to the examination of the political situation in Hungary nor to statements made since the beginning of the insurrection, but it should also address the humanitarian aspects of the issue and, in particular, on measures to be taken to assist the population.

It seems, therefore, that the discussion of a provisional resolution such as that suggested by Great Britain could be useful and take several sessions. This resolution could be completed by provisions that would draw inspiration from the fourth and fifth paragraphs of the American draft which, moreover, is not acceptable to us, particularly in its second paragraph. Finally, if the Council decides to convene an emergency special session of the General Assembly on the Suez issue, you should not miss it, agree with your British and American colleagues, to ask the Council to bring the Hungarian question in front of the same assembly.

Document 31

Report of Mr. Jouve, Ambassador of France in Helsinki to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 31 1956

CABLE 81

Mr. Jouve, Ambassador of France in Helsinki,
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n°69.

Helsinki, 31 October 1956.
(Received: 3 November, 17 h.)

The Chargé d'affaires of the United States yesterday made an approach to the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the basis of the following memorandum and, moreover, without having received precise instruction to make an intervention.

“1° The American, British and French governments jointly requested that the case of Hungary be placed on the agenda of the Security Council”.

“2° On this occasion, the three governments have invoked that foreign military forces had violently repressed the rights of the Hungarian people granted to it by the Peace Treaty As we know, the application of article 34 of the Charter of the United Nations was requested in the Security Council. The various possibilities of action within that organisation are at present under consideration.

“3° In view of the urgency, it was not possible to consult beforehand your government”.

“4° The government of the United States thinks that other governments will want to join the tripartite initiative. The foregoing has been brought to your attention for this purpose”.

The Chargé d'affaires of the United States, who came to see me before this approach, considered that it was advisable to show to the Finnish leaders that the special position of their country didn't dispense them automatically of any gesture of solidarity, even if that would be a shock to Moscow. Without deceiving myself about the practical scope of this intervention, I consider that the intention which animates it can only be favourable. It is important to note here, every time a favourable opportunity appears, that the West doesn't consider Finland as a country irredeemably subservient, by virtue of its commitments and its

geographical location, to the Soviet system. On the contrary, without requiring the Finns to take positions which would put them in arrow against Moscow, it is good to associate with them, as much as possible, on Western initiatives. The events in Hungary provide this opportunity.

As was to be expected, the approach of the Chargé d'affaires embarrassed his interlocutor, who made him content by assuring him that the appropriate authorities would be informed of the position adopted by the three governments who raised the Hungarian problem before the Security Council.

Document 32

Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Cornut-Gentille, Head of Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations – November 1 1956

CABLE 84

Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs,

To Mr. Cornut-Gentille, Head of Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations.

T. n° 3456. Absolute priority.

Reserved.

Paris, November 1st, 1956, 9.50 pm

According to information from Radio-Budapest, Mr. Nagy has requested the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, denounced the Warsaw Pact and proclaimed Hungary's neutrality. He requests that the Hungarian issue is brought before the UN General Assembly, from which he want to get help.

You will ask for the inclusion of this item on the agenda of the special session in accordance with the procedure provided by art. 19 of the regulation. In case of voting, you will ask that we proceed by roll call.

Document 33

Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – November 2 1956

CABLE 89

Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest,

To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n. 682 to 686.

Budapest, November 2, 1956. 7h. 1.

The *internal* situation is without major changes in relation to yesterday, both in terms of population nervousness (looting and burning of libraries, schools), and in the dealings between Imre Nagy and several parties or revolutionary factions. The day passed without knowing what changes the Prime Minister will make to the composition of his cabinet; in the meantime, it's the reorganized Cabinet, as reported in my telegram n° 669, that has prudently given him the task of Foreign Affairs. Opinions also differ on the issue if Imre Nagy and Kadar will figure in future government. In any case, the majority of current communist Ministers will either be excluded or will be temporarily ...⁴⁷ The evolution towards the right is extremely clear, I would say almost radical. Yesterday I reported some favorable factors for the government of Imre Nagy. On the contrary, I have to report on one side the first signs of intervention in the west of the country to the capital of Hungarian emigrants' organizations and, on the other side, the persistence of a general strike that ...⁴⁸ an economic disaster that risks to exacerbate people in the short term.

This, in my opinion, explains largely why, for the international plan, Imre Nagy suddenly gives nowadays the most meaningful satisfaction to two essential claims of labor trade unions and of countless revolutionary committees, the first of which is that of Győr, which is called from October 30 revolutionary Committee of Transdanubia. That this is a way to obtain the Soviet military evacuation from the country or to break free from the Warsaw Pact to adopt a policy of neutrality, the Prime Minister continues to play it all. The radio has just reported at the same time the communication made for this dual purpose by Imre Nagy to the Soviet ambassador, and the essence of the note is going to be summarized by phonecall to our ambassador in Vienna, in order to carry out a retransmission to the Ministry. I must point out that this last text, in which there is among other things the proclamation of neutrality of Hungary, was presented to the Legation of Yugoslavia at the same time to that of the three Western powers.

We are ignorant as to whether Russian reinforcements have actually entered in Hungary for purposes other than the change of the troops who participated in heavy fighting last week; we know only that some of these forces, who evacuated the capital yesterday, are entrenched on its eastern border, occupying the airport especially. The appointment of another member of

⁴⁷ Decryption gap.

⁴⁸ Decryption gap

the Revolutionary Committee of Honved as commander of the external defense of the capital revealed, this morning, the military concerns of the government towards the East.

Document 34

Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – November 2 1956

CABLE 90

Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest,

To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n. 687.

Budapest, November 2, 1956

(Received: 12.20 am)

I forward now to the Department the full text of the note verbale that I received last night from the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

"The Prime Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic, provisionally responsible for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has the honor of providing the following facts to His Excellency:

“Some genuine news have been presented to the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic, according to which new Soviet military units entered the territory of Hungary. The Prime Minister, as minister responsible for Foreign Affairs, received in this regard M. Andropov, the Soviet Union's ambassador in Hungary, and categorically protested against the entry of new Soviet troops into Hungary. He demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of these troops. He said to the Soviet ambassador that the Hungarian government was to immediately rescind the Warsaw Pact, proclaimed Hungary's neutrality at the same time, address the the United Nations – and to defend the neutrality of the country he requests the assistance of the four great powers.

“The Soviet ambassador has taken note of the communication and the protest of the Prime Minister, responsible for Foreign Affairs, and he promised to demand an immediate response from his government”.

Document 35

Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations. – November 2 1956

CABLE 91

Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs,

To the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations.

T. n°3469-3470.

Absolute priority. Reserved.

Paris, November 2nd, 1956, 2.25 pm.

I learned that the Security Council will be convened on 2nd or 3rd November to continue the examination of the Hungarian issue.

On the basis of Nagy government statement (The telegram of Vienne n°559) you will ask that this meeting takes place today and in the shortest possible time.

By doing so, you respond to the concern that I have expressed several times since yesterday (Telegrams n°3421 and 3456, telephone conversation of Secretary General [of the Ministry] with Mr. Cornut-Gentile in the afternoon of Novembre 1st) that this issue is ignored while all the attention of the UN is back towards the Israeli-Egyptian question.

I will communicate by a separate telegram a preliminary draft resolution to the point where you will want, certainly, to consult with your American and British colleagues as well as with the representatives of those allied countries which have supported our initiative at the Security Council or demonstrated an intention to join us.

Document 36

Note of the sub-directorate of Eastern Europe. The situation in Hungary. The new "restricted Cabinet" –November 2 1956

CABLE 94

Note of the sub-directorate of Eastern Europe.

The situation in Hungary. The new "restricted Cabinet"

Paris, November 2nd, 1956.

Imre Nagy, the prime minister of the government reorganized on October 27th, and Z. Tildy, president of the smallholders' party, Minister of State, announced on Radio Budapest, on October 31st, the establishment, within the government, of a "restricted Cabinet", composed of representatives of different Hungarian democratic parties.

The Hungarian Government, according to the formula of October 27th, included a majority of national Communists and some non-communist personalities: Z. Tildy, rehabilitated even before the fall of Gero and called by the latter to cooperate with the C.P. within the "Democratic People's Front", and Bela Kovacs, member, as Tildy, of the Smallholders' Party, but that does not seem to have outlined, before October 23rd, a partnership with the people's democratic regime.

However, the "restricted Cabinet" includes, next to the national Communists (Nagy, Kadar, first secretary of the party after the departure of Gero, and Losonczy) and two representatives of the smallholders' party (Tildy and Kovacs), the old president of the National Peasant Party, Ferenc Erdei, and a delegate of the Social Democratic party, who was not yet appointed on October 31st.

According to Nagy's speech, the Hungarian Government will be established "on the basis of 1945, at the time of the coalition regime of democratic parties," which involves, as pointed out by Tildy, the end of the one-party system.

It must be remembered that at the time of the occupation of Hungary by the Germans in 1944, the two major parties, the smallholders and the Social Democrats, had agreed with C.P. and the extremist Peasant Party, at that time few in numbers, the "National Peasant Party", to form the "National Front for independence." This formulation was also ephemeral, the C.P. having succeeded, despite the high percentage of votes obtained in the 1945 elections by the three non-communist parties (85%), to neutralize the opposition parties, without being forced to eliminate them officially, thanks to the infiltration of the army and police and later Rakosi

confessed thanks to "the presence of the red Army". Tildy Z., contrary to the attitude of Ferenc Nagy, had lent himself to weakness and embarrassment in this operation.

The reference made by Nagy to the experience of 1945 has nothing encouraging for supporters of democratization and independence of Hungary. On October 31st, it was also not clear that Nagy had sincerely aligned with the demands of the moderate insurgents. Power was poorly used and there was a rumor according to which Cardinal Mindszenty will be instructed to mediate between the different trends of insurrection or even to form a new government. The Hungarian army expressed its resoluteness to preserve the results of the insurrection, while in the provinces, and especially in Győr, numerous revolutionary committees express claims more and more anticommunist. (Nagy announced, in his speech of October 31st, that he recognized, in the name of the national government, local bodies of self-direction which were formed democratically and as a result of the revolution, "and that the government "leaned on them and approved their activities").

It was therefore normal that the Social Democratic Party, through its current leaders, Anna Kethly and Gyula Kelemen, have expressed, as Bela Kovacs, some hesitation to adhere to the restricted cabinet formula.

But the situation has changed very quickly, and on November 1st Nagy declared to the Embassy of the USSR that the Hungarian government denounced the Warsaw Pact and proclaimed the neutrality of the country. He let him know that he addressed to the UN to ask that the four great powers defend the Hungarian neutrality.

Different sources report, on the other hand, an influx of Soviet troops in Hungary. According to some information, they would have also picked up in some places the fight against the insurgents.

Will these new events contribute to the old democratic parties getting closer to the Nagy government? It can still not be guaranteed, this evening on November 2nd, and it is again a matter of the dismissal of Nagy and the formation of a government headed by smallholders and nationalpeasants. On the other hand, no information has arrived that shows that the revolutionary committees and the Hungarian army are determined to cooperate with the government of Budapest.

Document 37

Report of Mr. Dejean, Ambassador of France in Moscow to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – November 3 1956

CABLE 95

Mr. Dejean, Ambassador of France in Moscow,

To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n°4361 to 4365.

Priority. Reserved.

Moscow, November 3rd, 1956, 1.40 pm

Received: 11.40 am

News regarding the deployment in Hungary of Soviet reinforcements, apparently from Ukraine and Romania and perhaps from East Germany, has spread yesterday afternoon, in Moscow. A number of diplomats were skeptical, considering that the USSR could not simultaneously place themselves in defense of Egyptian independence and brutally suppress the Hungarian uprising. Other people wondered if the deployment of troops and the encirclement of the airports did not correspond simply to the intention of ensuring, in the right conditions, the evacuation of Soviet troops and their families.

In fact, it is to be feared that, sensing Hungary escape from any communist influence, the Soviet leaders have accepted the hard way, whether it's intimidation or bloody repression. The Soviet military seems to have aligned with this position.

Marshal Zhukov said to the Ambassador of the United States that he did not want war in any way, not even being in the field of winners and added about Hungary: "these people will get off alone". From that moment, next to political reasons, military prestige considerations seemed to be at play. Yesterday, at a reception for the Syrian president, the Soviet defense minister, faced by Mr. Bohlen, seemed elusive and he disappeared after a few minutes – as did Mr. Chepilov.

Mr. Khrushchev was absent. The Soviet leaders, among whom there were Voroshilov, Boulganine, Mikoyan, Kaganovitch, showed cold faces for serious days.

