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**Why Was There No “Second Cold War”  
in Europe?**

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**Hungary and the East-West Crisis Following the Soviet  
Invasion of Afghanistan**

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44. [Secret CPSU] Information [to Warsaw Pact Leaders] about the Situation in China and Beijing's Current Course of Foreign Policy, 12 Apr. 1977, SAPMO-BA, DY 30, J IV 2/20/543. It is interesting to note that the Soviets internally predicted that in 2000 China would reach the economic standard of the 1975 USSR and the 1959 USA. In 1977, Moscow identified China's state of science and technology with the Soviet Union of 1952-54.

## Why Was There No "Second Cold War" in Europe?

### *Hungary and the East-West Crisis Following*

#### *the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*

CSABA BÉKÉS

#### *Belatedly Informed Soviet Allies*

On 28 December 1979 Soviet ambassador Vladimir Pavlov forwarded a highly confidential communication on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan to the Hungarian Communist Party leadership. Its closing sentence was meant to be an excuse for the total lack of preliminary communication between Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies concerning the Soviet policy decision: "Our friends will naturally also understand that the development of events did not make a preliminary exchange of opinions possible for us." Although the Hungarian "friends" never made it public, they did not at all understand why they had to be informed about an event of such importance from the news.<sup>1</sup>

In fact, in the years following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the invasion of Afghanistan was the first and only case when the East-Central European allies had to face a fait accompli concerning Moscow's unexpected initiative in a serious international crisis. In 1962, too, the Hungarian leadership had been disconcerted about that humiliating situation. János Kádár, first secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) and prime minister, did not hide his frustration when, during a meeting with Nikita Khrushchev in July 1963, he warned the Soviet leader, "The point is that there should not occur such a situation when the Soviet government publishes different declarations and the other governments read them in the newspaper. . . . I have thought of preliminary consultation. . . . According to our experiences it is better to quarrel before rather than after the events." To avoid similar situations and to compel Moscow to inform its allies regularly about its intentions, Kádár suggested the establishment of a council of foreign ministers for the Warsaw Pact.<sup>2</sup>

Although the Hungarian proposal was turned down at the meeting, deputy foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states, now on Soviet initiative, began to meet regularly from early 1964, often several times annually, and other forums of consultation gradually developed. Eventually, a more or less functional mechanism for Moscow to inform its East-Central European allies regularly on important international issues evolved at the meetings of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee from 1965, the Warsaw Pact Council of Defense Ministers from 1969, and the Council of Foreign Ministers from 1976. There were also consultations for the ruling parties' Central Committee secretaries for foreign affairs starting at the end of the 1960s.

Reflecting on earlier crises inside the Soviet bloc, Hungarian leaders believed that it would not have been impossible for Moscow to consult with its allies even on very short notice. Just before crushing the Hungarian revolution in 1956, Khrushchev and his associates personally visited the heads of five countries (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia) at four locations in the course of only two days.<sup>3</sup> A half-year-long series of very intensive bilateral and multilateral consultations preceded the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact states in August 1968. That precedent was especially significant for the Hungarian leadership since Kádár personally played a prominent role in mediating between the Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders.<sup>4</sup> During the Vietnam War, too, Moscow regularly informed its East-Central European allies about the current Soviet position. The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process, starting in 1969 and culminating in the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, just four years before the invasion of Afghanistan, resulted in extensive efforts for cooperation and harmonization of joint positions with the Soviet bloc. The Eastern European states played a key role in the process that was unprecedented in the bloc's history.<sup>5</sup>

As far as the situation in Afghanistan was concerned, Moscow regularly provided confidential information to its allies following the "revolution" in April 1978. This policy suggested that Moscow seriously considered the allies in its planning and that they therefore had every reason to believe that an important initiative, such as the invasion of Afghanistan, would not be launched without preliminary consultation with the members of the alliance. It is now known that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Politburo decision on the invasion was taken on 12 December 1979,<sup>6</sup> so in fact there was sufficient time for such consultation.