The foreign agencies have been waiting all night for an important statement by the Soviet government which will probably be published later in the day.

Document 38

Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – November 3 1956

CABLE 96

Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest,

To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Budapest, November 3, 1956.

T. n° 698.

(Received: 1.15 pm)

I address to the Ministry the text of a note verbale that has been delivered to this legation from the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the night between 2nd and 3rd November:

“The President of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic responsible for the functions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs has the honor of communicating what follows:

“The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic wishes to fix, in each case, through negotiations and beneficial agreements, the question of the evacuation of Soviet troops from the territory of Hungary.

“The government has already expressed many times this intention and to prove its willingness to negotiate, has appointed some preparatory committees which have the task of specifying the expectation and the modalities of the evacuation.

“The proposals concerning the composition of the committees, the place and time of negotiations, have already been notified by the Hungarian Government to the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Budapest.

Despite all these facts, information and reports of our military sources prove that remarkable Soviet units have crossed the Hungarian border, they continue on their way to Budapest, taking possession of the lines and installations and stations.

“We also have information that in the West Hungary, there are movements of Soviet troops in East-West direction.

“The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic has considered it necessary to ask for some information about this from Mr. Andropov, ambassador of the the Soviet Union in Budapest, and at the same time to express its repeated claim because of the movements of Soviet troops on Hungarian territory.

“The facts mentioned above will be brought to the attention of all the heads of diplomatic missions accredited in Budapest by the Hungarian government, communicating to them also that the Security Council of the United Nations will be simultaneously informed of these new events”.

“Budapest, November 2, 1956”.

Document 39

Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Cornut-Gentille, Head of Permanent Mission of France to the United Relations – November 3 1956

CABLE 98

Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs,

To Mr. Cornut-Gentille, Head of Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations.

T. n°3539

Absolute priority. Reserved.

Paris, November 3rd, 1956, 7.10 pm.

In your future discourseregarding the issue of Hungary, you will not be limited to supporting the notion of neutrality.

You will support the need to allow the Hungarian people to decide about their future with free elections.

Document 40
Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – November 3 1956

CABLE 100

Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest,
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n° 705 706. Priority.
10.

Budapest, November 3th, 1956 17h.

(Received: 21 h.20.)

The preliminary draft resolution that the Ministry wants to communicate to me, makes no mention of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry, which, on the basis of various Western radio stations, everyone is waiting here for – to the extent that the radio has announced since yesterday: the commission's arrival by plane, the refusal of its landing by the Soviet authorities, then its imminent landing in Budapest airport.

Local speculation has developed since October 29, and the presence of this commission would be preferable to the guarantee that the Soviet commandment seems to be seeking, that is against the entry of armed bands of emigrants, in the gradual implementation, yesterday and this morning, of a curtain of tanks along the Austrian border from the Danube to Sopron.

Document 41

Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Diplomatic Representatives of France in Moscow, New York (ONU), London, Washington, Bonn, Budapest, Warsaw – November 3 1956

CABLE 103

Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs,

To Diplomatic Representatives of France in Moscow, New York (UN), London, Washington, Bonn, Budapest, Warsaw.

T. n° 4446 to 4448; 3540 to 3542;

11733 to 11735; 11895 to 11897;

3207 to 3209; 908 to 910;

1419 to 1421.

Very urgent. Reserved.

Paris, November 3rd, 10.30 pm.

The counsellor of the Soviet Embassy, whom the head of Europe [in the Ministry] had met with this afternoon to talk about the French journalists detained by Soviet troops at the Hungarian border, has presented, after promising to resolve the matter, very disturbing intentions on the development of things in Hungary .

According to Mr. Erofeev, we must accept that the Nagy government does not represents anything now. He is devoid of authority, he denies having asked for Soviet intervention and aims to play the role of a "provocateur". So the neutrality which he declared cannot be taken seriously.

On the other hand, this government tolerates fascist behaviours and adopts measures which are contrary to the spirit of socialism. In these conditions, the Soviet Union will be able to invoke the Article 4 of the Peace Treaty of to order to put end to the activity of these elements.

Finally, interrogated about the scope of the statement of October 30th about Hungary, Mr. Erofeev responded that this statement concerns only the "socialist" countries; if Hungary was leaving the path of people's democracy, it could not invoke this statement. If it will remain there, many relaxations could be allowed.

Warned of a recourse to force to save the "people's democracy", Mr. Erofeev has avoided any response, taking refuge behind vague statements: everything will return to "order" quickly, the essential was keeping the peace in Europe.

Document 42

Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Diplomatic Representatives of France in Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, Moscow, London, Washington, New York (UNO) – November 4 1956

CABLE 108

Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs,

To Diplomatic Representatives of France in Berlin, Vienne, Budapest, Moscow, London, Washington, New York (UN).

T. n°869; 965; 929;

4466; 11780; 11940; 3589.

Paris, November 4th, 1956, 12.15 am.

The Hungarian military attaché in Paris tells the Ministry of National Defense that he received instructions from his government to make known to the military attachés accredited in Paris the provisions recently adopted by the Hungarian authorities and which are the following:

- 1° The Hungarian government has proclaimed its neutrality;
- 2° It has denounced the Warsaw Pact;
- 3° It has asked the Soviet government for the immediate withdrawal of its forces from its territory.

Document 43

Report of Mr. Francois Seydoux, Ambassador of France in Vienna to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – November 4 1956

CABLE 109

Mr. Francois Seydoux, Ambassador of France in Vienna,

To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n°620 to 622. Priority.

Vienna, November 4th, 1956, 12.50 am.

(Received: 1.00 pm)

After learning this morning, through the radio of the tragic news of the massive offensive by Soviet troops on Hungarian territory, I phoned at 7am our legation in Budapest. The counselor, Mr. Quioc, informed me that Pest was entirely occupied by tanks, artillery and the Russian infantry; the bridges over the Danube were controlled by some elements of the Honved. Since then, I have tried to re-establish contact with Mr. Paul-Boncour, but all telephone communications are interrupted.

The emotion is all the stronger in Vienna than last night, despite the confirmation of the presence of Soviet tanks not far from the Austrian border; the leading circles and the public opinion signaled an optimism that was not entirely justified by the contradictory rumors in circulation.

This note is in the Sunday press that is published early in the night. It's the negotiation started on November 3rd at noon in Budapest, between the Soviets and the Nagy government on the evacuation of Russian troops which is emphasized as an almost decisive event. The socialist organ announces that the agreement is imminent. The editorial of the newspaper Chancellor appears under the title "Hope".

The duplicity of Moscow is so striking and premeditated in its details without doubt. Mr. Paul-Boncour told me yesterday on the phone, that his Soviet colleague was saying that the passage between Vienna and Budapest will not be hindered from today; wanting to give the impression that it was a wrong move, the minister of the USSR would tell this joke: "it is necessary that the diplomats correct the mistakes of the military."

I am also tempted to believe that at the Ballhausplatz, the Russians have tried to hide their game until the last moment. Saturday night in their speeches, Chancellor Raab and interim Vice-Chancellor Helmer have risen against the alarming information provided by the Austrian press on the movements of Soviet troops in Hungary.

Document 44

Report of Mr. Cornut-Gentile, Head of Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations to Ministry of Foreign Affairs – November 4 1956

CABLE 110

Mr. Cornut-Gentille, Head of Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations

To Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

T. n°2202 to 2204

Immediate priority.

New York, November 4th, 1956, 11h

(Received: 5.00pm)

To Mr. Louis Joxe and Mr. de Menthon.

I refer to my telegram n° 2193.

The Security Council met this morning, Sunday at 3pm, to examine the question of Hungary. After a brief debate, the draft resolution which was presented by the US delegation yesterday afternoon and slightly strengthened, was put to a vote and obtained nine votes to one (the vote of the USSR), and the Yugoslav delegate did not take part in the vote. The draft resolution was not adopted because the USSR exercised its veto.

The behavior of the Yugoslav delegate deserves attention. He said that from November 3rd at 3pm, he had been looking to obtain some instructions from his government, but without success.

A second resolution, which sent the matter to the Emergency special session in the form of a "United for Peace" resolution, got ten votes and only Russia voted against.

A special session of the Assembly is planned for tonight at 8pm, November 4th to hear the report of the Secretary General on the responses that Your Excellency and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd are to present to Mr. Hammarskjold, telegrams communicating the decision taken about Egypt on the night between Saturday and Sunday by the special Assembly.

It is possible that the Hungarian question will subsequently be discussed. In any case before 5am on Monday, November 5th.

In accordance with the telephone instructions of Mr. de Crouy, Mr. de Guiringaud will insist on keeping the Hungarian question in the foreground. However, this should not obscure the fact that, owing to the events of the day in the Middle East and the answers of Your Excellency and Mr. Lloyd, we could have a long and difficult session about Egypt and find ourselves forward the proposal of a conviction or sanctions. It is essential, in this regard, that our friends are notified within a few hours.

Document 45

**Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Cornut-Gentile, Head of
Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations – November 4 1945**

CABLE 111

Mr. Pineau, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

To Mr. Cornut-Gentile, Head of Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations.

T. n° 3609 to 3612.

Absolute priority. Immediate. Reserved.

Paris, November 4th 1956, 7.50pm.

Considering the seriousness of the information on the situation in Hungary, we must do everything possible to get the General Assembly to give priority to the examination of this situation. I leave to you the task of establishing with friendly delegations the most appropriate measures to achieve a result, without an initiative that could be taken, in this sense, to be interpreted as intending to delay the examination of the Egyptian question.

In your speech, you will emphasise the serious responsibility of the United Nations in the tragic development of the situation in Hungary. You will emphasise the astonishment and indignation that the behaviour of the United Nations causes and that, despite the agonizing invitations that were sent from Budapest, it has delayed in seriously dealing with the Hungarian drama, where the existence of a whole people is being questioned.

You will try, on the other hand, to strengthen in every possible way, with the support of our friends, the American resolution. It is important that the latter be extremely severe for the USSR; it has to include in particular the condemnation of Soviet military action, it will ask for the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops, request for a return to conditions that ensure rights and fundamental freedoms of the people of Hungary and free elections under international supervision.

As regards the possible establishment of an international police force, you will hint about it during your speech, but without proposing yourself an amendment for this purpose in the American project. In the event that such an amendment will be presented by another

delegation, you can support it.

Document 46

Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – November 4 1956

CABLE 115

Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest,

To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Budapest, November 4, 1956. 3.30 pm

(Received: 8.05 pm)

Budapest was woken up at 5am from the cannons at the time when Imre Nagy, by radio statement, communicated that the negotiations were interrupted yesterday at 10pm, and that the Russians were attacking the city. He called for resistance. This morning, Pest was invaded by troops accompanied by Russian infantry, who occupied the bridges and the surrounding hills. In Pest, despite energetic interventions at the USSR embassy..⁴⁹ Soviet and a bombing of the Killian barracks and along the Danube and in the workers' suburbs of Csepel [Csepel]. A new government allegedly installed in Szolnok or in Szeged, has been formed with Kadar and Apro. Nagy would be on the run. Colonel Maleter and General Kiraly were arrested at the end of the negotiations relating to the evacuation. An impression of astonishment reigns over the city, although some resistance groups are organizing here and there.

⁴⁹ Decryption gap.

Document 47

Report of Mr. Baelen, Ambassador of France in Belgrade to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – November 6 1956

CABLE 131

Mr. Baelen, Ambassador of France in Belgrade,

To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n° 958 to 960.

Belgrade, November 6th, 1956, 8.30 am.

(Received 12.38 am)

Following my previous telegram.

After having favored the combination of Nagy-Gero, and then supporting the attempt of Nagy, the Yugoslavians give now their⁵⁰ to the Kadar government, immediately recognized.

This adaptation to the circumstances involves the abandonment of certain principles: at the moment when the fate of socialism was put into play, the questions of equal rights, non-interference and democratization have lost much of their value, at least for the communities of the eastern countries. If the Yugoslavs recall that it is [the intervention] in any case contrary to their principles, they still basically justify the Soviet move.

In fact, the Belgrade leaders have found themselves between the danger of an excessive democratization that risked questioning their progressive achievements, which are an unfortunate example for their own public opinion, and the danger of a return to Stalinist methods, with those involving threats to world peace and for Yugoslav independence.

The embarrassment of Belgrade leaders is understandable. The Hungarian crisis forces them to make a choice that they could avoid until now; indeed, it seriously damages the position and the role of Marshal Tito concerning the satellite countries; furthermore, a return to the Cold War and the bloc system marks the vanity of the existing basic policy [of Belgrade] ...⁵¹ and the failure of efforts made by Yugoslavia over the past years.