#### *First Reactions*

Because Hungary was a committed member of the group of "closely cooperating socialist countries"—defined as the Warsaw Pact members minus Romania—there was little to do other than accept the Soviet explanation and follow the general line

of the bloc in areas of propaganda. Initially, this did not seem to cause too much trouble, because Hungary's main concern was to maintain its good political and, above all, economic relations with the West, especially dynamically developing links with Western Europe since the mid-1970s.

Unlike the case of the Warsaw Pact's intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Hungary would not be directly involved as a participant in the international crisis concerning Afghanistan. According to the official Hungarian position developed in the first weeks following Moscow's intervention, Soviet support for the Afghan revolutionary forces constituted not an internal affair of the Warsaw Pact but rather a bilateral issue between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.<sup>7</sup>

Initially, the Hungarian leadership did not foresee that the Afghan crisis might have serious consequences for East-West trade and economic relations, crucially important for Hungary. In terms of precedents, there had been no Western economic retaliation even after 1968, when Hungary participated in the harshly condemned invasion of Czechoslovakia. In fact, quite the opposite resulted as the dynamic phase of the CSCE process commenced scarcely six months after the crushing of the Prague Spring: in March 1969 the Warsaw Pact had issued its well-known Budapest Declaration for the convening of an all-European security conference. Although it took some time for the West to adjust its policies to the new challenge coming from the East, the serious intention to pursue Realpolitik was clearly illustrated in the recently discovered initiative of President Lyndon B. Johnson to ask Leonid Brezhnev to organize a summit meeting in the Soviet Union as early as September 1968.<sup>8</sup>

It therefore did not seem improbable for Hungary to maintain its main foreign policy objectives, even under the circumstances of the crisis—Hungary would work to preserve and develop its dynamically improving and balanced political and economic relations with the West and Western Europe, in particular, while sustaining its status as a loyal, reliable, and predictable partner in the Eastern bloc. As a result, the reaction of the Hungarian leadership to the crisis was initially rather enervated.

The political leadership first discussed the situation in an official party forum only on 8 January 1980,<sup>9</sup> about two weeks after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and even then, as an issue among the so-called miscellaneous topics.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, Kádár, on holiday at that time, did not return to his office even after hearing the news, and Prime Minister György Lázár was also absent from the meeting. They evidently did not consider the situation too alarming from Hungary's vantage point. In spite of this general response, several participants in the session of the political committee evaluated events critically, even expressing their concern that inadequate consideration of the crisis might have a long-lasting negative effect on East-West relations. Former prime minister Jenő Fock ventured to compare the situation in Afghanistan with the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. He postulated that

there had then been no one to ask for Moscow's help legally and that this time, too, the new government was formed only after the Soviet invasion. Moreover, in this instance it became obvious for everyone that official propaganda, following the Soviet line, had initially labeled Hafizullah Amin<sup>11</sup> a friend of the Soviet Union in a rather misleading way, but now he became an adventurer who had been killing honest Communists.

Károly Németh, similarly pessimistic about the situation, argued that Western Europe had been divided concerning the issue of Euromissiles<sup>12</sup> and in the West, too, relevant social forces stood up defiantly against the deployment of missiles. Owing to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, however, this favorable situation would change in a negative direction for the Eastern bloc, and the crisis would pose serious problems in the international workers' movement as well. Finally, as if foreseeing the dangerous consequences of the escalation of the crisis for Hungary, he formulated his main concern in the following manner: "We should do our best in the field of politics, in international relations to prevent—that is, the socialist countries should not provoke—such mutual pressure, stoppage, rigidity, refusal in international life as 'unless you deliver corn, we will not deliver oil.' This does not exclude the necessity of such a step. But to try to maximally avoid it is also in the interest of the socialist world."

At the end of the debate, the political committee undertook one specific task relating to Afghanistan: to approve the text of the government declaration published on 10 January 1980. Political committee members agreed that the document should express Hungary's solidarity with the new Afghan leadership but that the Soviet intervention should be mentioned in the most reserved tone possible. At the same time, the closing sentence stated the Hungarian leadership's undiminished resolution to preserve the achievements of détente, a statement that went beyond a mere obligatory reference in the post-Helsinki international discourse. This was probably the most important message of the declaration, the delivery of which they did not leave to chance.