⁵⁰ Decryption gap.

⁵¹ Decryption gap.

Document 48
Note from the Sub-directorate of Eastern Europe about the events in Hungary –
November 6 1956

CABLE 137

Note from the Sub-directorate of Eastern Europe
about the events in Hungary

Paris, 6 November 1956.

Insurgent for twelve days, the Hungarian people have fought heroically for freedom. Hundreds of Soviet tanks were needed to reduce it.

I

From October 24th, the revolutionaries demanded free elections, and the establishment with the USSR of relations based on equality. The Hungarian army had united with the people and with all the political cadres in a great movement of national unanimity.

Whatever may have been the intentions of the Budapest government, this movement has imposed itself by its spontaneity and its popular strength. It is impressive today to note the concordance of the claims formulated – in the most diverse regions – by the workers as well as by the peasants or intellectuals. All over, the independence of the country, inner freedom, an improvement of the living conditions were at the forefront of action plans. The social progress which Hungary has, since the war, paid for with so much misery, was not called into question: far from wanting to return their estates to former great landowners or factories to the societies of yore, as was claimed in Moscow, the insurgents demanded the redistribution of land to the peasants, the development of the action of trade unions and workers' committees.

The framework of the regime of the people's democracy has certainly been surpassed. But in spite of manifestations explained by the sudden return to freedom, the USSR was not attacked as a nation by the government of Budapest, moreover it was led by a communist – and many testimonies show that, during the first days, the Soviet soldiers themselves were not the object of a feeling of systematic hostility. In some villages, the population publicly thanked those who had not used their weapons.

II

A peaceful solution was therefore possible even, apparently, from the point of view of Soviets interests.

Until November 2, only the withdrawal of the foreign troops was demanded: Hungary's membership of the Warsaw Pact was not called into question. Provided that it promised to respect the independence of the country and to put an end to its economic exploitation, the

Soviet Union was still able, at that moment, to lay the foundations for normal cooperation with the Hungarian Republic.

But, even if the government of Moscow had agreed, after 2 November, to accept that Hungary became neutral, this neutrality guaranteed, in any case, the USSR against the participation of Budapest in the defensive association of the Western powers.

On the internal plane, a position of democratic socialism could be drawn up; it is already in the process of taking shape. The only eventuality that was excluded – if the Hungarian people had been left free – would have been the return to the single-party system.

III

This is what the Soviet Union didn't want. In its statement of October 30, it recognized the legitimacy of the aspirations of the Hungarian workers; it declared that it regretted that blood had been spilt in Hungary, and agreed to discuss with the Budapest authorities, as well as with the other signatories of the Warsaw Treaty, the presence of Soviet armed troops.

But, by asserting that “the peoples of the socialist countries would not allow reaction to shake the foundations of the regime of people's democracy”, the Kremlin has specified, without ambiguity, the limit which it intends to fix for the envisaged concessions.

Also, the Soviet troops which had gone out of Budapest from 29 October to 3 November, while a negotiated solution developed, were brought in there in force to crush the Revolution, when it has proved that Nagy was appealing “as in 1945” to all democratic groups, ended the single-party regime, and proclaimed his intention to organize free elections.

Thus, it is only within the framework of communism imposed by force, that the government of Moscow envisages the independence and sovereignty of peoples whom it claims to respect. It is in the name of freedom, and especially freedom of vote, that the Hungarian revolution took place, and it is because of this fundamental claim that the Red Army received a mission to come and crush it.

The New Kadar government, that Radio Moscow presents as “revolutionary, peasant and worker”, doesn't announce in its program the opening of negotiations for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops – which constituted one of the essential points of the Nagy program. It specifies on the contrary, that such talks will be subordinated to “the restoration of the order”, and doesn't hesitate to acknowledge that it asked the command of the Soviet troops to help to “bring peace to the country”.

There is more: the Hungarian military mission sent by Imre Nagy to negotiate the withdrawal of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact disappeared in a complete trap.

And, while at the weekend, the critics from *Pravda* against fascism aimed to create visibly the psychological climate of an intervention, the Russian representatives in Budapest and in New York spread, in a concentrated way, news to persuade of the success of the negotiations, and sought thereby to deceive the vigilance of the Hungarian people and the United Nations.

There is not only the mark of a revolting cynicism, but clear evidence of premeditation.

IV

The French government has, for its part, requested, from the October 26th, the inclusion in the agenda of the Security Council, of the question posed by the intervention of the Soviet troops in Hungary. The council, having met on 28 October, has acceded to this request, despite the opposition of the USSR and the abstention of Yugoslavia.

The debate about Hungary could not, unfortunately, be immediately started. The calm, which has appeared from the October 28th, in the fighting between the Hungarian insurgents and the forces of the USSR, and the Soviet Declaration of October 30, explain, in part, this delay. But it is also due to the attitude of a large number of powers, that failed to, or did not want to, see that the fate of freedom was being played out in Hungary.

November 2nd, at the request of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, the Security Council resumes the examination of the question, and, this time, the call initiated by the Nagy government. A new session is held on November 3: the Security Council asks the USSR, in accordance with an American resolution, to withdraw its troops from Hungary.

In the night from 3 to 4 November, when the powers were informed of the armed intervention of Soviet troops, the Security Council meets urgently. The American resolution is then approved by nine votes against one vote, that of the USSR, which opposes using its veto. But the general assembly is immediately seized. It adopts, by fifty votes against eight and fifteen abstentions (those in particular of numerous Asian states, India, etc.) a resolution proposed by the United-States and reinforced by a French amendment, which requires the withdrawal without delay of Soviet forces and gives to the Secretary General of the United Nations a mission to propose, as quickly as possible, methods to put an end to the foreign intervention.

The French government is firmly committed to continue its action at the level of the United Nations, so that, despite the unleashing of force against an unarmed people, the fate of Hungary, that of its heroic people, can't be decided in the secret and in disregard of the principles of justice and freedom.

But the French government, the whole French people have, from the first hours of the insurrection, put everything in place to assist the Hungarian people, its wounded persons, its families in distress. Five planes carrying twenty tons of drugs and food have been sent to Vienna, hence, with the help of the Austrian Red Cross whose cooperation has been admirable – aid is sent to the neighbouring country. An additional sixty tons were sent by railways. Radio calls allowed to gather in total, nearly two hundred and fifty tons of food, drugs, equipment of all kinds. As far as the means of transportation of which we have and need are able to, these materials are sent day by day to Hungary to try to ease the misery of its people.

Document 49

Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Broustra, Head ad interim of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations – November 8 1956

CABLE 143

Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs,

To Mr. Broustra, Head ad interim of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations.

T. n°3785 to 3790

Immediate transmission. Reserved.

Paris, November 8th, 1956, 4.00 pm.

Your intervention before the Assembly about the Hungarian question will be based in a general manner on the instructions that you have been sent by telegram n°3609 and that underline the great responsibility of the United Nations in the tragic development of the situation in Hungary.

You will insist on the extreme urgency of the implementation of the resolution passed by the General Assembly on November 4th of which you will resume all the points.

I underline that the main interest focuses, as you will recall, on the different missions assigned by paragraphs 4 and 7 of resolution to the Secretary General.

1° Did it create a real investigation about the situation provoked by the Soviet intervention in Hungary? The United Nations could not be satisfied by a consideration that does not put in full light all aspects of this situation.

2° Did it appoint and send on-site some representatives to observe the situation directly?

3° What methods does it propose to stop the foreign intervention in Hungary? In this regard, as I have already indicated to you, you will support any proposal that will be submitted, according to press reports, by Italy and Pakistan in view of the establishment of an international force, and you will engage to obtain that the resolution presented be as close as possible to that voted regarding the situation in the middle East.

4° What measures did it take in accordance with paragraph 7 of the resolution? The question is therefore all the more serious – that the Hungarian border is closed and that all Red Cross convoys are blocked. The press announces, on the other hand, that the Kadar government has

just declared that it would be unworthy to accept "the aid of the capitalist countries". Misery, however, reaches in cities and especially in Budapest unimaginable proportions.

I believe that the Secretary General, by virtue of the mandate that has been given it, has the duty to immediately contact the Soviet government, as well as the Hungarian Government, asking them to comply with international conventions and to allow that all possible reliefs are taken without limitation to the civilian population.

It is no less urgent to take care of people who, at the time, are chased, deported or exterminated without trial and they are delivered to all the excesses of an arbitrary power. In this field the Conventions of 1949 impose on the belligerents rigorous duties that we have the obligation to enforce.

Document 50

Report of Mr. Quioc, Chargé d’Affaire of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – November 8 1956

CABLE 145

Mr. Quioc, Chargé d’affaires of France in Budapest

To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n° 727 to 731. Reserved.

Budapest, November 8, 1956. 5.00 pm.

(Received: 9.10 pm)

In total agreement with Mr. Paul-Boncour, I draw your attention to the following information:

- 2) The resistance has not decreased in the outskirts of the city in spite of the systematic cleansing and the destruction of the center. The Russian troops in Hungary do not stop increasing and they have surpassed two and a half divisions on October 23 to at least eight divisions on November 6. The results obtained are far from correspondent to this inflow and it must have been the Soviets who at first were surprised at this.

On the evening of Saturday, November 3, the ambassador of the USSR said to M. Paul-Bancour: "In a maximum three days conduct will be restored everywhere", which clarifies retrospectively the illusions cultivated by the Russians.

3) The government is nowhere to be found and the Minister of Yugoslavia tried unsuccessfully yesterday to reach Kadar. General Grebennik, Russian commander in Budapest, gives his orders to the population through leaflets.

4) There is, from side to side, a certain desire of understanding.

Secret military negotiations were interrupted on the evening of November 5, but no one knows whether they will be restarting.

The insurgents are aware of the precariousness of their position, but they are encouraged by the real local success and by the fact that the means used were disproportionate. The military supply of Soviet troops is difficult and their wounded in the hospitals admit they do not know why they fight.

The ideological positions of the combatants of the two sides are not far away and no one knows to what extent the revolt and aspirations of Hungarians will not touch the Russians.

5) If the requirement for the evacuation of Russian troops is essential, spirits are more divided on the need for neutrality.

6) I have learned through the radio that Britain is associated with a Pakistani proposition leaning towards the occupation of the territory by an international force. If this project is approved, it will complicate in my opinion, at the same time both the ceasefire and setting a deadline for the evacuation of Russians and for the delivery of weapons from the partisans, as the former can not lose face and the latter do not want to holster their weapons immediately. This force would be composed mostly of troops from neighbouring powers that should take the commitment of abstention and disinterest.

7) In this hypothesis, the government should not have to be made up, at least for a period, by representatives of numerous parties, this would be unpopular and would take little into account of the sacrifices and the weight of the insurgency; it will also expose it to the accusations made against reactionaries and immigrants.

Document 51

Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Broustra, Head ad interim of Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations – November 9 1956

CABLE 148

Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs,

To Mr. Broustra, Head ad interim of Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations.

T. n°3831 to 3836.

Immediate. Reserved.

Paris, November 9th, 1956, 3.00pm.

I refer to the instructions that I sent you yesterday as well as to your telegram n°2313 and 2312.

Apart from some actions, such as Cuba, the general attitude of the United Nations in the Hungarian question gives an impression of slowness and weakness, difficult to sustain in the presence of the brutality of the intervention and horrors of Soviet repression. Moreover, public opinion hardly understands the difference in behavior between the frenzy of the Assembly and the zeal of the Secretary General in matters of the Near East.

It is important that with the help of delegations who share our feelings, you encourage the Assembly towards more vigorous action.

First of all, it is desirable to reinforce the Italian draft resolution, judged insufficient and a step backward compared to what we contemplated.

The considerations are satisfactory, but in the device, the first paragraph should be replaced by these three:

“1) Insist for the USSR government to immediately stop its intervention in Hungary, to proclaim a ceasefire and to withdraw its forces from Hungary without further delay;”

“2) Insist for the USSR government to strictly comply with the Convention on the protection of civilians in time of war of August 12th, 1949, especially the Article 3;”

“3) I insist that all relevant authorities on Hungarian territory allow free access to the missions regularly authorized by the International Red Cross so that they can exercise their humanitarian work with no obstacle.”

The best thing is that you agree with your Italian colleague to transform his resolution, which will then receive our patronage.

The press has published elements of a US resolution on aid to the Hungarian population. I leave to you the task of evaluating to what extent the previous paragraph 3 does not constitute a duplication of this resolution.

On the other hand, in your speech, you will underline the need for the Secretary General to spare nothing in the quick implement of the decisions of the Assembly concerning Hungary. You will show that everywhere in the Near East, hostilities have ceased, while in Hungary, an entire people is subjected to ruthless repression. We recognize the difficulty of the task of Mr. Hammarskjold, but the gravity of events is such that everything must be put in place to stop the bloodshed in Hungary.

Document 52

Report of Mr. Broustra, Head ad interim of Permanent Mission of France at the United Nations to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – November 10 1956

CABLE 155

Mr. Broustra, Head ad interim of Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations,

To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n°2319 to 2328

Priority. Reserved.

New York, November 10th, 1956, 7.00am.

(Received. 7.00pm)

November 9th, 1956.

As the debate about the question of Hungary continued in the Assembly Hall, Mr. Cabot Lodge, meeting Mr. de Guiringaud in the corridors, said a few kind words about the speech that he would have pronounced at the end of the morning session. It was the first time in many days that the US delegation approached us. Mr. de Guiringaud took the opportunity to talk to the permanent representative of the United States and tell him, directly, how the policy of his

government seemed incomprehensible and dangerous.

Mr. de Guiringaud noted to Mr. Cabot Lodge that, for ten years, the US government, through the mediation of the Radio Free Europe emissions, encouraged the peoples of the other side of the Iron Curtain in resisting Soviet oppression. When one of them, taking advantage of the thaw in Moscow's empire, raised and kept up victory for several days against the Red Army, the United States were content with some debate at the United Nations and helping Moscow, with the support of the Arab-Asians, to divert attention on the Middle East.

If the US had wanted to, the United Nations would not have waited five days without doing anything for Hungary. Now that the revolt of the Hungarian patriots will be practically crushed, what is the importance of resolutions voted by an organization that is beginning to be discredited?

We know, from good sources, that the Radio Free Europe Hungarian staff intended to resign en masse to protest against the attitude of the US government. Some of them said that America had behaved towards them like the Russians against the Poles during the siege of Warsaw.

Is it what the US government wanted? If we remain on a similar impression, Europe would soon be communist. For now, all over Western Europe, the majority of public opinion protests against the action of Moscow and requests an intervention in aid for the insurgents in Budapest. But in a few months, if this European opinion had to note that any resistance to the Soviet power was destined to failure, if Poland, if Berlin were, after Hungary, to be again be reduced to slavery, free Europe will live no more. How is it that the Washington government doesn't understand such a danger? How is it that it does not understand that it is losing all prestige and all credit with the peoples of Europe?

We know that is not the case, but how can we prevent certain people from thinking that the United States is dividing the world with the Russians: freedom to act in Europe, as long as they don't intervene directly in the Near East?

How can French and the British opinion understand that there are two weights and two measures, one to condemn France and England where they defended the free world in Suez, and another one to absolve Russia which oppressed the Hungarian patriots?

Mr. Cabot Lodge, who had been listening with great attention, seemed very moved by this observation: "But what can we do?" he said. Mr. de Guiringaud then reminded him that the United States agreed to the maneuver with which Boulganine had stopped the French-British operation in Suez. Couldn't President Eisenhower, with the moral authority that he possesses and the power that he represents, launch this evening a solemn appeal to the Soviets to give his guarantee and his support for the resolutions adopted by the United Nations and to require the Russians to cease the fighting, to withdraw their troops and to leave that observers and humanitarian UN missions enter in Hungary?

Such an initiative obviously involves risks. But if we don't want to risk today, there will be

more serious risks in the short term or we will have to renounce to the existence of the free world. Mr. Cabot Lodge thanked Mr. de Guiringaud for having talked to him with "such brutality and frankness". After discussing for a few moments, he said that the idea of an appeal of the President seemed to him excellent. He added that he would call him immediately. It was 4pm local time.

Sir Pierson Dixon, to whom Mr. de Guiringaud communicated this conversation, pleaded entirely in agreement with the proposals made towards Mr. Cabot Lodge. He added that, for his part, he would have said this morning to the American representative: "Your policy of recent days was driven by emotional reactions, you should start to think." At the moment when I send this telegram, Mr. Cabot Lodge has just gone up to the rostrum for defending again the resolution that he had deposited this morning. He did it with more decisive terms and above all he said "it should not to have two weights and two measures, one for Hungary, another for Suez."

Document 53

Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors of France in Washington and London – November 13 1956

CABLE 167

Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs,

To the Ambassadors of France in Washington and London.

T. n°12534 to 12536;

12364 to 12366.

Reserved.

Paris, November 13th, 1956. 24 h.

The problem of maintaining diplomatic relations with the new Hungarian government has been invoked at the Ministry from the US Embassy, I shall be grateful if you ask anything in this regard at this, Washington: Department of State; London: Foreign Office.

Please, at the same time gather his opinion, have the following reserves about the principle of a rupture of diplomatic relations with Hungary:

1. On the moral level, this rupture would risk to appear in the eyes of the Hungarian population, subjected to a great test, as the sign of an abandonment by the West;
2. On the political level, it would mean the disappearance of an important observation point in time when Hungary is at a crossroads where it is important to follow the development of the Soviet attitude;
3. The Kadar government is going to oppose the sending of UN observers in Hungary, it seems all the more appropriate for the Western powers, follow on the spot the problem of the potential evacuation of Soviet troops and that of Western aid distribution to the affected populations;
4. Finally, though the political situation in Hungary remains unclear, it has not been said whether the sacrifices of the Hungarian people have been otiose and that the intervention of Soviet troops had destroyed the main demands of the population.

Document 54

Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – November 14 1956

CABLE 174

Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest,

To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Budapest, November 14, 1956. 16.50. (received: 20.45)

It seems to be confirmed that Nagy took refuge at the Delegation of Yugoslavia where he must have met Kadar (although this delegation is on bad terms with him since his latest activities, while recognizing their forced character).

I have been also informed that relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia could be at a delicate phase.

Document 55

Report of Mr. Alphand, Ambassador of France in Washington to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – November 15 1956

CABLE 185

Mr. Alphand, Ambassador of France in Washington,

To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n°7215 to 7217.

Reserved.

Washington, November 15th, 8.00am.

(Received: 5.25pm)

November 14th, 1956.

The Deputy undersecretary of State for European Affairs said to the Minister Counsellor of this embassy that the US government would have some information about the deportations to the USSR of young Hungarians as a result of recent events. The spokesman of the Department of State has mentioned it this afternoon. The United States reserved the right to discuss the issue ahead of the United Nations, but they would agree with us in advance.

They didn't intend to break off diplomatic relations with this country, sharing our opinions on this subject (your telegrams n°12534 and 12537) and considering themselves as also required to give refuge to Cardinal Mindszenty. However, as their representative in Budapest has just arrived to his diplomatic station and has not yet handed over his letter of credence, it was decided that he would remain in office until the Kadar government does not ask him to present it.

In this hypothesis, the position would be assigned to a chargé d'affaires and the minister be recalled to the United States.

The State Department would not see as a serious drawback that some small members of NATO break their diplomatic relations with Hungary, as they seem to want to do. The matter will be examined in the North Atlantic Council.

As to the question of the powers of the Hungarian delegation to the General Assembly of the

United Nations, it won't be raised in the coming days because the State Department does not want to bother Mr. Hammarskjold as long as the negotiations of the Secretary general with Mr. Horvat, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, currently in New York, continue.

But the issue will be evoked further ahead the Commission for the verification of powers of the United Nations where Mr. Beam thinks that a majority could be gathered against the validation.

Document 56

Report of Mr. De Boisanger, Ambassador of France in Prague to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – November 15 1956

CABLE 187

Mr. De Boisanger, Ambassador of France in Prague,

To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n°1198.

Reserved.

Prague, November 15th, 1956, 7.00pm.

(Received: on 16th, 0h.22)

The departure for Budapest of Mr. Siroky caused some surprise here.

It had not been expected. Note the fact that members of the government that will accompany the Prime Minister belong, all three of them, to the non-communist parties of the National Front. The importance of the government delegation seems to reinforce the aid plan for Hungary announced yesterday and the reason for the official trip given, that is the testimony of friendship and solidarity with the Kadar government and the Hungarian people.

Document 57

Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Broustra, Chef ad interim of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations –November 16 1956

CABLE 188

Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs,

To Mr. Broustra, Chef ad interim of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations.

T. n°4221 to 4223.

Priority.

Paris, November 16th, 1956, 3.00pm.

Mr. Turbet-Delof, our cultural advisor in Budapest, came from Hungary on the evening of November 13th, and communicated to the Ministry the following information on the situation in Hungary:

1° Soviet intervention.

Numerous cases of fraternisation of Soviet soldiers with the insurgents occurred. In some cases, weapons and even tanks were given to them, especially at the beginning of the insurrection, when the tanks were not accompanied by infantry. An entire battalion has provided its armament. Soviet losses were serious: in the only district of Csepel [Csepel], five hundred soviet injured were counted. The troops were limited to controlling the main roads and haven't ventured to control the small streets.

2° Kadar government.

The government fights vainly to win recognition by the country. The resistance is more or less general and manifests itself publicly without fear: government posters are publicly torn down. The ministerial services don't work, except in the fields of alimentation and public services. The total shortage of coal prevents the resumption of work in the factories.

3° Attitude of the population.

The Hungarian army was surprised by the events in a period of full reorganization, that is in

the disorder which has encouraged the autonomous reaction of different units.

The civilian population, and especially the youth, gave evidence of extraordinary resolve in resistance and fighting. The working mass, conscious of its national interests, has maintained the factories and has consistently opposed, in general, acts of sabotage.

Document 58

Report of Mr. Dejean, Ambassador of France in Moscow to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – November 16 1956

CABLE 189

Mr. Dejean, Ambassador of France in Moscow,

To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n°4597 to 4600.

Moscow, November 16th, 1956, 5.50pm.

(Received: 6.00pm)

In the difficult circumstances that the international communist movement finds itself in after the Soviet repression in Hungary, the support that some brother parties give the Soviet Union's Party is used here to reinforce the confidence of the militants. The loyalty expressed by the French Communist Party despite the "fascist provocations" that it suffers. is particularly thanked for. But the most appreciated aid is that of the Chinese Communist Party. The *Pravda* of November 15th has reproduced the article dedicated the day before by Jen Minh Ji-Pao to the events in Hungary. It gives full Chinese approval to Soviet action, absolutely necessary and not at all in contradiction with the declaration of 30th October and the five principles of peaceful co-existence; it confirms that as soon as order is re-established, negotiations will take place "regarding the stationing of Soviet forces in Hungary on the basis of the Warsaw Treaty" and declares that there is no question of accepting any control by police forces of the United Nations. In conclusion, the newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, reflecting the problems that the Hungarian crisis has provoked in the consciences of the communist in Western Europe, compare them to those that caused the defamation campaign conducted against the Soviet Union in 1939. It must be said clearly that the Soviet repression of the Hungarian uprising causes in the communist world, and especially in the West, a crisis

as serious as the Stalinist collusion with Nazism signed by the German-Soviet pact. But the Chinese, who are turning to the foreign Communists with the growing authority of which they give evidence, ask them to analyze these difficult and complex events with the cold realism of Marxism and not to let go in to defeat and confusion; of this courageous lucidity, the French Communist Party gives, according to Beijing, an obvious example.

The vital role played by China in international communism appears thereby more and more evident. Helping the USSR, refusing to surrender to the temptation of “purity” and agreeing to dirty their hands to save the cause of socialism compromised by the errors of the Stalinists, the Chinese Communists are given the additional benefits for future discussions with the Soviets on the definition of the general line.

Document 59

Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Broustra, Head ad interim of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations – November 17 1956

CABLE 195

Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs,

To Mr. Broustra, Head ad interim of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations.

T. n°4350 to 4357.

Absolute priority.

Paris, November 17th, 1956, 11.55pm.

I am sending you, here, for all purposes, a brief summary of the current situation in Hungary.

1. Though the intervention of Soviet troops has re-established an almost total calm in Budapest, the Kadar government cannot consolidate its authority. The passive resistance of the population continues and it seems that some insurgent groups have retained their weapons.

The authorities make the greatest efforts both on the external side to receive a guarantee and on the internal side to resume contact with the population and win the support of both the peasants and workers and intellectuals.

2. The Cabinet - composed of seven communist ministers - looks like a simple "Council of government", intended to be expanded if other contributions can be found. This is the reason why it has entered into negotiations, so far fruitless, with the Peasant Party leaders (Mr. Szabo and Mr. Bibo) and the Smallholders Party.