#### *The Horn Mission in the United States and Canada*

Although many people worried about the effect of the harsh American reaction to the invasion on the future of East-West relations, for the Hungarian leadership it was reassuring that both the Soviet leaders (Brezhnev in his speech of 16 January) and most key politicians in Western Europe, including West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt, made it clear that there was a strong joint interest in maintaining the results of détente.

Gyula Horn, then deputy head of the HSWP Central Committee International Department, conveyed this Hungarian hope during a special mission to the United States and Canada in January 1980.<sup>13</sup> He was officially designated as a "diplomatic

courier" to visit party organizations preparing for the impending HSWP congress, but the Hungarian embassies in Washington and Ottawa informed the diplomatic services about the presence of the Hungarian official, which then resulted in meetings.<sup>14</sup> Leading State Department officials stressed that by 1979 the general balance of power in the arms race of the two superpowers had shifted in favor of Moscow and that the Soviet Union's military intervention in Afghanistan had caused a distinctly qualitative change in East-West relations. The United States therefore had to take the necessary military steps to ensure the protection of its basic interests. These developments, they warned, could be expected to set back greatly the process of détente.

The Hungarian ambassador organized a session for Horn in New York with "leading representatives of great financial and economic monopolies and religious organizations," who warned that the Soviet Union had to "prepare for an extremely hard fight" and indicated that the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan meant the removal of the last barriers on the road leading to increasing the defensive capabilities of the United States and its allies. At the same time, they also predicted that for the execution of this program a stronger leader than Jimmy Carter was required as the winner of the upcoming presidential elections.<sup>15</sup>

Regarding bilateral relations, State Department officials emphasized that the United States still followed a discriminating approach in its policy concerning the East-Central European countries. They emphasized that in the pending difficult period with an anticipated deterioration in Soviet-American relations these states would acquire an important role and could ensure continuity in maintaining the policy of détente. They called the Hungarian leadership's attention to the fact that U.S.-Hungarian economic relations and, specifically, the most-favored-nation status achieved just two years earlier in 1978 as the result of several years' hard work now hinged on Hungary's positions toward the United States.<sup>16</sup> American officials urged the Hungarian side not to take a step backward in the field of bilateral relations and placed great importance on the upcoming visit to the United States by a parliamentary delegation headed by the speaker of parliament and HSWP Political Committee member Antal Apró.

The Horn mission also confirmed the Hungarian leadership's belief that the estrangement of the superpowers would not necessarily lead to the narrowing of the country's Western relations. On the contrary it seemed that under the circumstances, besides Poland, Hungary had the greatest chance for using the situation to its advantage.

#### *The Soviet Union, Imnos Kádár, and His "Little Lousy Country"*

The real shock for the Hungarian leadership came in the form of Soviet pressures in late January 1980, which "requested" that Hungary freeze its high-level contacts with the West immediately. This unexpected Soviet demarche stemmed from Moscow's

revamped position on the international crisis. The Kremlin had originally anticipated a certain level of criticism from the West but basically projected that, after a short interlude, the fait accompli would be accepted by the world community and that the critical objective of maintaining the momentum of détente would overshadow the problem of Afghanistan. The West, and especially the United States, however, reacted differently. They rightly interpreted the situation as the first instance since 1945 that the Soviet Union militarily occupied a country that did not fall within the Soviet sphere of influence. While at the time of the East-Central European crises of 1953, 1956, and 1968 the West reluctantly acknowledged the Soviet Union's right to restore order within its bloc, it now considered the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to be a unilateral and aggressive expansion of the Soviet sphere. With this initiative, Moscow had breached the tacit agreement that formed the basis of European status quo policy and that had functioned well since the end of World War II. Yet considering Afghanistan's geographic location, the acquisition of that territory violated only potential Western interests. As a result, the severity of the international crisis generated by the Soviet aggression ultimately did not attain the levels of the Berlin and Cuban crises at the beginning of the 1960s.

American countermeasures announced at the beginning of 1980 (e.g., restricting the sale of fodder grain to the Soviet Union, freezing of cultural and economic relations, banning the transfer of developed technologies) had not yet caused too great a trauma for Soviet leaders. Similarly, these measures did not initially effect any essential changes in their policy when the UN Security Council placed the Afghan question on the agenda on 5 January 1980 and when a special General Assembly session condemned the Soviet action. Although the possibility of the UN keeping the Afghan question permanently on the agenda might later have contributed to the reinforcement of the confrontational trend within the Soviet leadership, Brezhnev's speech of 16 January unambiguously emphasized the need for the maintenance of cooperation. Concurrently, however, on 20 January, President Carter called on all countries to boycott the Olympic Games scheduled for Moscow during the summer. Since these Olympics were to be the first in a Communist country, this event loomed importantly for the international prestige of the Eastern camp.

At the end of January 1980, the situation became even more critical. Although most Western European countries were not unambiguously and in all areas joining the American campaign aimed at the "punishment" of the Soviet Union, the question of European security was now viewed in a completely new light as a result of the Afghan intervention. On the basis of NATO's "double resolution," passed at the beginning of December 1979, it was still quite possible that, in the case of successful East-West talks, the deployment of the so-called Euromissiles would not take place in Western Europe. Under the new circumstances, however, it became more and more obvious that the NATO member states could not be dissuaded from the deployment of the missiles aimed at the strengthening of their security. Moreover,

they now did not have to confront higher levels of popular resistance, which had earlier become an important political factor in a number of countries.

Thus, in late January 1980, after the announcement of the Olympic Games boycott and especially when it became clear that the Soviets could not convince the Western European countries to reject the deployment of the "Euromissiles," an offended Moscow decided to take countermeasures. During this campaign, Moscow ordered the cancellation of imminent high-level talks with Western politicians. Two visits of West German politicians—Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher to Prague and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt with Erich Honecker in Berlin—were subsequently called off. Although the Bulgarians did not have upcoming meetings with Western politicians, they, too, received warnings against planning such steps.

These measures caused a serious clash of interests between the Soviet Union and the Eastern European Communist states, since at this juncture all of these countries, in varying degrees and in different ways, remained interested in developing their relations with Western Europe. Further research will show exactly how this conflict affected the relations of the individual states with Moscow. To be sure, for Hungary this Soviet move caused one of the most serious crises since 1956, both within the Hungarian leadership and in Hungarian-Soviet relations. In the case of Hungary, the Soviets "requested" that the visit of Hungarian foreign minister Frigyes Pujá to Bonn, scheduled in less than a week, be canceled and, similarly, that the visit of a parliamentary delegation to the United States be postponed. At the 29 January meeting of the HSWP Political Committee, one of the most dramatic in its history, the Hungarian leadership came the closest to making a political decision that openly defied the Soviet will. During a heated debate several Politburo members, including hard-liners like Apró, Dezső Nemes, and Németh, proposed that, taking into consideration the extremely short notices and the country's economic interests, the Soviet request should be disregarded. There seemed to be a clear majority for this position.<sup>17</sup>

Perhaps for the first time since 1956, the HSWP's first secretary, in an issue involving relations with the Soviet Union, always considered overriding, assumed a position contradicting that of the party's main operative body. During the debate Kádár, who had always strived to play a centrist role, found himself defending the policy considered to be the only realistic option, basically as a "leftist" deviator. Kádár adhered to the customary routine of carefully listening to members of the body and at the session's end of summing up the debate's essence in his own speech. He then proclaimed the resolution, which had worked well for decades but now brought its own punishment. In his rather confused and curse-filled speech, revealing his state of great agitation, Kádár argued that "we are again in a situation when the high-level visits to Bonn and Washington had to be canceled. He considered that Hungary would not lose anything by obeying Moscow, and, at the worst, he,