On the other hand, since its multiple appeals for the resumption of work remained without results, it was forced to accept to discuss, with the workers' representatives, the different claims of the insurgents. It is under these conditions that he has obtained, under the terms of a *modus vivendi* defined on November 16th, that the "workers Committee of Budapest" invites workers to return in the factories. However, this revolutionary organ proclaimed at the same time that it was refusing to abandon "one iota of the achievements and goals of the national uprising" of which the main points remain: departure of Soviet troops; back to the formula of a Nagy-style coalition government; free elections with plurality of parties and neutrality of Hungary.

In addition, the Kadar Government published a decree granting extensive rights to the workers' councils, and has banned from the political life the most compromised Communist leaders associated with Rakosi and Gero.

Finally, he promised the opening of negotiations for the evacuation of Soviet troops without specifying the term; the liquidation of the political police; ending the system of compulsory delivery of agricultural goods, the suppression of the Soviet uniform for the army and of mandatory teaching of Russian in schools as well as the increase in wages.

However, popular mistrust persists towards the Kadar government and is worsened by a few days because of rumors more and more widespread in Hungary and in the neighboring countries about deportations of hundreds of Hungarian citizens to the Soviet Union. Radio-Budapest announced on November 15th that the railway workers of Szolnok, who had returned to work, went on strike again at the news of the "mass deportations".

3. In order to give his support to the Kadar Government, the Czechoslovak prime minister, Mr. Siroky, on November 15th, visited Budapest for a few hours. To the terms of the statement published, the Czechoslovak government approves the Budapest government for having requested the help of the USSR; it rejects as "illegal" the UN resolutions and accuses the organization of not respecting "the principle of non-interference in the Hungarian affairs".

On the other hand, Mr. Kadar and Mr. Siroky have decided to develop further still Hungarian-Czechoslovak relations in every fields.

4. For his part, Marshal Tito, visibly concerned about the pressure that a Hungarian democracy, more or less Western, would exert on the internal regime of his country, is not afraid to say, in his speech at Pula, that the second Soviet military intervention in Hungary had been made inevitable by the need to save "the further building of socialism in this country and the world peace." He has limited himself to giving a view of foreign troops after "the restore of order and peace". The latter point of view connects quite exactly the USSR and Hungary.

The head of the Yugoslav Government also stated, in a somewhat contradictory way, that on point of principle Yugoslavia could not approve of foreign interference in Hungarian affairs.

Document 60

Report of Mr. Alphan, Ambassador of France in Washington to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – November 18 1956

CABLE 197

Mr. Alphan, Ambassador of France in Washington,

To Mr. Pineu, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n°7318.

Washington, November 18th , 1956, 11.45am

(Received: 5.45pm)

In the course of the interview that I had with him on the afternoon of November 17th , Mr. Robert Murphy has indicated to me that, according to information received today by State Department from good sources, the deportations from Hungary to the USSR would cease.

On the other hand, the under-secretary of State has underlined how much importance was given here to the speech pronounced in Pula by Marshal Tito last Sunday, that revealed the existence of some doubts in central and Balkan Europe about the good political judgment of the leaders of the Kremlin.

Document 61

Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – November 18 1956

CABLE 198

95

Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest,

To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Budapest, November 18, 1956.

(Received: on 21st, 6.20 pm)

I refer to my communication of the 14th of this month and my slips n° 1052/EU and n° 1053/IP with this letter.

Neighborhood by neighborhood, block by block, street by street, house by house, apartment by apartment, the hunting of young men continues, methodically made by teams in which survivors, ultimately very numerous, of the lynchings of the old political police - today officially dissolved - collaborate with the Russian troops; I witness to harrowing scenes; rescue calls are made to our diplomatic car as they pass in front of a building during an inspection.

There would be the reason to take up arms to this heroic people: that it hid for ten days –and I do not exclude some sporadic rebellions – if you don't consider in any moment the terrible disaster that afflict the capital under its debris. Measuring, the lamentable consequences of their patriotic folly of three weeks ago, the spirits of today have scarcely any other obsessions than those of daily bread or flight to Austria.

The strike and other forms of passive or active resistance are only the substitute of the third fight what the Soviet armored patrols are waiting for, which are as numerous, powerful and stirring as during the best days of insurrection... and destruction. The urban tactic of the Russian command was without doubt neither remarkable nor winning in terms of military technique, but it is clear that it has succeeded in crushing the revolution on the moral level.

Kadar has claimed to have obtained the arrests of the deportations of young people; we were also told that, thanks to his intervention, the convoys could be arrested in the Hungarian part of the frontier station; Someone affirmed to have heard the prisoners screaming in chorus their patriotic enthusiasm or their desperation in their wagons. Whose blackmail will be prepared for a nation that refuses to cooperate – for its politicians? For the working masses on strike?

If deportation to the USSR was really no longer expected, who needs the abduction and detention of all young people, collectively and jointly made responsible for the insurrectional movement? Is it possible to conceive, on the Hungarian territory and in the atmosphere of the revolution, only one concentration camp where the guards will inspire confidence to the Moscovite responsible for this radical process of destruction of a revolution from its base?

As long as in any case, they will apply these methods, I think it's useless to expect that Imre Nagy or some other Hungarian politician, worthy of the name, even a wannabe of Rakosi, will leave to “*embark*” by Kadar willingly. There is a little bit too much floating prison in the galley of the government and the miserable Imre Horváth is wearing the colors at the UN.

Document 62

Report of Mr. Dejean, Ambassador of France in Moscow to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – November 19 1956

CABLE 201

Mr. Dejean, Ambassador of France in Moscow,

To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n°4656 to 4666.

Priority.

Moscow, November 19th, 1956, 8.45pm.

(Received: 6.45pm)

Because of its scope and its complexity, the Soviet declaration of November 17th gives a measure of the current difficulties that afflict the USSR and force a vast operation of diversion and propaganda.

The Moscow government is trying, first of all, to divert attention from the events in Hungary. For this purpose, it has up until now fully exploited the Egyptian question. But the ceasefire deprives it of its essential argument and forces it to use statements whose deceptive nature is evident. On the other hand, it knows that the Arab governments are beginning to worry about the intrusive interest of the USSR, and on the issue of volunteers, there has been correspondence between the opposition of the US president and manifest Arab aversion.

However, in Hungary the blood continues to flow. The Soviet repression takes more and more brutal forms (shootings, deportations). The unpopularity of the Kadar government grows, while the chances of stabilizing the situation to the Polish level decrease. This situation not only upsets the world's conscience, but the USSR loses much sympathy among its traditional

supporters.

In addition, happening after the problems in Poland, the Hungarian tragedy illustrates the failure of the communist regime on its own ground of choice, that of the realization of worker welfare. The panegyric of the socialist regime which covers several ...⁵² the statement is actually an advocacy. Secondly, after using the most brutal military force in Hungary, after proclaiming to want to use force to crush the attack on Egypt, after having raised the specter of a third world war with the use of remote-controlled machines and nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union feels the need to present itself again as an advocate of peace and proponent of the solution through the negotiations of all international disputes. It has to return to the issue for which it has shown little interest in the past few months, but which it knows holds a seductive power over the people, as well as on the most diverse personalities and circles. We must expect, without a doubt, that the Soviet initiative causes a new offensive of peace movements and similar groups.

The affirmation of this desire for peace and disarmament joins strangely to a huge pride of power that betrays the illusion to the possibility that the USSR would have had in 1945 and that it would have again today, in better conditions, to overcome the rest of Europe with its tanks.

Thirdly, the concrete proposals presented regarding disarmament are discussed in section 3 of your telegram n°4937.

For my part, I will only mention the following:

These proposals in general, repeat the formulas presented by the USSR for eighteen months, if possible, in an even more absurd and more demagogic way. They go even farther than the great program presented on May 10th, 1955, to the extent that the Soviet government, while reiterating its demands for the complete destruction of all atomic stocks and total liquidation of foreign bases without geographical limitations, does not recognize – more than anything – that an effective system of control requires the prior establishment of a climate of trust.

In the field of the actual strength stationing in Germany, it should be noted that the USSR suggests only a one-third reduction in the immediate. This reserve betrays its unease about the total evacuation at the time in which it faces many difficulties in the people's democracies.

The only part of the statement which seems positive concerns the Eisenhower plan on an aerial inspection. The USSR is willing to examine a proposal for a local application of this plan to a depth of 800 km on each side of the dividing line between the West and the East. It had therefore welcomed with coldness a similar project when Mr. Jules Moch had evoked it in the course of his negotiations. There is, however, an element that seems destined to seduce a part of American opinion.

Fourth, concerning the various proposed conferences, one more time, the USSR presents

⁵² Gap of decryption.

projects that it knows are impossible to realize. It can not ignore that at the present time, President Eisenhower refuses even a three-party conference at the highest level. So there are considerations of tactics and propaganda that inspire primarily these proposals.

However, we can't forget that the Soviet Union is currently dealing with the most serious problems. Whether it's Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, the connection of issues that concern all of these countries, their impact on relations with the other people's democracies, including China, or the course of the German and Polish problems, the future of the Stalinist empire is at stake. The time is no longer such that the dictator could resolve crises of this nature by convening in Moscow the Communist leaders who could have choice only between submission and elimination. In these conditions, it is possible to wonder whether, after doing what it had to do for several days to bring the situation to the extreme and to make acute the threat of armed intervention, the USSR does not consider more prudent at the present time, to move the events to a political and diplomatic level.

Additionally, in this situation, the USSR has an interest to prevent the "coup of Budapest" from causing the armaments of the Western powers from creating effects comparable to those that had caused the "Prague coup" and the Korean War, the consequences for the entire economic and social policy of these effects would be more difficult to bear at the present.

It seems to me indicated to adopt a more flexible behavior that the department suggests in order not to leave the USSR to raise the political and moral benefit of its maneuver, and at the same time not to neglect any opportunity to defuse the dangers of the current tension.

Document 63

Report of Mr. Dejean, Ambassador of France in Moscow to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – November 20 1956

CABLE 204

Mr. Dejean, Ambassador of France in Moscow,

To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n° 4671 to 4675.

Reserved.

Moscow, November 20th, 1956, 2.15pm.

(Received: 12.15am)

During the interview that is contained in my telegram n°4583, the Ambassador of Sweden said to Mr. Khrushchev that the intervention of Soviet troops in Hungary causes in his country, as in the rest of the world, deep emotion and it will affect the relations between Sweden and the USSR. Global opinion was certain, in fact, that it was the whole Hungarian people, and not just some counter-revolutionary, who would be relieved to obtain the departure of Soviet troops and recover its independence.

The first secretary of the party said that he was aware of the effect produced on global opinion. The absence of the NATO representatives during the evening recalled the era when there was no contact between the Soviet world and the West. But the USSR had already overcome this isolation once. It would now yet overcome the current crisis.

For us it was very difficult, continued Mr. Khrushchev, to make the decision to send our troops into Hungary, but we could not act otherwise. The reactionary elements had begun to chase and massacre the communists and other progressives and attack our troops. Withdrawing our forces in these conditions would result in a loss of political and military prestige. It was inadmissible. Moreover, it was evident that the uprising was not only directed against those such elements which were particularly compromised. It wanted to destroy the very foundations of people's democracy. In these conditions, our intervention was required. Moreover, it is exaggerated to speak, for Hungary, of a popular uprising. Addressing the Ambassador of Finland, Mr. Khrushchev has emphasized the difference between the resistance of the Finnish people to the Soviet troops in 1940 and the events that are taking place in Hungary. In Finland, we had realized that we had against us all the Finnish people and that it was a real national war. This is not the case of Hungary because we had controlled the insurgency in just three days.

According to Mr. Khrushchev, the Soviet government had the most liberal intentions with regard to Hungary; as soon as the Kadar government is in good shape, the Soviet government will be willing to withdraw its troops. The issues of the Warsaw Pact and of Hungary's eventual neutrality were more complex. But the Soviet government intended to examine them later if that was the desire of a Hungarian Government animated by friendly feelings towards the USSR.

Document 64

Note from the sub-directorate of Eastern Europe. Reactions to the events in Hungary – November 20 1956

CABLE 207

Note from the sub-directorate of Eastern Europe

Reactions to the events in Hungary

Paris, November 20th, 1956.

Introduction.

The development of the Hungarian Revolution and its destruction by the Red Army are among the most important events in the post-war era. Their consequences are far from being exhausted. However, the creation of divergence between different communist parties around them already appears as a threat which could split communist and progressive movements. This is the reason why Moscow tries to take care of the situation through a set of concessions, at least apparent, and forceful measurements.

It is therefore necessary, for the countries concerned, to observe the following guidelines:

A. INITIATIVES TAKEN BY MOSCOW:

In its relations with the satellite countries and Yugoslavia.