Kádár would be called "a Soviet satellite" in the West. "Some presumed advantage may only be hoped for, the negative effect is immediate" warned the experienced party leader to the members of the political committee, referring to the fact that by forfeiting the trust of the Kremlin's leaders, Hungary might lose much. Kádár proceeded to outline the basically determined character of Hungarian foreign policy: "At present Hungary has a certain reputation concerning its international policy. . . . this started . . . by our boycott by NATO, and we have reached a certain position, recognition with much effort, but at the same time never permitting to question that we were the allies of the Soviet Union. We have acquired this . . . and this is in the long-term interest of the nation. By another type of prestige we could obtain only short-term, sham advantages, eventually our people would be losers, believe me." To enlighten those who still might have had illusions concerning the nature of the Soviet request, he added, "What do you think, how long will they be polite to us? Why with us . . . excuse me for the phrase, with our little lousy life and country . . . how long will they behave politely toward us?"

This desperate declaration of the veteran Hungarian party leader offers perhaps the most blunt and drastic representation of the true nature of Hungary's relations with the Soviet Union in the whole Kádár era. From the debate's course it seemed that the members of the political committee did not perceive adequately the radical change in the political situation, and that is why they insisted on their position, worked out at the beginning of January, which emphasized the priority of cooperation with the West. Now, however, after Kádár's revealing speech, several of them rushed to point out that if the situation was as described, nothing was left to be done. In spite of this interpretation, Ferenc Havasi expressly indicated even afterward that, as a result of the planned step, the country might experience very serious economic difficulties, since Budapest had to take out a \$1.7 billion Western loan to survive 1980. The two states concerned, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), could therefore make the situation rather difficult for Hungary.

But after Kádár's dramatic speech, the possible options withered, and the political committee finally passed a resolution on the cancellation of both visits. At the same time, in a confidence-building measure toward the West, the political committee requested that the Soviets postpone for a later date the joint Soviet-Hungarian military exercise originally scheduled for the western section of Hungary between 11 and 16 February.<sup>18</sup>

In some respects, this political committee session began the process leading to Kádár's political downfall. Although at this juncture the veteran party leader still succeeded in imposing his will upon his comrades, it can be stated that he might have won the battle but would ultimately lose the war. A few years later, because of Hungary's increasingly difficult economic situation, this conflict significantly contributed to an unfolding situation in which even his closest colleagues wanted him to step down from his leadership position.

*Successful Crisis Management: A "Hungarian" Decision in the Kremlin*

The two visits were canceled.<sup>19</sup> Paradoxically, the humiliation that Kádár had to suffer in this instance eventually contributed to the development of positive processes for his country. It resulted from a series of diplomatic maneuvers aimed at exerting pressure on the Soviets to change their position, on the one hand, and at explaining Hungary's difficult situation to Western partners, on the other. At that same Politburo session in late January, Hungary's leaders also decided that Moscow should be asked urgently to hold a multilateral consultative meeting on the impact of the situation in Afghanistan on East-West relations. A special envoy, András Gyenes, the central committee secretary for foreign affairs, was immediately dispatched to Moscow with a letter from Kádár to Brezhnev. The message articulated a firm Hungarian position: in the present situation the allies must be consulted regularly on joint policy for the Soviet bloc in international politics, and the results of détente must be preserved. Only by maintaining and strengthening the relations of the Eastern European countries with Western Europe would this be possible. Kádár concluded that this approach would deflect the spread of American influence in those countries.

With Brezhnev chronically ill, internal fights intensified among factions within the Soviet leadership. It was under such circumstances that Hungary's urgent call for consultation arrived in Moscow. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko replied to the suggestion nervously, because he did not understand what the Hungarians wanted to discuss.<sup>20</sup> Nonetheless, the Soviets accepted the Hungarian proposal for consultation and summoned a meeting of the central committee secretaries for foreign affairs of the "closely cooperating socialist countries" in Moscow on 26 February 1980. At the conference, Boris Ponomarev, CPSU Central Committee secretary for international affairs, not only adopted the above-mentioned Hungarian position but also put forward this thesis as *the current CPSU line*, emphasizing that "the socialist countries should make the maximum use of the possibilities contained in existing relations with the Western European countries to counterbalance the United States's foreign policy line."<sup>21</sup>