Declaration of October 30th.

Its implementation, for example, in the Polish-Soviet talks the recall of Marshal Rokossovsky from his position.

The justification for intervention in Hungary.

B. LOCAL REACTIONS:

Satellites, China, Yugoslavia, P.C. foreigners, India.

1° Attitude more or less favorable, from leaders and from public opinion, about the events in Hungary.

2° Call for vigilance and implementation of safety mechanisms.

3° Concessions made to local opinion.

a. *Economic measures.*

Provisions made to raise the standard of living of the population, possibly by reducing the pace of investment; dissolution of joint companies, especially for uranium exploitation; repair injustices; problem of Polish coal.

b. *Psychological measures.*

Suppression of the Soviet influence, the compulsory nature of the teaching of Russian language and Marxism-Leninism.

c. *Effort* to make less apparent Soviet control: departure of military advisers; new status of troops in Poland; problem of the evacuation of troops from Hungary.

Document 65

Report of Mr. François Seydoux, Ambassador of France in Vienna to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – November 21 1956

CABLE 211

Mr. François Seydoux, Ambassador of France in Vienna,
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs

T. n 770 à 774.
14h. 10.

Vienna, 21 November 1956,

(Received: 14h. 20.)

Two news coming from Budapest retain, today, the attention of Vienna:

1. The position taken by the official body of the Hungarian communist party, which expresses openly the hope that the Soviets will withdraw their troops from Hungary and will thus allow the establishment between the two countries of relations based on friendship. The situation of Hungary is very different, adds the newspaper, to that of Poland. This country has, in fact, a border with Germany, whereas Hungary is surrounded only by friendly countries and by Austria.

- 2. The declaration of Mr. Istvan Bibó, Minister of State in the former cabinet of Nagy, according to which only the following program could allow the end of the crisis:

- 1) Return to power of Imre Nagy;
- 2) General amnesty for all those who “committed political offenses in good faith”;
- 3) Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary within six weeks.
- 4) Adoption of a constitution guaranteeing the functioning of a parliamentary and democratic system.
- 5) Recognition of the agrarian reform, of nationalizations and freedom of thought.
- 6) As regards foreign policy, Hungary would be presented the following alternative: to remain a member of the Warsaw Pact, provided that it loses its military character, transformed into consultative organization and that Yugoslavia forms part of it, or, denounce the pact and conclude with the USSR a treaty of non-aggression. Finally, Mr. Bibo declared that the sending of United Nations observers would not be necessary if Soviet troops withdrew. No allusion appears to have been made to elections.

Such statements show that the Kadar government fails to impose its authority, while economic activity is still paralyzed.

I note on the other hand that the number of the refugees greatly increased: 3,750 Hungarians crossed the border from Monday till Tuesday and more than 5,000 from Tuesday to Wednesday.

Among the latter, most of whom had to crawl in swamps of Lake Neusiedl, there were wounded. According to some information, the Soviets, in fact, would shoot at the fugitives in the border area; they would have killed an important proportion; we are talking about 20%. The increase of the stream of the refugees is doubtless due to the deportations made by the Soviets and the atmosphere which they create in Hungary.

Document 66

Report of Mr. Alphan, Ambassador of France in Washington to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – November 23 1956

CABLE 224

Mr. Alphan, Ambassador of France in Washington
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs

T. n° 7512-7513.
10.

Washington, November 23, 1956, 22h.

(Received: November 24, 4h. 10.)

The information received from Budapest indicates that the Kadar government is virtually a prisoner of the Russians. No interlocutor is admitted to be with the Hungarian Prime minister without the presence of several Soviet officers. The food situation would have improved in the Hungarian capital, but the population suffers cruelly from lack of fuel and gasoline. It is

confirmed here that the strike movement continues without disruption and that there is no indication of a decline in the popular will. The number of the refugees now exceeds 60,000. By way of example, the passage into Austria of all the teaching staff and of all the students of the University of Sopron. Although there is no intention of blaming for such an exodus, the fact remains that the Hungarian resistance forces will soon weaken.

The State Department is not aware of the entry of new Soviet troops into Hungary nor of a concentration on the Yugoslav borders. The reports received from Belgrade indicate, however, that Marshal Tito is increasingly concerned about the Russian military threat.

As to the fate of Imre Nagy, they consider, in Washington, that if he really is in Romania as per the Budapest radio announcement, he could only be deported by Soviet troops contrary to the commitments given to the Yugoslav government by Mr. Kadar.

From the point of view of the State Department, the situation in Hungary remains extremely unclear and complex. They would see great advantage that Mr. Hammarskjold follow up on the project which he was ready to request to go for himself to the area to be aware of the situation.

Document 67

Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – November 26 1956

CABLE 235

Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest,

To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n° 825-826. Reserved.

Budapest, November 26, 1956. 3.36 pm, 3. 34 pm.

(Received: 10.27 pm)

I reply to your telegram n° 1224.

The secretary of this legation was able to speak this morning at the US legation to the Cardinal, who appeared in good physical and moral health despite his sadness and his isolation: to avoid the difficulties that might raise his presence to their legation, in fact, Americans prohibit him any outside contact; the chargé d'affaires has insistently asked us not to spread news about the Cardinal.

As regards to his secretary, he attempted to reach Vienna in the company of journalists aboard a US convoy, probably on November 10, but he was arrested at Győr by the Russians or by the Hungarian political police. From that moment, no one has heard from him.

Document 68

Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – November 27 1956

CABLE 238

Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest,

To Mr Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n° 828-830.

Budapest, November 27, 1956. 6.20 pm.

(Received: 9.39 pm)

My Italian colleague has been consulted from Rome about the hypothesis contained in my telegrams n° 745 and n° 801 and which makes more real the diplomatic incident with Hungary, the USSR and Yugoslavia. Count Franco answered in the sense of this telegram.

Like all my western colleagues and I, my Yugoslav colleague recommends the maintenance of diplomatic missions, but he considers inevitable his personal retreat if, as is likely, disappointing answers will come from Budapest to Belgrade's protests; in any case, his mission here is over.

My new American colleague doesn't see any possibility of presenting his credentials. If the heads of mission will not be withdrawn by agreement, he will have to find a way to disappear.

My British colleague doesn't know more than me about the modification of his government's point of view. My Belgian and Dutch colleagues told me that they had expressed views to their governments that are similar to those of your telegram n°1084. In the event that Your Excellency might consider the withdrawal of the heads of mission, I would be grateful if you would let me temporarily withdraw in Vienna, my wife wants to improve upon, over the months to come, the assistance work that she has undertaken in accordance with local

representatives of the Red Cross and according to the line defined in my telegrams n°733 and 770, however, it is based almost on car shuttles between Vienna and Budapest.

Document 69

Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – December 4 1956

CABLE 257

Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest,

To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T.n° 857.

Budapest, December 4, 1956.

I met today, on December 4th, with my polish colleague returned from Warsaw where he had gone for a fortnight.

After telling me that he had kept in constant touch with M. Kadar and the USSR ambassador, M. Willmann has exposed all the current problems.

After having welcomed the regulation adopted in his country, the ambassador of Poland said to me that he was convinced that a political solution will be found in Hungary within two or three weeks. For now, the main thing was to restart production where the process is underway and where normalization will inevitably follow the political solutions.

Mr. Willmann does not exclude at all that Nagy would be the spokesman of these changes, because his deployment in Romania with Lukacs and Losonczy (they are staying in Sinaia) is less a deportation than a stay in a reflection room. The failure of the workers' councils negotiations with the government does not mean anything, because in the long run they will represent a force and a symbol of which the Soviet Union will be obliged to take into account, and the ambassador maintains close relationships with them.

As regard the rural population, it is clear to him that its evolution is entirely parallel to that of the Polish rural population. The same aversion to the forced co-operatives, the same persistence of the good cooperative and the same irremediable collapse of the bad. The

principle of the elimination of the compulsory delivery seems accepted; by these concessions, a certain social peace can be maintained in the countryside.

One of the essential elements of a political solution will be the future economic regime of Hungary, and Mr. Willmann has implied that a Western orientation seems excluded, but nevertheless, Russia and the People's Democracies could make loans and a generous aid. From now on, Russian aid would be extremely important (something that seems to me so much confirmed by official statements and direct testimonies including wagons, food...). Poland has granted a loan of 100 million zlotys, including important carbon shipments, and delegated hundred students in Szeged to get in touch with Hungarian students. No doubt that they will sympathize.

Overall, the Polish people are generous with the Hungarian people in the present events. As regards the government of Warsaw, it considers that the Hungarian affair is a matter of pure domestic policy and that it would not be possible to interfere without inconvenience for the Hungarians and for himself.

Speaking about the projected visit of Hammarskjold in Hungary, Mr. Willmann, relying on the official reply, stated that it was not feasible at present, but no doubt possible at some time (the radio announces that Mr. Hammarskjold will travel to Budapest on December 16th).

As regards the possibility of a relatively close political solution, I notice that the statement published after the Romanian-Soviet negotiations concludes that: "There is no doubt that similar negotiations will be held with other countries of the socialist gcamp."

However, we have to take into account the distortion in the talk of the Polish Ambassador, which must have settled on his mind because of the Polish–Russian settlement on November 18 which he evidently sees as the basis of a future agreement between the USSR and Hungary. This hypothesis is plausible to a certain extent, but it is not a certainty.

Document 70

Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – December 6 1956

CABLE 266

Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest,

To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

D. n° 1122.

Budapest, December 6, 1956.

I have the honor to present to the Ministry in an annex some passages from an editorial in Nepszabadsag of December 2nd, 1956 on the difficulties of rebuilding the party. Then we go to the heart of the problem: after arresting Nagy last week, after putting aside easily workers' demands, after the suppression of revolutionary committees, the main idea now is to raise the "workers' socialist party", and the press is full of reports of modest victories in some region and in some factory.

For those who perform the daily drudgery of reading the new Hungarian press, there is no doubt that the old nightmares not...those remaining of the revolution in a scenario of Russian tanks and with the presence, today, of numerous disguised policemen.

But the guiding element of the party is no longer the same. This editorial of Nepszabadsag, what admission of weakness! What inability to renew! After seventy years of parliamentary republic, the French flout the vice-prefect's talks willingly, but retain some amused sympathy. In this communist newspaper on the contrary, boredom only gives way to distrust; it's clear that the militant of 1945 is no more than a creature of habit, divided between the concern of his position and the fear of the indignation of his own. The press has lost the right tone of hope and it's in Budapest that you can better measure how communism has aged. We are far from the years 1945, 1946, 1947, when the most avid reactionary was not so sure, in the depths of his conscience, that the party was not in the process of building socialism and would achieve something.

Nowadays the legal country does not mask the real country any more and the choruses of Nepszabadsag have lost their grip on youth.

For the latter, communism has ceased to be a truth, before becoming perhaps a civilization. This is the youth who greets the most frantically Western cars, that runs away clandestinely to Austria, it is the youth that has taken up arms. We can say that these guys don't know what they want, they definitely know what they don't want: in their spirit, foreign occupation and economic exploitation, arbitrariness, the secret police, press under control, cohabiting like black beasts with large landowners or large industrial employers. We are in 1848, with Human Rights and social claims, not to mention the revival of nationalism. As in 1848, the mass feels a deep respect for intellectuals: before resuming their negotiations with Kadar, the delegates of the workers' Councils have created a relation with a Committee of lawyers, that work hard; but there is a lack of maturity in this. However, it's to give hope to the supporters of the marxist theory of historical development.

In addition to this, the most superficial observation betrays the embarrassment of the Russians, who are no longer what they are in Warsaw and Berlin. During the feminine demonstration on December 4th, the soldiers had to repel the protesters, guns blazing.

Therefore, sometimes, you could see a group of young girls get over the cordon laughing, without other reaction of the Russians except a head nod. A ten-year experience contains the fear they inspire within the limits of reality.

On the other side of the street, our military attaché meets his Soviet colleague who also considers the show, and with all military frankness he said to him: "You know that we withdrew from Indochina; here, do not you realize that no one can see you; you'd better leave". Colonel Kojanov was incapable of imagining a minimal response to this statement without reruns and the most profound signs of dismay could be read on his face. Once again, this is something different to the Stalinist Era.

In fact, it is likely that the Communist Party will have difficulties in reconstituting itself, that its new members do not demonstrate zeal at all, and that maybe it won't find again its impulsion

Annexed: Report of The place of the Communists in the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (editorial) – December 2 1956

ANNEXED

Nepszabadsag, December 2nd, 1956

The place of the Communists in the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (editorial)

The Hungarian communist movement is in a difficult, grievous situation. The Rakosi-Gero group has seriously compromised, in the eyes of the working class people, the objectives, the sacred ideas of our party. The counter-revolution tries to make the Hungarian communist movement responsible for any crime, for all acts committed against the people of this group. We haven't had to deal only with the agitation of the counter-revolution, but also the bloody counter-revolutionary terror that has hit the Hungarian communist movement.

In such a situation, the main objective is to organize the Communist ranks, reorganizing the party, get rid of past mistakes, the bad practice. The party of the communists lives and organizes. The bodies of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party are formed gradually in the country, and have started, though with little effect for the moment, political work and organization.

Many communists, nowadays, do not take part in the work of the party. Sometimes they do not enter the party and pursue a wait and see policy. What is the reason for this?

... One thing prevents particularly comrades to take part in this work: they are afraid that, sooner or later, the old criminal leadership appears in the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. They think that nowadays, it is just the slogan "Normalize Life", and that when this will be realised, the evil will start again from the beginning. Of course, not just the communists are afraid of this, but also all those who care about the cause of the building of socialism. Numerous radio and foreign newspapers announce consciously, day after day, false news intended to make people believe that a Rakosist restoration takes place in the party. So it's in this way, for example, the rumor that Oscar Betlen, the old editor who was seriously compromised, was writing *Nepszabadsag*, leaked out. There is not a word of truth in this.

... It is that it does not satisfy. They are demanding the removal of other people and some wish to exclude from their workplace the old officials of the P.T.H. They are talking about nothing less than persecution, which hides the obvious intention of the counterrevolution: the communists excluded from public life.

Alas! Some of our comrades don't understand that the persecution of the old officials of the party is something profoundly unjust. It must not be forgotten that after 1953, in the party, the resistance against the Rakosi-Gero band has been strengthened and developed to the point that several members and officials of the party came into open opposition with the leadership of that period and requested the exclusion of leaders who had broken away from the people...

A characteristic fact has happened in these days. The party is reintegrating into the work of production numerous officials of the party who had been suspended recently. An old official introduced himself as a stocker at a hospital in Budapest. They would have hired him, but when they saw in his work book that was an official of the party, they said that they didn't need him. It is nothing but a new form of the famous blacklist of our time. There is no difference between that and the vile methods of Horthy's secret police.

Others see a danger in the fact that we were able to solve the counterrevolutionary coup with the help of the Soviet armed forces and they believe that the old leaders, being the enemy of people, leaning on the Soviet armed forces, will return one day. This anguish is also fueled by the slanders of the enemy, according to which a Stalinist restoration would take place in the USSR. It is completely impossible that the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party, who have mercilessly revealed to the whole world the criminal activities of Stalin, they themselves commit the same mistakes. A proof of this is, for example, the result of the Polish-Soviet negotiations recently published. The agreement is an open condemnation of the past, and puts the relations between the USSR and Poland on a new basis of the principles for which the Hungarian communists and the Hungarian people fought and are fighting. An article appeared in the last Sunday number of *Pravda* and it condemned the criminal activities of the Rakosi-Gero band and openly declared that the USSR doesn't want to repeat the mistakes committed by Stalin in the relations between states ... These facts prove wrong those who see in the Soviet army a force that is preparing the return of Rakosi-Gero band ...

The ranks of our party are still a little tight. It will not get as many members as the P.T.H. We need neither upstarts or careerists, nor those who served everyone , regardless of their beliefs. But the party needs the longtime Communist, tested, hardened, capable, in the difficult situations of today, to smooth the path of development, to advance the recovery of normal life.

Document 71

Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – December 7 1956

CABLE 271

Mr. Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest,

To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n° 875

Budapest, December 7, 1956.

It is surprising to note how much the streets of Budapest suffer the influence of the UN debates. The feminine demonstrations of 4th, 5th and 6th had to keep on toes the international opinion. It's possible to wonder if the reference to December 15th of the demonstrations and protest scheduled for December 6th and 7th was decided in the light of the planned and then cancelled visit of Mr. Hammarskjold to Budapest: in fact, the posters that established the appointment on 15th were ready in December 4th, while this visit was announced on 5th.

In general and if I may give an opinion on the nature of our work at the UN in the Hungarian debate, it seems that we had interest in maintaining a constant pressure on the USSR, pressure, for example, may have had some effect on the pace of the deportations; but it's better not to encourage exaggerated hopes in Hungarian opinion, not only in consideration of lives needlessly sacrificed here, but also because our eventual failures would risk jeopardizing the credit of the Western powers.

Document 72

Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – December 10 1956

CABLE 280

Mr. Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest,

To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n°885

Budapest, December 10, 1956.

Ignoring how the telegrams, that the telegraphic center has not returned to me, without transmitting came to the Ministry, I list here the events of the end of the week.

a. It has become a test of strength; the fracture underlined in my telegram n°832 caused, refusing Kadar any concession and going back on his earlier promises, an ultimatum from the central organ of workers' councils that expired the day before yesterday, Saturday at 8pm, and has again placed on the government responsibilities of new bloodshed.

b. Going beyond, the "government" has made public the resolutions dating back to mid-week and adopted by a "Provisional Central Committee" of the new formation of the Hungarian communist party (of which we assume that it behaves exactly like the "Central Committee"); the composition of this provisional central committee has not been disclosed until now and it is assumed that it was hardly different, at the moment, from the government's team headed by Kadar.

Translations of the second, third and fourth parts of these resolutions come to the Ministry in n°1129/EU, 1130/IP by this letter. Giving these events a tendentious explanation to the point of touching the absurdity, these texts have no other immediate purpose than purging, if it's possible, the "counterrevolutionary members" of the workers' councils and introducing in these some elements which Russian-Hungarian authorities can lean on.

c. Yesterday, Sunday, the central authority of the workers' councils decided a general 48-hour strike starting this evening at midnight on Monday; the police entered forthwith in the area of deliberations, while the Russians surrounded the building. About sixty people were arrested and detained up to 17 hours at the police prefecture. Released all at this time, except for two of them, the members of the central committee of the workers' councils recover their place, where an A.V.H colonel arrives to give them a reading of a "statement", translated in

n°1126/EU by this mail; despite the provisions of the Decree of November 13th (see my Report n° 1054/EU) which provided "the most intense participation of workers to the exercise of power," the activities of workers' councils become illegal when they come out of the context of the enterprises that they manage. This has practically dissolved the central and provincial organisms of the workers' councils.

d. The decrees, in due form, establish, starting tomorrow December 11th, the martial law against all those who will be found in possession of weapons without a special permit. Characteristic of the little confidence that Russian-Hungarian authority has in the elements that recruits, is the fact that the newly created militias are not exempt from this legislation, their exception from regarding the application of it is only delayed by one day.

Document 73

Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – December 11 1956

CABLE 287

Mr. Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest,

To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n° 889-890.

Budapest, December 11th, 1956, 10.10 am.

(Received: on 13th, 5.49 pm)

I read in the telegram from New York n° 2529 that the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs said to the UN General Assembly that the government of Imre Nagy, "before it was overwhelmed by the reactionary elements", had proposed itself the intervention of Soviet armed forces.

The underlined words show that it is not about the counterattack of November 4th in the capital, but the start of the Russian armed intervention on the night between 23th and 24th October.

Or, this started in Budapest around midnight at the latest, when an armored division begun to cross Szeged two or three hours before; it is at 4:30 am that the official radio of the regime

revealed that he had appealed to the Soviet forces; it is only at 8.10 am that the same radio spread the news of the designation of Imre Nagy, by the Central Committee still manned at this time by Gero, and it's at 12:10 am that for the first time the new prime minister took the floor, by microphone.

Document 74

Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – December 13 1956

CABLE 293

Mr. Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest,

To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

D. n° 1149

Budapest, December 13th, 1956.

The attached notes of the cultural attaché in this legation oppose this impotence of the associations of Hungarian intellectuals of "over 30 years", the dynamism of which continues to show a youth who hid their weapons during the first ten days of November, in order to better continue the resistance clandestinely..

Among the observations of Mr. Turbet-Delof, I welcome especially the fact that the thousands of students who provoked the initial events of the revolution, continue to be the leaders of a movement only – to the extent that the camaraderie of the fighting has integrated them into workers' youth of which many students were also made part because of their family origins.

The fundamental revelation of the first days of the national uprising, in late October, remains the unbridled opposition to the workers' regime that Gero still believed, on the evening of October 23th, in calling to his aid. As well as the intellectual revolutionary committees, now dissolved, which subordinated in recent times their resistance to that of the workers' councils with whom Kadar was grappled, there is also a youth for at least half originating from

working-class or rural backgrounds who has carried out the illegal tasks confidentially reported by Mr. Turbet-Delof.

Annex: Note from the cultural attaché – December 11 1956

ANNEX

Note from the cultural attaché

(Strictly confidential)

N. n° L/146/56

Budapest, December 11th, 1956.

The three notes that I have dedicated to the "political behavior of the Hungarian intelligentsia" (n° L/138/56 of November 27, L/141/56 of 1 December and L/ 145/56 of 10 December) concern essentially the intellectuals of "over 30 years" grouped in organizations that, existing before the revolution, formed, from October 26th, the "revolutionary committees" gathered, from November 20th, by the "revolutionary Council of the Hungarian intelligentsia". I have indicated how these committees and the council, declared illegal by December 5th, exercise again, in different forms, an activity that the government seems to tolerate to the extent that it has slowed. I learned, for example, that at the time of the search made on December 5th at the headquarters of the Revolutionary Council, the police seized the stock of mimeographed documents that was there: it seems that, from this date, this council accepted to be deprived of every type of expression.

The situation is quite different in the youth.

On October 23th, Budapest counted 25,000 students. Many of these, originating from the province, have returned home and others took refuge abroad so that the number of students who are currently in Budapest must not exceed 10,000. This numerical decrease of actual students is compensated by elements from two social categories:

1. Young intellectuals who have recently completed their university studies (that is the "new intelligentsia" of my note of September 14th, 1956, Chapter 1).
2. Young workers maintaining with students fraternity created during the fighting. 60% of the students were from working-class or rural backgrounds by virtue of the people's democracy

policy on higher education intake, it is not uncommon to see the workers and students having between them more or less close links of parentage.

Unlike the "old intelligentsia", this Youth that called itself "the fourth generation", and has avoided giving credit to the Kadar policy by organizing itself in committees located on the street. By the end of the fighting, it entered the underground resistance in the form of small groups, whose working rules are the following:

1. Absence of central management, to avoid the brutal beheading of the organization;
2. Controlled contacts among groups, so that what is respected, in all possible ways, is the principle of division of labor.

The groups were brought to specialize, for the current period, in the following skills:

1. Drafting and copying flyers and newspapers. There was also a clandestine newspaper, *Élünk* ("We live") up to December 4th, the day when members of its editors were arrested in a car in which were found weapons and a copy machine;
2. Collection and installation, for use of the archives and libraries of Hungary and of other countries, of all handwritten, photocopied, printed, photographic documents, etc., if concerning the revolution;
3. Transmission abroad of the main revolutionary documents through the intermediary of refugees and Western legations;
4. A telephone information system to be aware of what is happening in different areas of the capital and possibly alert the Western legations (this was the case on November 5th, when some students of Bersenyi Street were arrested);
5. Agitation on public roads. The "fourth generation" claims a part in the organization of the demonstrations that began on December 4th, in particular those of December 6th in front of the West station;
6. Surveillance of the stations, railway tracks and roads in order to report concentrations and departures of deportees.
7. Armed commandos for the liberation of the latter. My informant - one of the most gifted and serious of my old students - says that this kind of operation was several times successful.

For Budapest, all of these groups of permanent activities would represent between two and three thousand young people. Five or six thousand mobilized would constitute a reserve in case of a "hard strike".

After that, the youth have got back the contacts that were interrupted because of my absence from November 13th to 25th, I hope to be able now to transmit to the Ministry regular and firsthand information that concerns it.

P.S. The newspaper Nepszabadsag of December 7th, under the title "The troublemakers, the provocateurs of the uprising and the receivers of stolen weapons have been arrested", published a statement from the National Police Headquarters announcing, among other things, the arrest of "Gyula Obersovski, a 29-year-old journalist, who prepared and spread leaflets, entitled Élük". We can read in the same statement: "in the sixth district, the police stopped a car and confiscated, from four bandits, three guns with 250 cartridges and a copy machine."

This official information confirms what I mentioned earlier, on page 2, fourth paragraph from the bottom of the page.