This proved to be an important victory for Hungarian diplomacy.<sup>22</sup> First, Budapest received a green light for continuing efforts to develop its Western relations, so crucial for the country's economy at that time, freeing these relations in 1980 would have blocked Hungary's acquisition of a critical \$1.7 billion Western loan in 1980, which, it is now known, would have led to the country's insolvency.<sup>23</sup>

From a historical perspective, it is even more important to point out that Kádár's firm personal intervention and the effective Hungarian diplomatic initiatives eventually helped liberal forces in the Soviet leadership—mostly key members of the central committee apparatus interested in maintaining détente—overcome their adversaries, led by Gromyko, who advocated a more belligerent attitude toward the West. As Vadim Zagladin, first deputy head of the International Department

of the CPSU Central Committee, told Gyula Horn on 16 July 1980, "for several months in the CPSU Politburo, there had been heated debates about the Soviet Union's specific foreign policy steps, the general evaluation of the international situation and the situation of the Communist movement."<sup>24</sup> He emphasized that in this debate comrade János Kádár's message to the Soviet leadership played an important role.<sup>25</sup>

Parallel with the letter for Brezhnev, Kádár forwarded explanatory messages to Social Democratic Party chairman Willy Brandt and West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt. In these communications, he apologized for the cancellation of the visit of the Hungarian foreign minister on such short notice and subtly explained the difficult situation for the Hungarian leadership. He also stressed that his country was strongly committed to maintaining the results of détente and to fostering East-West cooperation. Helmut Schmidt, who in 1979 was the first German chancellor to visit Hungary, formulated in his reply the historical challenge confronting European states: it now depended on these states "whether they let themselves be drawn into the Cold War instigated by the two superpowers or not! Neither the FRG nor any other Western or Eastern European country can keep out of this [Cold War] alone. This is possible only with the collaboration of all states concerned."<sup>26</sup> It is evident that by the beginning of the 1980s, Hungary, while remaining a loyal member of the Warsaw Pact, felt compelled by its economic interests to move even closer to this virtual European community.

The resolution of this internal crisis can be regarded as an informative lesson concerning the limits of small-state diplomacy in the Warsaw Pact, or, stated otherwise, the opportunity for a small state, belonging to the "closely cooperating" group, to exert pressure on the Soviet leadership in order to achieve certain political goals. While it turned out to be impossible for Hungary to defy Soviet will openly, subsequent diplomatic maneuvers and Kádár's personal intervention could be successful, by extension, in affecting internal debate in the Kremlin, thereby influencing the outcome of events according to the crucial interests of the country and, in fact, of the international community.

This interlude contributed to conditions that averted the aggravated deterioration of East-West ties, as had occurred in U.S.-Soviet relations following the invasion of Afghanistan. It can be inferred that, consequently, there was no "Second Cold War," as many term these years, in Europe. Thus, the invasion of Afghanistan, in which the Warsaw Pact states were not involved, in fact helped amplify the notion of an East-Central Europe with a special identity significantly different from that of the Soviet Union. All these patterns, paradoxically, contributed to the gradual establishment of a common European consciousness, which had been evolving since the late 1960s.

During this period of serious tension at the superpower level—from the invasion of Afghanistan to the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985—Hungary served as

a model case by demonstrating how a small state, driven by its economic interest, while a "closely cooperating" member of the Warsaw Pact, could maintain and advance the policy of détente as if nothing had happened between the United States and the Soviet Union. In fact, these years brought a dynamic and prosperous era in developing the country's economic and political relations with the West. In 1982, Hungary was able to join the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, as early as 1981 exploratory talks had already begun concerning a potential agreement between Hungary and the European Community. These overtures stalled not from Moscow's pressure but because of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who worried about the potentially negative effect such a step might have on his own country's relations with the Soviet Union. The German chancellor explicitly talked Kádár out of this plan on his visit to Bonn in April 1982.<sup>28</sup> This period witnessed a general intensification of high-level relations with Western states. Kádár paid visits to Bonn and Rome already in 1977; to Paris in 1978; to Bonn again in 1982, and to London in 1985. In turn, Budapest received visits from French prime minister Raymond Barre in 1977, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1979, French president François Mitterrand in 1982, Vice President George Bush in 1983, and Helmut Kohl, Margaret Thatcher, and Bettino Craxi in 1984. Since Poland lost the sympathy of the Western states after the introduction of martial law in 1981, as did Romania due to its repressive policy, Hungary became the favorite in the eyes of the West as the most respectable country of the Eastern bloc.