Document 75

Report of Mr. Francfort, Minister of France in Bucharest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – December 13 1956

CABLE 294

Mr. Francfort, Minister of France in Bucharest,
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs

D. n° 1002.
1956.

Bucharest, 13 December

One of my employees just had a conversation with a Hungarian official about the current feelings of some Hungarians even from official circles.

This official, who during these last months, has always shown moderation and pleasant disposition towards the legation, considers that the present Hungarian government must endeavour to increase its popularity, giving the ministries not yet filled to personalities who are more representative of public opinion.

In particular, it would be preferable that some of the people, who accompanied Mr. Imre Nagy in Romania, can enter into the government. It didn't seem to him that Professor Bibo, whose name was announced by the Western press, must enter into the government.

The economic situation in Hungary is extremely difficult, each day of strike the country loses, he said, 300 million forints.

As regards Romanian aid, naturally he didn't think that Romania could supply cereals to Hungary nor much more petroleum products, but he hoped above all that Hungary would receive chemicals and timber.

Like all Hungarians, this interlocutor doesn't manifest a special sympathy for the Romanians. He maintained relations of sympathy with Mr. Moghioros because this one, of Magyar ethnic

origin, member of Politburo and Vice-President of the Cabinet, was the defender of the Hungarian minority within the government. We couldn't say as much of Mr. Ladislav Banyai, new Vice-Minister of Education, who shows himself more Rumanian than the Rumanians. As my collaborator pointed out, undoubtedly the nomination of Mr. Banyai couldn't increase the popularity of the regime among the students of Cluj, he was answered: "it is the same for the Romanian leaders, they have chosen a tough policy".

Questioned about Hungary's relations with neighbouring countries, this official indicated that the Hungarian "people" had now more sympathy for "peoples" such as the Yugoslav people and the Polish people which had a national policy than for the others, that is to say the Romanians and the Czechs.

On the terms of the Soviet-Polish communiqué, different in the tone from those of the Soviet-Romanian communiqué, he declared: "This is the difference that characterizes the position of peoples who make a national policy and that of the others".

As regards to the number of the Hungarian minority in Romania, the indications of the census (telegram n° 963/EU of 3 December 1956) would be lower than the reality. There are more than two million Hungarians in Romania (official census figure: 1,550,000).

In particular, for the city of Bucharest, the census announces 11,000 Hungarian; according the President of the Romanian Presidium, Mr. Groza, himself, there are 80,000 Hungarians in Bucharest and, according to the Hungarian Legation, about 200,000. Except in the Ministries of Forestry and the Chemical Industry, the government will not leave to the Hungarians the place which they are owed.

The conversation ended by an anecdote. As we pointed out to a Szekler that in his village there was no more than one Hungarian for three Romanians, the man replied: "it doesn't matter: a Hungarian is well worth three Romanians".

Such must be today – more than ever – the feeling of the Hungarian people towards the Romanian "brother" people.

Document 76

Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the diplomatic representatives of France in New York (O.N.U.), Washington, London, Moscow, Prague, Vienna, Bonn, Warsaw, Bucharest, Berlin, Belgrade, Sofia, Rome – December 14 1956

CABLE 295

Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
To the diplomatic representatives of France to New York (UN),
Washington, London, Moscow, Prague, Vienna, Bonn, Warsaw,
Bucharest, Berlin, Belgrade, Sofia, Rome,

T. n° 5618-5619; 14126-14127;
19h. 45.

Paris, 14 December 1956,

13874-13875; 5515-5516;
1552; 1414; 3913; 1837; 963;
1246; 1466; 826; 2420.

According to the indications communicated by telephone this morning by Mr. Jean Paul-Boncour, the situation in Hungary remains chaotic and we still don't see how could they break the deadlock.

However, Kadar has demonstrated some manoeuvring skill. Owing to lack of transport, the peasants have difficulty in supplying the city with their agricultural products. The strikes have become unpopular. Moreover, the efforts of the insurgents, which have taken the last days, a spectacular aspect, without a doubt cannot renew themselves for a long time. These factors must not escape the Soviets who await signs of fatigue to attempt to overcome the crisis. It is not impossible that they are trying to put back on track personalities that they temporarily removed from traffic.

In any case, it seems that Kadar himself is definitely compromised regarding the Hungarian people.

Document 77

Report of Mr. François Seydoux, Ambassador of France in Vienna to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – December 17 1956

CABLE 299

Mr. François Seydoux, Ambassador of France in Vienna,
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n°960 to 963. Priority.
20h. 15.

Vienna, 17 December 1956,

Reserved.
25)

(Received: 20h.

According to the information received during the last forty-eight hours, the situation in Hungary is characterized at the beginning of this week by the following lines:

1° The Kadar government is being ignored by the Hungarian population; it is supported only by the officials of the communist party and by the members of the political police. The workers reject it unanimously.

2° In Budapest, the Soviet troops are quite numerous so as to make order reign by the constraint. Almost all factories are occupied by troops of the Red Army.

3° The direction of the resistance movement has shifted to the provinces and particularly to mining regions.

The spokesmen of workers in the underground industry, who sit “somewhere in Hungary”, have published a manifesto expressing their refusal to pursue any negotiations with the government of Budapest.

The day when a new ministry is formed, the mining delegates will subordinate any resumption of conversations to the release of the persons arrested since 4 November and the evacuation of mining districts by the State police and by the Soviet troops. The manifesto ends with the affirmation of unwavering will of resistance of minors, who will destroy the installations rather than bowing in front of Kadar and the Russians.

4° If, generally “order reigns in Budapest”, skirmishes have nevertheless taken place in the suburbs last Friday and Saturday. In the provinces, in the regions of Miskolcz, Sikonda, Zahony and Pecs, partisans remain very active. At various locations and in particular close to the Ukrainian border, several hundred Russian deserters have joined the Hungarians.

5° The food situation seems to be getting worse. For the first time since 4th November, refugees told us that they had left Hungary from fear of famine.

Document 78

Report of Mr. Dejean, Ambassador of France in Moscow to Mr. Pineau Minister of Foreign Affairs – December 22 1956

CABLE 318

Mr. Dejean, Ambassador of France in Moscow,
To Mr. Pineau Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n° 5085 to 5090.

h. 20.

Urgent. Reserved.

45.)

Moscow, 22 December 1956, 18

(Received: 18h.

I am referring to my telegram n° 5002.

1° I had this morning, 22 December, a meeting with Mr. Menon, Ambassador of India to the USSR who, retained in Moscow by illness, will return to Budapest only on the 24 December. During the two-hour conversation that he had 12 December with Mr. Chepilov, the Indian diplomat didn't hide to the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs the very painful impression that he had obtained from his stay in Hungary. He insisted a lot on the disastrous effect that the intervention of the Soviet army against the Hungarian population had produced in the Asian countries. Until then, these countries saw gladly in the USSR the champion of peace and settlement of all disputes by negotiation. This trust was today seriously shaken.

Mr. Chepilov appeared to have not fully realized this situation. He claimed that world opinion was misinformed. He supported, by all sorts of arguments, the notion of the fascist counter-revolution, in cooperation with certain bodies of subversion of Western powers.

He gave as a proof the skill that the insurgents had shown in street fights; he evoked the 10.000 Horthystes who would have been trained in an American camp in West Germany and introduced in Hungary; he recalled that under admiral Horthy, the Hungarian fascist party counted a million members of eight million inhabitants. It was then only more necessary to completely extinguish the fascist foyer which had re-formed in that country.

2° The minister asked the ambassador what political solution he considered possible.

Mr. Menon highlighted the great popularity which is accorded to Imre Nagy. He said that it was too late, and that this had been at the end of October-beginning of November overtaken by the events. But that he kept his prestige in the eyes of the masses. In another phase, he could, in the absence of any character benefiting from any esteem, play a useful role.

Mr. Chepilov reacted neither in a sense nor in another one as regards to a possible appeal to Imre Nagy. He restricted himself to underlining, that, above all, it was necessary to restore order. Only then we could think of a political solution of compromise.

3° Mr. Menon came back from Budapest convinced that the Hungarian population is, in its immense majority, deeply hostile to communism and the Soviet occupying power. He reckons that, however indispensable, that Hungary will obtain, at least for a time, a regime similar to that of Gomulka. According to him, the only valid representatives of the Hungarian popular will, that is the leaders of the labour councils and certain organizations like the association of writers would understand this well. The Ambassador confirmed to me that these men stood for a truly socialist regime and that they would be prepared to accept, on a temporary basis, the maintenance of Soviet forces stationed in Hungary before the crisis, the complete evacuation to be obtained subsequently by negotiation.

Document 79

Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – December 22 1956

CABLE 320

Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest,

To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

T. n° 937, 938.

Budapest, December 22nd, 1956, 12.10 am, 12.15 am.

(Received: on December 23th, 5.08 pm, 1.26 pm)

My British colleague complains that London would not seem to consider his personal suggestions for a quick UN intervention.

Mr. Fry is one that would see gladly Mr. Hammarskjold land, without notice, at the airport of the capital, even at the cost of causing bloody clashes in the area, on the assumption that the Soviet fighter plane fails to divert the Secretary General to another landing zone.

I no longer agree with my colleague that the two experts appointed by the Secretary General for the study of the Hungarian dossier come to Vienna, failing to go to Belgrade or Prague. Austria has turned out to be, in fact, a hotbed of rumors that are largely locally built-up or completed .

But why don't the experts of the Secretary General convene in Geneva a selection of serious informants to hire some of the Hungarian refugees who are flowing into Western Europe or the staff already dismissed from the International Red Cross? The possibility will also open to the Russian-Hungarian authority that it can send some qualified informants to Geneva.

Document 80
Report of Mr. De Guiringaud, Deputy Head of the Permanent Mission of France to
United Nations to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – December 29 1956

CABLE 331

Mr. de Guiringaud, Deputy head of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations,
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs

T. n° 3436 to 3442.

15h. 30

Reserved.

40.)

New York, 29 December 1956,

(Received: 21h.

I am referring to my telegram n° 3411.

I also questioned Mr. Hammarskjold about the continuation that he planned for the question of Hungary. First, the Secretary General denied having dissolved, as had been alleged, the Consultative Committee last month (my telegram n° 2516 of 17 November). Committee members had only let him know that they did not believe anymore to be able to be of any use, and he had agreed.

As regards the task for which the Assembly had charged him by different resolutions, he saw between them some contradictions. On one hand, in fact, he considered himself as invested in a kind of a conciliation mission and task of persuasion, aiming to obtain the withdrawal of Soviet forces currently in Hungary. On the other hand, by asking him to send observers into Austria and possibly somewhere else, the Assembly had in fact asked him to constitute against the Soviets a real charge. If he assured responsibility for the latter, he would remove the possibility to fill his first mission. Yet, this one appeared of many the most important. Without wanting to deny that a conviction of the Soviets, like that pronounced by the Assembly on 12 December 1956, was both justified and inevitable, Mr. Hammarskjold considers that no practical conclusion can be derived from it, in the interests of the free world and the Hungarian people themselves, other ways must be looked for.

The Secretary General showed himself convinced that the Soviets recognize that they can't, in the long run, maintain their control over Hungary by the means which they have used since the end of October. He believed that a development in the sense of the one that occurred in Poland is possible and even probable. But the Soviet leaders must be allowed to "save face". The negotiation about the disarmament could provide the opportunity, but also, seems to think Mr. Hammarskjold, a journey of the Secretary General of the United Nations to Budapest, if not even to Moscow.

Mr. Hammarskjold estimates that the dramatic way in which the discussion of his possible mission in Hungary has, on 6th December 1956, focused on the fixing of a date is the cause of the failure of this project. He doesn't give up so far; he believes in fact that he could, when the

time comes, exert on the Soviet leaders an effective pressure to convince them to withdraw their troops from Hungary.

For all of these reasons, Mr. Hammarskjold would not want designate for himself the observers aimed by the resolutions of 19 November and 2 December 1956, but he proposes to ask the Assembly, as soon as the debate would be reopened, to establish an exclusive committee which would be responsible for carrying out the desired survey by the majority of delegations and which would take the responsibility of appointing the observers and to report their findings. As for him, he would save himself for accomplishing, when the circumstances would allow it, the mission of persuasion which appears to him the only way in his power to contribute to a solution of the question of Hungary.

The plan of the Secretary General is unmistakably ingenious; if the Assembly is suited to it, it will allow Mr. Hammarskjold to get out, momentarily at least, of a situation that has become difficult. But I must note the Secretary General gave me yesterday, for the first time, the impression of bringing a real and sincere interest in the Hungarian question. He does not believe that he is in his role to formulate a moral judgement. He recognizes that we are obliged to employ towards the Russians a special tactic, but he seems concerned with good faith to obtain the best possible result.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

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