With Gorbachev's rise to power in the Soviet Union, the new Soviet leadership became the primary advocate of dialogue between East and West. The initiating and moderating nature of Hungarian foreign policy remained but would now assume secondary importance in dramatically unfolding developments.<sup>29</sup>

## Notes

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3. Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne, and János M. Rainer, eds., *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents* (Budapest: Central European Univ. Press, 2002), xli-xlii.
4. On the invasion of Czechoslovakia see *The Prague Spring 1968*, comp. and ed. Jaromír Navrátil with Antonín Benčík, Václav Kurlík, Marie Michalíková, and Jitka Vondrová (Budapest: Central European Univ. Press, 1998).
5. For an account of Hungary's role and activity in the Warsaw Pact, see Csaba Békés, "Hungary in the Warsaw Pact, 1954-1989. Documents with an Introduction," *Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact*, 2003: www.isn.ethz.ch/php, accessed 12 Dec. 2003, and Csaba Békés, *Hungary and the Making of the CSCE Process, 1965-1970*, in *The Helsinki Process: A Historical Reappraisal*, ed. Carla Meneguzzi Rostagni (Padova, Italy: CEDAM, 2005), 29-44.
6. Odd Arne Westad, "Concerning the Situation in 'X': New Russian Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 8-9 (winter 1996/1997): 131.
7. Bulletin for the members of the Political Committee and the Secretariat on the talks of the deputy head of the HSWP Central Committee International Department in the United States and Canada: 23 Jan. 1980: MOL, M-KS 288 f. 5/791. 6.e.
8. President Johnson suggested the discussion of the following topics at the planned summit: Vietnam, the Middle East, and the issue of antimissile systems. Moscow agreed to the proposal and the meeting was to be held in Leningrad in October 1968, but it was eventually canceled. See Csaba Békés, *Európai Európában: Magyarország konfliktusok keresztülszélén, 1945-1990*, [From Europe to Europe: Hungary in the crossfire of conflicts, 1945-1990] (Budapest: Gondolat, 2004), 236; see also Anatóly Dobninn, *Confidence: Moscov's Ambassador to Six Cold War Presidents* (New York: Random House, 1995), 189-95.
9. Minutes of the HSWP Political Committee meeting on 8 Jan. 1980: MOL, M-KS-288.f. 5/790. 6.e.

10. Between 17 Dec. 1979 and 14 Jan. 1980, there was no meeting of the HSWP Secretariat either, so the operative bodies of the party did not discuss this issue before January 8. In spite of this, members of the top leadership must have talked about it unofficially at ad hoc meetings. It is most likely that the text of a telegram welcoming the new Afghan leadership right after the Soviet intervention was accepted at such a meeting.
11. Hafizullah Amin was foreign minister following the "revolution" in Apr. 1978; in Sept. he became prime minister. He was killed during the Soviet invasion on 27 Dec. 1979.
12. At the meeting of the NATO Council on 12 Dec. 1979 a so-called double resolution was adopted. On the one hand, it was decided that 108 Pershing 2 missiles and 464 ground-based robot planes would be deployed in Great Britain, the FRG, Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was called upon to start negotiations on the limitation of medium-range nuclear missiles. According to the resolution, in case such talks are not completed successfully by the end of 1983, the deployment of the Western missiles would be started.
13. Horn's report on his mission, as part of a collection of documents on Hungarian archival sources on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, was published in Békés, "Why Was There No 'Second Cold War' in Europe?" 209-11. Later Gyula Horn was foreign minister (1989-90) and prime minister (1994-98).
14. Information bulletin for the members of the Political Committee and the Secretariat on the talks of the Deputy Head of the International Department in the United States and Canada: 23 Jan. 1980: MOL, M-KS 288 f. 5/791. 6.e.
15. At the elections on 4 Nov. 1980, Republican candidate Ronald Reagan was elected president.
16. The status of most favored nation was granted to Hungary in a way that it had to be renewed by the U.S. Congress annually.
17. Minutes of the session of the HSWP Political Committee on 29 Jan. 1980: MOL, M-KS-288.f. 5/791. 6.e. The full text of the verbatim minutes, pertaining to this topic as part of a collection of documents on Hungary and the East-West crisis following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was published in Békés, *Miert nem lett második hidegháború Európában?* 24-50.
18. The Soviets approved the suggestion and postponed the military exercise to a later date, to July 1980.
19. Hungarian foreign minister Frigyes Paja eventually visited Bonn between 10 and 12 Sept. 1980.
20. Memorandum of conversation between János Kádár and Leonid Brezhnev, 4 July 1980: MOL, M-KS-288.f. 47/764. 6.e. Kádár emphasized, at this meeting, too, the great importance of preliminary consultation, while reminding the Soviet leader about the events that had taken place about half a year earlier: "At that time, the Afghan question was rather acute and we cancelled our visits to the West. At the time of the signal of the Soviet Union, there was only one week left before the date of our foreign minister's visit to the FRG. The FRG did not get offended by the cancellation, they came to the conclusion: 'it is clear, the Soviet Union has blocked everything.' However, we could have spared this in case of a more operative coordination. The conference of 'the six' is useful for avoiding such situations, too. We understand every word that makes sense, but we require consultation, otherwise we walk blindfolded, and this we cannot afford. If we coordinate our policies in time, no one could embarrass us."
21. Memorandum of conversation between Vadim Zagladin, first deputy head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, and Gyula Horn, deputy head of



the HSWP Central Committee Department of Foreign Affairs, on debates inside the Soviet leadership on issues of international politics; [16 July 1980]; MOL M-KS 288 f. 4/7/764.ó.e.

22. On the history of Hungarian foreign policy in this period see Békés, *Európpából Európába* and "Hungarian foreign policy in the Soviet alliance system, 1968–1989," *Foreign Policy Review* (Budapest) 3, no. 1 (2004): 87–127.

23. Minutes of the session of the HSWP Political Committee on 29 Jan. 1980; MOL, M-KS-288 f. 5/791.ó.e.; in Békés, *Miért nem lett második hidegháború? Európpabont?* 234–50.

24. For the substance of these debates see memorandum of conversation between Vadim Zagladin, first deputy head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, and Gyula Horn, deputy head of the HSWP Central Committee Department of Foreign Affairs, on debates inside the Soviet leadership on issues of international politics; [16 July 1980]; MOL M-KS 288 f. 4/7/764.ó.e. The English translation of the document was published as part of a collection of Hungarian archival sources on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in Békés, "Why Was There No 'Second Cold War' in Europe? 214–15.

25. Békés, "Why Was There No 'Second Cold War' in Europe?" 214.

26. Information bulletin for the Political Committee and the Secretariat concerning the oral reply of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to the message of János Kádár; 14 Feb. 1980; MOL, M-KS-288. f. 11./4512.ó.e.

27. Hungary made an attempt to join the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as early as 1967 but at that time this move was blocked by Moscow.

28. István Horváth, István Németh, . . . *És a falak leomlának: Magyarország és a nemzetegység (1945–1990)* [And the walls come down: Hungary and German Unity (1945–1990)] (Budapest: Magvető Kiadó) 1999, 173–76. Eventually the contract was made in 1988 and official relations between Hungary and the EBC were established.

29. Csabá Békés, "Back to Europe: The International Context of the Political Transition in Hungary, 1988–1990," in András Bozóki, ed., *The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy* (Budapest: Central European Univ. Press, 2002), 237–72.

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